MagríZ-Marrero v. UnióN De Tronquistas De P.R.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–1201 (ADC).
• Parties: Migdalia MAGRÍZ–MARRERO, Silvia Rivera–Torres, Plaintiffs, v. UNIÓN DE TRONQUISTAS DE PUERTO RICO, Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a Labor Organization, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

933 F.Supp.2d 234

Migdalia MAGRÍZ–MARRERO, Silvia Rivera–Torres, Plaintiffs,

v.UNIÓN DE TRONQUISTAS DE PUERTO RICO, Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a Labor Organization, Defendant.

Civil No. 10–1201 (ADC).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

March 27, 2013.

Linda Backiel, Linda Backiel Law Office, San Juan, PR, Barbara Harvey, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Jose E. Carreras–Rovir, Jose E. Carreras Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

AIDA M. DELGADO–COLON, Chief Judge.

Currently pending before the Court are Magríz–Marrero (“Magríz”) and Silvia Rivera–Torres' (“Rivera,” collectively “plaintiffs”) motions for summary judgment (ECF No. 82) and imposition of a permanent injunction against the Unión de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901 (“the Union” or “defendant”) (ECF No. 97). Also pending before the Court is plaintiffs' motion to strike defendant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 100.

I. Procedural History

On July 6, 2010, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against defendant, their Labor Union, requesting preliminary and permanent injunctions for alleged violations of Sections 101(a)(1) and (2) and 609 of the Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411–529. ¹ECF No. 11. After holding a hearing, the Court granted plaintiffs the requested preliminary injunction on February 18, 2011. ECF Nos. 66, 765 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.P.R.2011), 73. Specifically, the Court ordered that: (1) the Union was preliminarily enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs' exercise of full membership rights of members in good standing, including the right to attend and participate in meetings, to campaign and be nominated for Union office, and to have their names placed on ballots for Union office; (2) the Union was preliminarily enjoined from barring plaintiffs' names from nomination or election based on the disciplinary actions which underlie the present action; (3) the Union was preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the $10,000 fine imposed upon plaintiffs; (4) the Union was enjoined from prohibiting or impeding plaintiffs' reinstatement to their positions as stewards; and (5) the Union was preliminarily enjoined from imposing or threatening discipline against plaintiffs for exercising their rights to campaign and run for Union office or enforce their legal remedies challenging the Union's actions. ECF No. 66.

Currently pending before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction, which requests five types of relief, namely that: (1) they be reinstated to membership in good standing in their Union for as long as they continue to pay dues and meet the requirements of membership; (2) the Court vacate and nullify the $10,000 fines that were imposed against each of them; (3) plaintiffs maintain their eligibility as candidates for Union office and for the positions of stewards in their shops; (4) the Union be permanently enjoined from interfering in any way with the exercise of plaintiffs' full membership rights; and (5) the Union be permanently enjoined from threatening, intimidating or retaliating against plaintiffs for exercising their membership rights. ECF No. 82. The Union opposed the motion on several grounds, including mootness because the elections in which plaintiffs sought to participate have passed and that the Union has not, as yet, enforced the $10,000 fines against plaintiffs. ECF No. 89. Additionally, the Union claims that plaintiffs' arguments rest upon conduct that occurred after entry of the preliminary injunction. Id. Plaintiff filed a reply, arguing that the controversy is not moot, that the Court enjoys jurisdiction to enter a permanent injunction under the LMRDA and that such an injunction is appropriate here. ECF No. 91.

As a preliminary matter, the Court already determined that entry of a permanent injunction was inappropriate where plaintiffs had not prevailed on the merits of their underlying claims through a jury trial or successful motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 94. As a result, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which is also pending before the Court at this time. ECF No. 97. Defendant opposed the motion (

ECF

Nos. 98, 99

) and plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant's opposition for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (“Local Rule 56”) (ECF No. 100), as well as a reply (ECF No. 102).

II. Motion to Strike

The Court begins by addressing plaintiffs' motion to strike defendant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with Local Rule 56. SeeECF No. 100.

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (“Local Rule 56(c)”) mandates that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment submit an opposing statement of material facts, admitting, denying or qualifying facts propounded by the movant. D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(c). Along the same vein, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (“Federal Rule 56” or “Rule 56”) states that a party contesting a fact set forth by its adversary must support its assertion by citing to the record or demonstrating that the material cited does not establish the fact it is cited in support of. Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c).

Furthermore, the anti-ferreting subsection of Local Rule 56 provides that the Court has “no duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts.” D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e). Likewise the anti-ferreting provision of Federal Rule 56 states that the Court “need consider only the cited materials.” Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

Here, defendant failed to file any opposing statement of facts. Rather, defendant noted that it does not dispute the following: (1) any fact found or legal determination made by this Court in the Opinion and Order granting the preliminary injunction (ECF No. 66); (2) stipulations previously reached by the parties (ECF No. 37); (3) factual findings made by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) (ECF No. 831); or (4) the record developed during the preliminary injunction hearing (ECF No. 39). ECF No. 99. Defendant did broadly dispute all facts relating to post-preliminary injunction actions cited by plaintiffs in their motion for summary judgment and accompanying statement of uncontested material facts. Id. Defendant submitted a declaration of the Union Secretary Treasurer, Alexis Rodríguez (“the Rodríguez declaration”), in support of its opposition. ECF No. 98–1.

The Court finds that defendant's inclusion of the Rodríguez declaration without reference in any opposing statement of facts filed with the Court violates the anti-ferreting provisions of both Federal and Local Rules 56. Additionally, by failing to file an opposing statement of material facts citing to record evidence in support of its broad denial of plaintiffs' post-preliminary injunction facts, defendant has indeed run afoul of both Federal Rule 56(c) and Local Rule 56(c). However, the Court does not understand that plaintiffs' requested sanction of striking defendant's filings in opposition to summary judgment is the appropriate course. Both the Local Rule and the Federal Rule provide that the Court may deem admitted any fact not properly controverted. Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(e)(2); D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e). Additionally, both rules also allow the Court to disregard material that violates their respective anti-ferreting provisions. Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c)(3); D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e). Thus, the Court understands that striking the Rodríguez declaration and deeming admitted all of plaintiffs' properly-supported proposed material facts represents an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART plaintiffs' motion to strike (ECF No. 100).

III. Factual Background

Consistent with the summary judgment standard, the Court states the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir.2010); Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006). However, while the Court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party] ... [the Court] will not draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions or rank conjecture.” Vera, 622 F.3d at 26 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, the Court does not consider hearsay statements nor allegations presented that do not properly provide an accurate and specific reference to the record. See D.P.R.Civ.R. 56(e)(“The [C]ourt may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment. The [C]ourt shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced.”); see also Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (finding that, where a party fails to buttress factual issues with proper record citations, judgment against that party may be appropriate); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990)( “Hearsay evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.”).

As defendant failed to submit a statement of material facts, the facts contained in this section are derived primarily from plaintiffs' statement of material facts (ECF No. 97–1).² Although defendant waived objection to plaintiffs' proffered facts, the Court does not admit the facts wholesale, but, rather, includes only those facts properly supported by the cited evidentiary record and stipulations by the parties. Proposed facts unsupported by the material cited ³ or devoid of citation are not included in the Court's recitation of the facts below. Proposed facts based on inadmissible, unstipulated material is likewise excluded. Where necessary, the Court has supplemented plaintiffs' proposed facts with facts stipulated by the parties (ECF No. 37) and factual determinations made...