Maguire v. Municipality of Old Orchard Beach, Civ. No. 91-0095-P-C.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 91-0095-P-C.
• Citation: 783 F. Supp. 1475
• Parties: John F. MAGUIRE, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPALITY OF OLD ORCHARD BEACH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

783 F. Supp. 1475

John F. MAGUIRE, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPALITY OF OLD ORCHARD BEACH, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 91-0095-P-C.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

February 18, 1992.

Cynthia Dill, Thompson, McNaboe, Ashley & Bull, Portland, Me., for plaintiff.

Edward Benjamin, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Daniel Rapaport, Portland, Me., for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GENE CARTER, Chief Judge.

This case involves an action brought against individual Defendant police officers (hereinafter "individual Defendants") and their employer, the Town of Old Orchard Beach (hereinafter "the Municipality"), arising from several incidents involving Plaintiff John F. Maguire between October 23, 1988 and October 29, 1988. Plaintiff alleges common law causes of action under the Maine Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "MTCA") and violations of the federal and state constitutions.¹ With respect to federal constitutional violations, Plaintiff alleges violations of constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and brings his cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.²

The Court now has before it Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on September 24, 1991. The Court acts on the motion on the basis of the written submissions of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment must be granted if:

The pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has articulated the legal standard to be applied in deciding motions for summary judgment:

The movant must adumbrate `an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When that is accomplished, the burden shifts to the opponent to establish the existence of a fact issue which is both `material,' in that it might affect the outcome of the litigation, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976), and `genuine,' in that a reasonable jury could, on the basis of the pro-offered proof, return a verdict for the opponent. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir.1988). It is settled that the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations, but must adduce specific, provable facts demonstrating that there is a triable issue. `The evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.' Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). As the Supreme Court has said:

There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be entered.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-59, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-16.

Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 191-92 (1st Cir.1989).

The Court now looks to the supporting papers on the motions and the citations to materials of evidentiary quality in support of the issues which the Court must consider as a basis for its action upon the motion.

II. Facts

On October 23, 1988, Plaintiff, while driving, was stopped by Officer Norman Gendron of the Old Orchard Beach Police Department (hereinafter "Police Department"). Plaintiff appeared to Officer Gendron to be disoriented at the time.³ Officer Gendron radioed the Old Orchard Beach rescue unit for assistance. The rescue unit arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and Officers Allen Holmes and Danny Bruns arrived as back-up at the same time.

Plaintiff was taken from his car, restrained, and placed on a stretcher. He was then taken by rescue personnel in an ambulance to Southern Maine Medical Center (hereinafter "Medical Center") in Biddeford, Maine for immediate evaluation. After evaluation by a physician in the emergency room at the Medical Center, the medical staff determined that Plaintiff posed a likelihood of serious harm due to mental illness and was certified for emergency involuntary admission to the Augusta Mental Health Institute (hereinafter "AMHI"). That decision was authorized by the approval of the application for emergency involuntary admission to a mental hospital by a Justice of the Peace.

Plaintiff's vehicle was towed from the scene by the A-1 Towing Company of Old Orchard Beach to its holding yard. In checking the ownership and registration of the vehicle driven by Plaintiff at the time of the stop, Officer Gendron found Certificate of Title and Transfer of Title documents from the State of New Hampshire.⁴ Because Officer Gendron believed that the vehicle might be stolen, he directed personnel of A-1 Towing Company not to release the vehicle to anyone unless they could show documentation proving their ownership of the car.⁵

After Plaintiff was discharged from AMHI on October 25, 1988, he returned home, where he learned that his car had been towed to A-1 Towing. He went with a friend, William Schofield, to the towing yard. An employee of the A-1 Towing Company allowed him to take the car.⁶ After the release of the vehicle, the owner of the towing company called the Police Department to inform it that the car had been released without any proof of ownership.

Officer Gendron accompanied an A-1 tow truck to Plaintiff's house. The vehicle was located in front of Plaintiff's house. The A-1 Towing Company tow truck towed Plaintiff's vehicle back to its holding yard until Plaintiff provided ownership documents.⁷ The police did not have a warrant for the seizure of Plaintiff's vehicle.

Plaintiff later learned that his car had been towed by the A-1 Towing Company. He went to the Police Department and demanded the return of his vehicle. The police refused to return it to Plaintiff. The record shows, without dispute that, while at the police station, Officer Danny Bruns removed his night stick from his belt, placed it near Plaintiff's head, and threatened Plaintiff with physical harm if he mentioned the towing incident to anyone. Officer Bruns stated to Plaintiff, "I am going to put knots in your head if you say anything to anybody."

On October 29, 1988, Officers Keith Grandy and Todd Nadeau were dispatched to Plaintiff's home, along with Raymond Veir, the driver of an ambulance. The officers had been advised by Amy Levasseur, a social worker at the Bureau of Mental Health and Retardation, that Plaintiff had conveyed to her threats to take action against Old Orchard Beach police officers. Upon arriving at Plaintiff's house, Officer Grandy knocked on the door. Plaintiff opened the door slightly and asked what the officers wanted and whether they had a warrant. The officers responded that they did not have a warrant.⁸

Once Officer Grandy and Raymond Veir were inside Plaintiff's house, they noticed that Plaintiff was on the telephone.⁹ Mr. Veir then spoke on the telephone with someone involved with Plaintiff's mental health care.¹⁰ Upon hanging up, Mr. Veir advised Officers Grandy and Nadeau that Plaintiff was to be brought to the Medical Center for an immediate psychiatric evaluation in the emergency room. At the time of the call, the officers were not aware of the caller's specific identity. Officer Grandy stated that he knew from Mr. Veir, however, that the person who had directed this action was involved in Plaintiff's mental health care.

The officers then took Plaintiff from his home to the ambulance where they laid him face down on the ambulance gurney. Mr. Veir used a roll of gauze material to fashion restraints to secure Plaintiff to the gurney. Mr. Veir and the police officers placed the gurney into the ambulance.¹¹ Officer Nadeau rode in the ambulance to the Medical Center.

The Medical Center's Emergency Department Record stated that Plaintiff was "brought in by police;" that he was "accompanied by 3 OOB policemen." The Record also noted that Plaintiff's legs and arms were restrained,¹² and that he was "transported for evaluation regarding making homocidal sic threats to OOB P.D." Defendants' Statement, Exhibit 8.¹³ He was discharged from the Medical Center and admitted to Togus Veterans' Hospital (hereinafter "Togus") as an emergency involuntary commitment on the same night. After "several days of adequate self-control," Plaintiff was discharged from Togus on November 2, 1988.

Several months after his discharge, Plaintiff sought medical treatment at the Osteopathic Hospital of Maine and at Togus for recurring neck pain, which he attributed to the aforementioned incident of October 29, 1988. See Exhibits C-D.

III. Qualified Immunity under Section 1983

A. Standard

Defendants have raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to Plaintiff's section 1983 action. See Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, at 5; Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Issue of Qualified Immunity (hereinafter "Defendants' Memorandum") at 7. In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102...