Mahan v. Austin

Decision Date13 December 2022
Docket Number2:22-cv-10489
PartiesTYRONE WILLIAM MAHAN, Plaintiff, v. K. AUSTIN, NP; N. STOKLEY-HAMDAN, NP; JOSHUA BUSKIRK, PA -C; CARMEN MCINTYRE, CMO; and CARMEN BUSSELL, BHCS, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HON GEORGE CARAM STEEH DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL (ECF No. 73)

HON PATRICIA T. MORRIS MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. RECOMMENDATION

For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND that this Court GRANT Defendants Dr. Carmen McIntyre-Leon, Karmen Bussell,[1] and Joshua Buskirk's Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), dismissing these Defendants WITH PREJUDICE. (ECF No. 73).

II. REPORT
A. Procedural and Factual Background

At the time of the events in question, Plaintiff was a prison inmate in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (“JCF”) in Jackson, Michigan. He alleges Eighth Amendment violations and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by various prison officials stemming from his quarantine placement in January 2021 following “close contact” with another prisoner testing positive for COVID-19. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8).

On March 28, 2022, the District Court summarily dismissed the following Defendants under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(c), 1915(e)(2), and 1915A(b): Thomas Cobb; Timothy Schubring; Sirena Landfair, Health Unit Manager (“HUM”); Austin, Hearing Investigator; C. Young, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor (“ARUS”); C. McCumber-Henry; Jimmy Jarrett, Deputy Warden, Tiffani Kisor, Assistant Deputy Warden (“ADW”); Stevenson, Correctional Officer (“CO”); and Brian Nichelson, CO. (ECF No. 7, PageID.42).

The Court declined to dismiss the following Defendants: N. Nagy, Warden of JCF; S. Bailey, Deputy Warden; J. White, ADW; R. Rurka, ADW; K. Austin, NP; N. Stokley-Hamdan, NP; Lt. Root, CO; Sgt. Haskett, CO; Sgt. Ferguson, CO; Officer Holzchu, CO; Joshua Buskirk, PA-C; Heidi Washington, Director of the MDOC; Carmen McIntyre-Leon, Chief Medical Officer (CMO); and Karmen Bussell. (Id., PageID.42-43).

On April 15, 2022, Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman ordered the case excluded from the pro se prisoner mediation program because Defendants K. Austin and N. Stokley-Hamdan, through their employer Corizon Health, declined to engage in mediation. (ECF No. 10, PageID.50). On July 13, 2022, the District Court adopted my recommendation to deny Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 19, 22, 44). On November 4, 2022, the District Court adopted my recommendation to grant the motion to dismiss by Defendants Washington, Nagy, Bailey, White, Rurka, Root, Heskett, Ferguson, and Hoszschu. (ECF Nos. 39, 69, 94).

The Complaint contains the following factual allegations.

On January 1, 2021, after coming into “close contact” with a prisoner testing positive for COVID-19, Plaintiff was taken from his level 1 security unit and placed in quarantine among prisoners from levels 2 to 4 security units. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8). Although Plaintiff tested negative for the virus the next day, he was forced to stay in the quarantine unit. (Id.) Plaintiff asked now-dismissed Defendant Nagy for a transfer out of the unit, to which Nagy responded that “his hands [were] tied” by a state policy implemented by current Defendants McIntyre and Buskirk. (Id.) Now-dismissed Defendant White also failed to intervene on Plaintiff's behalf, stating that the requested transfer would need to be cleared by current Defendant Bussell. (Id.) Now-dismissed Defendant Washington and current Defendant McIntyre “knew or should have known” that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm but disregarded the risk. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of being required to share the same living quarters with COVID-19 positive inmates, he suffered “emotional, mental and physical harm,” including becoming “obese from a[n] eating disorder, hair loss from stress, [and] thoughts of suicide.” (Id., PageID.11). He alleges that he later “caught the virus and refused treatment,”[2] adding that he experienced “breathing issue[s] and body pains from complications of the virus. (Id., PageID.12). He claims that he has been “mistreated, harassed, [and] threaten[ed] [with] continued incarceration. . .” (Id.) He requests monetary damages and costs.

B. Standard of Review

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, a plaintiff's complaint shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it lacks sufficient “factual matter (taken as true) to” provide “plausible grounds to infer” that the elements of a claim for relief could be met. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere labels, conclusory statements, or “formulaic recitations” of the elements of a cause of action are not sufficient to meet this burden if they are unsupported by adequate factual allegations. Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The requirement to provide a plausible claim does not require that a claim be “probable”; however, a claim must be more than merely “conceivable.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009).

Because Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se, his pleadings are liberally construed. Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). However, even pro se complaints must satisfy basic pleading requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

C. Analysis[3]
1. The Official Capacity Claims

Present Defendants, Buskirk, PA; Bussell, RN; and McIntyre, Chief Medical Officer of the MDOC, are sued in both their official and personal capacities.[4] They argue first that under they are entitled to absolute immunity from the claims for monetary damages brought against them in their official capacity. (ECF No. 73, PageID.1178-80).[5]

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no citizen of the United States shall commence a suit against any state. U.S. Const. amend. XI.; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). A suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is a suit against the entity he or she represents. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Defendants, working in various positions for the MDOC, are all state employees. Therefore, by suing Defendants in their official capacities, Plaintiff is effectively suing the State of Michigan. See Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 257, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit against a prison guard in his official capacity); Baskerville v. Blot, 224 F.Supp.2d 723, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a lawsuit against “corrections officers [and] nurses employed by the New York State Department of Corrections in their official capacities). The official capacity claims against Defendants for monetary damages are therefore barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

While the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits against states for purely injunctive relief, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908), the Complaint requests only monetary damages. (ECF No. 1, PageID.13). Moreover, the Complaint's allegations are limited to injuries that occurred in the first three months of 2021. The Ex parte Young exception “does not . . . extend to any retroactive relief.” Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 417, 2019 WL 2417390 (6th Cir. 2019). Because the Ex Parte Young exception allowing for suits against individuals in their official capacities for injunctive relief does not apply, the official capacity claims should be dismissed.

2. Qualified Immunity

Present Defendants also contend that the claims against them are barred by qualified immunity. (ECF No. 73, PageID.1180-84).

As a threshold matter, Defendants' arguments rely on exhibits attached to an earlier, now granted motion to dismiss by their former codefendants. (ECF Nos. 39, 39-5, 39-7, 39-12). “As a general rule, a court cannot consider matters outside the four corners of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 516 F.Supp.3d 711, 720, 393 Ed. Law Rep. 216, 2021 WL 351997 (E.D. Mich. 2021). However, [t]he court may . . . consider documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss if the documents are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims.” Id. The Complaint criticizes the MDOC Director's Office Memorandum (“DOM”) in effect at the time of the events in question and the CDC's guidance for the relevant period. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7). And the Court may consider “public records” in reviewing a motion to dismiss. Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the exhibits consisting of the applicable DOM and CDC protocols are both central to Plaintiff's claims and public records, the Court may consider them.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (1999) (quotation marks omitted).

In a § 1983 claim, [t]he first step is to determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Shumate v. City of Adrian Michigan, 44 F.4th 427, 439 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson at 232)....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT