Maher v. International Paper Co., Case No. 1:08-cv-212.

• Decision Date: 05 March 2009
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:08-cv-212.
• Citation: 600 F.Supp.2d 940
• Parties: Melinda MAHER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation, and Kate Dutrow, an individual, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

600 F.Supp.2d 940

Melinda MAHER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, a corporation, and Kate Dutrow, an individual, Defendants.

Case No. 1:08-cv-212.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 5, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William F. Piper, William F. Piper PLC, Portage, MI, for Plaintiff.

Kalyn D. Redlowsk, Kurt P. McCamman, Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone PLC, Kalamazoo, MI, Jessica A. Neal, International Paper Company, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Denying the Defendants' First Motion for Summary Judgment; Finding a Genuine Issue as to Whether the Alleged FMLA Violations Were Willful; Finding a Genuine Issue as to whether the Plaintiff's Claims are Timely

PAUL L. MALONEY, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Melinda Maher ("Maher") worked for defendant International Paper Company ("IPC") from October 2000 until her termination in March 2006, and the manager of the plant during the relevant period was defendant Kate Dutrow ("Dutrow"). Maher alleges that both IPC and Dutrow (collectively "IPC") violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"). IPC filed its first motion for summary judgment, Maher filed an opposition brief, IPC filed a reply brief, and the court held oral argument in January 2009. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny IPC's first motion for summary judgment, finding that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether IPC's alleged violation of the FMLA was willful. If a jury found that IPC violated the FMLA and did so willfully, Maher would be entitled to a 3-year statute of limitations rather than the FMLA's 2-year limitations period for non-willful violations.¹

BACKGROUND

Maher began working for IPC in October 2000. See First Amended Complaint filed April 2, 2008 ("Am Comp") ¶ 9. At that time, Maher received IPC's written no-fault absenteeism and tardiness policy, under which employees receive "points" when they arrive late, leave early, or take unexcused (non-FMLA) absences. She signed a document acknowledging her receipt and understanding of the policy. See Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed September 19, 2008 ("1st MSJ"), Ex. 2 (IPC Absenteeism and Tardiness Policy) and Ex. 3 (Acknowledgment Form signed by Maher on Oct. 13, 2000).

In March 2005, Maher's father was diagnosed with lung cancer; the cancer was metastatic and affected his brain, rendering him unable to use his legs. See Am Comp ¶ 11. Maher's parents were still married, but her mother used a walker and was unable to lift, move or dress the father, or do other needed tasks, such as taking him to medical appointments. Am Comp ¶ 12. At some unspecified time "[s]hortly after the diagnosis", Maher spoke with plant manager Dutrow and explained that she needed to care for her father, and asked for FMLA paperwork so that she could request intermittent leave for that purpose. Am Comp ¶¶ 13-14. Dutrow refused to give Maher the paperwork, telling her that she ineligible for FMLA leave because her parents were married and living together. Maher initially accepted Dutrow's statement as true. Am Comp ¶¶ 15-16.

IPC soon began assessing "points" against Maher, under its no-fault attendance system, when she was absent from work in order to care for her father. When Maher complained to an IPC Human Resources ("HR") representative about Dutrow's refusal to provide FMLA forms and the assessment of points, the HR representative merely shrugged his shoulders and said nothing. Am Comp ¶ 17. Maher then requested FMLA leave; in response, IPC did not ask her to certify her father's or her medical condition, and it neither approved nor denied the request. Am Comp ¶¶ 18-19. (Maher contends that IPC should not have needed to request certification in any event, because there was no reasonable basis to doubt that her father's condition was serious. Am Comp ¶ 20).

On September 28, 2005, Maher called Dutrow and said that she would be a few hours late because she needed to take her father to the doctor, and asked if the missed hours could be excused or made up later. Saying that Maher would not receive special treatment, Dutrow assessed a point against Maher under the attendance system. Am Comp ¶¶ 21-23. On the night of October 25 and the morning of October 26, 2005, corresponding with the start of Maher's third shift, her father had a bad night and was deteriorating, and she stayed with her parents to care for him and prepare him to go to the hospital. Because of Maher's emotional condition, she did not feel prepared to go to work, but she arrived at work, albeit late, after calling to explain she would be late. Dutrow refused to excuse the lateness and assessed another point against Maher under the attendance policy. Am Comp ¶¶ 24-27. Because Dutrow feared losing her job, she left her father to be transported to the hospital alone by ambulance, instead of riding with him or driving him herself. He died three days later, on October 29, 2005. Am Comp ¶¶ 28-29.

On March 10, 2006, Maher, who was pregnant, had a miscarriage. She missed several days of work due to the miscarriage, and informed IPC of the reason for the absences, yet IPC assessed at least one point against her attendance record. Am Comp ¶¶ 30-31. When Maher returned to work, she heard that IPC planned to fire her, so she went to Dutrow's office to verify what her coworkers had said. Dutrow allegedly said something to the effect of "I am going to fire you, but for now you have a job to do so go out there and do a good job and we will let you know when you are going to be fired." Am Comp ¶ 33. Several days later, on March 17, 2006, IPC terminated Maher, claiming that she had exceeded the number of points allowed under its no-fault attendance policy. Am Comp ¶ 32 and Maher Dep 125 & 127.

Maher filed the complaint on March 3, 2008. Maher alleges that if IPC had properly excused the absences related to her father's care and her miscarriage as FMLA absences, she would not have exceeded the number of points allowed under the no-fault attendance policy and would not have been terminated. Am Comp ¶¶ 34-35. Specifically, Maher alleges that the defendants wilfully and in bad faith improperly informed her of her FMLA rights, Am Comp ¶¶ 38 and 43-44; willfully and in bad faith interfered with and denied her FMLA rights, Am Comp ¶¶ 39-40 and 43-44; and willfully and in bad faith terminated her in retaliation for attempting to exercise her FMLA rights, Am Comp ¶¶ 41-44. Maher seeks compensatory damages for lost wages and benefits, and for past and future non-economic damages; equitable relief including an award of front pay; interest; and attorneys fees and costs. See Prayer for Relief following Am Comp ¶ 45.

LEGAL STANDARD: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper if the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Appalachian Railcar Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2008 WL 828112, *13 (W.D.Mich. Mar. 25, 2008) (Maloney, J.) ("ARS") (quoting Conley v. City of Findlay, 266 Fed.Appx. 400, 405 (6th Cir.2008)) (Griffin, J.) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)). The court is not to weigh the evidence or decide the truth of the matter. Totes Isotoner Corp. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union Council, 532 F.3d 405, 411 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Sterling China Co. v. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Local No. 24, 357 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir.2004)).

The movant has the burden of proving the absence of genuine issues of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. ARS, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___, 2008 WL 828112 at *13 (citing Conley, 266 Fed.Appx. at 404) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). However, the movant "need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials `negating' the opponent's claim"; rather, the movant's initial burden is only to "point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case...." Wilson v. Continental Dev. Co., 112 F.Supp.2d 648, 654 (W.D.Mich.1999) (Bell, J.) (citing Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir.1993)), aff'd o.b., 234 F.3d 1271 (6th Cir.2000).

Once the movant has met its burden, the non-movant must present "significant probative evidence" to demonstrate that there is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." ARS, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___, 2008 WL 828112 at *13 (citing Conley, 266 Fed.Appx. at 404 (quoting Moore, 8 F.3d at 339-40)). The non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings. Wilson, 112 F.Supp.2d at 654 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e) and Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir.1995)). Moreover, the mere existence of an alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; there be some genuine issue of material fact. ARS, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___, 2008 WL 828112 at *13 (citing Conley, 266 Fed.Appx. at 404 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986))).

The court must accept the non-movant's factual allegations, ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 691 (6th Cir.2007) (concurrence) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1334, 170 L.Ed.2d 59 (2008), and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Fox v. Eagle Dist. Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir.2007) (Richard Allen Griffin, J.).

Ultimately, "summary judgment is appropriate `against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element to that party's case, and on which that...