Mahaffy v. Mahaffy
| Decision Date | 19 March 1884 |
| Citation | 18 N.W. 685,63 Iowa 55 |
| Parties | MAHAFFY ET AL. v. MAHAFFY |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Des Moines District Court.
THE plaintiffs are the children of William Mahaffy, deceased, and the defendant is his widow. This is an equitable action brought by the plaintiffs to enforce the specific performance of an ante-nuptial contract, entered into, as they allege between the said William Mahaffy and the defendant, in contemplation of marriage, whereby it was agreed between said parties that, in case she survived said Mahaffy, she should be paid out of his estate the sum of six hundred dollars with six per cent interest thereon from the date of his death, and that she would receive and accept this sum in lieu and stead of any dower right, or right of inheritance in his estate, and of any other right, title or interest which might accrue to her therein by reason of her marriage with him. They allege that the parties were married after this contract was entered into, and that William Mahaffy has since died intestate, and that, at the time of his death, he was the owner of a farm of one hundred and thirty acres, and personal property of the value of from two thousand five hundred to to three thousand dollars; that the administrator of his estate has tendered to defendant said sum of six hundred dollars with interest, as provided in the contract, but that she refuses to accept the same, and that she is in possession of, and asserts a right to continue to occupy, the portion of said farm which before his death was occupied by said William Mahaffy as a homestead.
The defendant admits that she was married to said William Mahaffy, and that he has died since the marriage, and that she has continued to occupy the homestead since his death. She also admits that, on the day of her marriage, she signed a paper or contract, which Mahaffy had procured to be prepared, but denies that its terms and conditions were as alleged by plaintiffs; and she alleges that her signature was obtained to said contract by fraud; that she was induced to sign it in ignorance of its contents and of her own rights in the premises, and without any opportunity being given her to inform herself as to her legal rights, or the effect of the instrument, and she prays that the contract may be canceled, or, if the contract shall be determined to be valid, that he right to occupy the homestead be established by the judgment.
The district court determined that the contract was valid and binding on the defendant, and that by it she had relinquished all dower right or right of inheritance in the estate, but that she was not divested of the right to occupy the homestead; and judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiffs appeal.
AFFIRMED.
Hall & Huston, for appellants.
J. T. Illick and J. C. Powers, for appellee.
I.
The first question which we are required to determine is one of practice. The appellee filed an additional abstract, in which it is denied that the ante-nuptial contract, or any copy of it, was attached to plaintiffs' petition as an exhibit, or at any time made a part of the pleadings or records of the case in the district court, or that it was offered or introduced in evidence on the trial; and it is claimed by appellee that it does not appear by the record, either that the execution of the contract was admitted in the pleadings, or that its execution or conditions were proved on the trial, and that, in the absence of the contract, we cannot consider or determine any of the questions arising in this case on its merits. If the case had been finally submitted on the abstract originally filed by appellant and the additional abstract filed by appellee, this position would undoubtedly be correct. But, after the additional abstract was filed by appellee, appellants suggested a diminution of the record, and had leave to amend the same. After obtaining this leave, they appeared in the district court and filed a motion to correct the record and minutes of the evidence taken on the trial. Defendant's counsel appeared to this motion, and, upon a hearing, the motion was sustained, and it was ordered that the record and minutes of the evidence be so corrected as to show "that, on the trial of said cause, the plaintiff sought to find and introduce as evidence the original ante-nuptial contract referred to in the pleadings, but, the same being mislaid and not being produced at the time, a copy of said ante-nuptial contract was found and produced by plaintiffs' attorney, and the counsel for defendant consented that said copy might be used instead of the original; that, by mistake or inadvertence, this consent was not noted by the short-hand reporter on his minutes; that, after all the evidence was concluded, the said copy of the ante-nuptial contract was read to the court as part of the evidence, the counsel on both sides discussed and considered said contract, and what was its proper construction, and that, when the case was submitted, the court took said copy and considered it as part of the evidence in the case, and the same was incorporated in full in the decree of the court, as shown by the record."
At the next term of this court, after this order was made in the district court, appellants filed an amended and supplemental abstract containing these proceedings; also, the judgment or decree of the district court, in which is incorporated what purports to be said ante-nuptial contract in full. Appellee now contends that we cannot consider this supplemental abstract; that appellant, having averred that the original abstract was correct, and having filed the certificate of the judge who tried the case, and of the short-hand reporter, to its correctness, cannot now be heard to assert the contrary. The original abstract shows that the evidence introduced on the trial was taken down by the official short-hand reporter of the court, and that his minutes or notes were at one filed with the clerk. "
The statute, section 3777, McClain's Code, makes these notes, when thus filed with the clerk, part of the record of the case, and we know of no reason why this record may not be amended or corrected by the court that made it, when it is ascertained in a proper proceeding that it does not fully or correctly embody the action or proceeding of which it was intended to be the record. It has been frequently held, it is true, that it is not competent to contradict the recitals in the bill of exceptions by affidavit, or by the certificate of the judge, as in Pearson v. Maxfield, 47 Iowa 135, cited by appellee, and in Dedric v. Hopson, 62 Iowa 562. But the difference between the holding in those cases and the question here presented is very apparent. There the offer was to contradict the recitals of the record by affidavit, or by the certificate of the judge. Here an additional record is presented, so amended and corrected by the proper court as that it embodies the action and proceedings which was had upon the trial. We think, therefore, that this supplemental abstract is properly before us as part of the record, and that the case must be determined on its merits.
II. Coming, then, to the merits of the case, the first question to be determined is whether this is a valid contract. It is not claimed by appellee that contracts of this character are not recognized by the law, or that they are not enforceable when they have been fairly entered into; but her claim is that, when she signed this contract, she did not know what rights or interest she would acquire by the marriage in the estate of her husband, and that she did not understand the force or effect of the instrument she signed. It is true that a court of equity will not enforce the specific performance of a contract against one who entered into the contract in ignorance of his rights as to any material matter involved in it; and this is specially true, if any undue advantage has been taken of his ignorance in this respect.
In this case, however, we are not satisfied by the evidence that appellee was ignorant of her rights when she signed the contract, or that any advantage was taken of her. The evidence shows that William Mahaffy was about sixty-nine years old when this contract was entered into; that he was an ordinarily well-to-do farmer, living on his farm, but having it cultivated either by hired help or by tenants; and that for a number of years, he had been unable to do much work, being in delicate health and suffering from some disease of the heart. Appellee at this time was about thirty-three years old, and had been living for some time in Mahaffy's family as a domestic. She was almost illiterate; was poor and depended on her own earnings for support, having neither home nor property,...
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