Maher v. People

• Decision Date: 21 May 1862
• Citation: 10 Mich. 212
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: William Maher v. The People

10 Mich. 212

William Maher v. The People

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 21, 1862

Heard April 19, 1862 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to Houghton District Court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of Christiancy J.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.

Buel & Trowbridge, for plaintiff in error:

1. Malice aforethought is the grand criterion which distinguishes murder from all other killings.

The quo animo, or state of mind under which the offense is committed, is always a legitimate subject of inquiry: Bish. Cr. L., § 227; 2 Ibid., § 616; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; 3 Inst. 107; Burr. Cir. Ev., 282 and n.

Accordingly, the appearance of an actual necessity for taking life in self-defense, though it in fact do not exist, may justify the act; insanity may excuse it, and sudden transport of passion may mitigate it to a lesser offense. Yet each of these circumstances is a state of the mind.

The definition itself of murder requires, that it be committed by a person of sound mind and memory, and with malice aforethought: 3 Coke's Inst., 47; 4 Bl. Com., 195. Each of these ingredients is a fact; each puts in issue the state of the mind, and each must be passed upon by the jury.

In a case of murder it is always a proper subject of inquiry, whether the accused acted from deliberation and intelligence; whether he had command of his passions and acted from a mind undisturbed; or whether reason had lost in part its sway: 2 Bish. Cr. L., §§ 630, 631 and n.; 1 East P. C., 222; Whart. Cr. L., §§ 983, 984; Burr. Cir. Ev., 284 and n.

It is a true test of manslaughter that the homicide be committed in a sudden transport of passion arising upon a reasonable provocation, and without malice. The law requires only a reasonable provocation. The authorities use the terms adequate, sufficient and reasonable, when applied to the provocation, as equivalent: 1 East P. C., 232; Whart. Cr. L., § 987; 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 630 and n.; 11 Humph. 200. A reasonable provocation, is one for which a good reason can be given, and which might naturally and rationally, according to the laws of the human mind, produce the alleged sudden transport of passion.

By sufficient cooling time, is meant a reasonable time; therefore, each case depends on its own circumstances: Whart. Cr. L., § 990; 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 641; 1 Speers 384. A reasonable cooling time, is that for which a good reason can be given, and in which the sudden transport of passion might naturally and rationally, according to the laws of the human mind, pass away.

2. Acting on information: "When it becomes a subject of inquiry whether a person acted bona fide, prudently or wisely, the information and circumstances on the faith of which he acted, whether true or false, are original and material evidence. This is often illustrated in actions for malicious prosecution:" Whart. Cr. L., § 663; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 101 and n. Such evidence bears directly upon the question of malice, and state of the prisoner's mind. In the following cases of alleged murder, the parties acted under provocation arising on information which was admitted in evidence: Cases of Jarboe, of Mercer, and of Norman, cited in Sickles' case; Boyley's case, 2 Cro. 296; Mc Whirt's case 3 Gratt. 594.

So evidence is often admitted of information communicated to the prisoner, of prior threats against him by the assailing party. See Pond's case, 8 Mich. 153.

3. As to the taking in the act; the law does not require that the husband stand by and actually see the adulterous act.

Adultery can always be proved by facts and circumstances. Those offered in this case transpired under the eyes of the accused; they tended to establish a taking in the act, within the meaning of the law. Would a blind man be without protection when his remaining senses leave no room for doubt?

A mistake may exist; still "the guilt of the accused must depend upon the circumstances as they appear to him." One may act in self-defense upon reasonable grounds for believing that the danger is actual and imminent, though he be mistaken: Pond's case, 8 Mich. 150.

So too, an insane delusion or belief may exist, as to unreal facts, which will justify or excuse a homicide committed under its influence, if, being real, they would have that effect: 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 295.

4. As to the res gestae: most of the matters offered and excluded immediately preceded the assault, tended to illustrate it, were directly connected with it as its cause, and with it constituted one continuing occurrence. They were, therefore, clearly admissible in evidence as belonging to the res gestae: Potter's case, 5 Mich. 5; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 108 and n.

They belong to the class of concomitant circumstances, which include those immediately following and preceding the criminal act, as well as those strictly contemporaneous with it: Burr. Cir. Ev., 368.

C. Upson, Attorney-General, for the people:

If a husband find his wife in the act of adultery, and, provoked by the wrong, instantly takes the life of the adulterer, the homicide is only manslaughter. But to entitle it to this tender consideration, the detection must be in the very act. In all cases the party must see the act done, and if, after merely hearing of, or suspecting such an outrage, the wronged individual immediately takes vengeance on the other, by pursuing and killing him, his offense is murder: Foster, 296; T. Raym., 212; 1 Vent. 158; 1 East. P. C., 234; 8 C. & P., 182; 2 C. & K., 814; 3 Gratt. 594; 8 Ired. Law, 330; 1 Russ. on Cr., 525 and 581; 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 638 and notes 2, 3 and 4; Whar. Cr. L., § 984 and n. a, 4th ed.

The books which speak of the slaying of the adulterer by the husband as only manslaughter under certain circumstances, all instance the case where he finds the adulterer in the act of adulterous intercourse with his wife, and immediately kills him; but none of the cases speak of thus justifying the killing of a person by the husband, on account of information or suspicion of acts of adultery committed with his wife. Most of them expressly say that in all such circumstances the killing would be murder.

See particularly on this point the language of the court in 8 Car. & P., 182, and 2 C. & K., 814, above quoted.

Christiancy, J. Martin, Ch. J. and Campbell, J. concurred. Manning, J. dissenting.

OPINION

Christiancy J.:

The prisoner was charged with an assault with intent to kill and murder one Patrick Hunt. The evidence on the part of the prosecution was, that the prisoner entered the saloon of one Michael Foley, in the village of Houghton, where said Hunt was standing with several other persons; that prisoner entered through a back door and by a back way leading to it, in his shirt sleeves, in a state of great perspiration, and appearing to be excited; and on being asked if he had been at work, said he had been across the lake; that, on entering the saloon, he immediately passed nearly through it to where said Hunt was standing, and, on his way towards Hunt, said something, but it did not appear what, or to whom; that as soon as the prisoner came up to where Hunt was standing, he fired a pistol at Hunt, the charge of which took effect upon the head of Hunt, in and through the left ear, causing a severe wound thereon; by reason of which Hunt in a few moments fell to the floor, was partially deprived of his sense of hearing in that ear, and received a severe shock to his system which caused him to be confined to his bed for about a week, under the care of a physician; that immediately after the firing of the pistol prisoner left the saloon, nothing being said by Hunt or the prisoner. It did not appear how, or with what, the pistol was loaded. The prisoner offered evidence tending to show an adulterous intercourse between his wife and Hunt on the morning of the assault, and within less than half an hour previous; that the prisoner saw them going into the woods together about half an hour before the assault; that on their coming out of the woods the prisoner followed them immediately (evidence having already been given that the prisoner had followed them to the woods); that, on their coming out of the woods, the prisoner followed them and went after said Hunt into the saloon, where, on his arrival, the assault was committed; that the prisoner on his way to the saloon, a few minutes before entering it, was met by a friend who informed him that Hunt and the prisoner's wife had had sexual intercourse the day before in the woods. This evidence was rejected by the court, and the prisoner excepted. Was the evidence properly rejected? This is the main question in the case, and its decision must depend upon the question whether the proposed evidence would have tended to reduce the killing--had death ensued--from murder to manslaughter, or rather, to have given it the character of manslaughter instead of murder? If the homicide--in case death had ensued--would have been but manslaughter, then defendant could not be guilty of the assault with intent to murder, but only of a simple assault and battery. The question therefore involves essentially the same principles as where evidence is offered for a similar purpose in a prosecution for murder; except that, in some cases of murder, an actual intention to kill need not exist; but in a prosecution for an assault with intent to murder, the actual intention to kill must be found, and that under circumstances which would make the killing murder.

Homicide, or the mere killing of one person by another, does not, of itself, constitute murder; it may be murder, or manslaughter, or excusable, or justifiable homicide, and therefore entirely innocent, according to the circumstances, or the disposition or state of mind or purpose, which induced the...