Mahers v. Harper, 92-1767
| Decision Date | 01 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-1767,92-1767 |
| Citation | 12 F.3d 783 |
| Parties | Ronald A. MAHERS, Appellee, v. Charles HARPER; Ken Wittry; Ronald Welder; Paul W. Grossheim, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
R. Andrew Humphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, argued, for appellants.
Robert D. Sharp, Des Moines, IA, argued, for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, LAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Ronald A. Mahers, a prisoner at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP), brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) alleging that defendants Charles Harper, Disciplinary Chairperson at ISP; Kenneth Wittry, Administrative Assistant at ISP; Ronald Welder, Executive Assistant at ISP; and Paul W. Grossheim, Deputy Director of Institutions at the Iowa Department of Corrections, 1 violated his due process rights by disciplining him under the wrong disciplinary rule. Defendants appeal from the District Court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. We reverse.
In April 1985, Mahers was required by the appropriate prison officials to provide a urine sample for analysis, and the sample tested positive for marijuana. He was written up for a violation of Rule 9 of the disciplinary regulations at ISP. Rules, Regulations and Disciplinary Procedures for the government of the Iowa State Penitentiary Inmates ("the Blue Book"). Rule 9 is a class I offense for "Possession of Dangerous Contraband" and is violated "when the inmate possesses, uses, or has under the inmate's control or in the inmate's custody an item defined as dangerous contraband." App. at 25. The Blue Book defines dangerous contraband as:
A firearm, knife, bludgeon or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which is readily capable of causing or inducing fear of death or serious physical injury or any flammable substance or incendiary device. Includes altering of authorized property (such as razors) for purpose of weapon.
At the disciplinary hearing, Mahers was found to have violated Rule 9 based on the positive urine analysis. He was punished with ten days of disciplinary detention, loss of sixteen days of good time, and fifteen days of administrative segregation. Mahers' appeals through administrative channels were denied.
In June 1986, Mahers filed this lawsuit, which was stayed until Mahers had exhausted his state court remedies. See Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir.1987). Following the stay, Mahers filed an action for post-conviction relief in Lee County District Court in Iowa, alleging due process violations stemming from the disciplinary proceedings at ISP. The state court found that there was a due process violation because even though testing positive for marijuana is a violation of ISP rules, it does not fall within the definition of Rule 9. The court ordered Mahers' good time restored and his record expunged of this violation. No appeal was taken from the decision of the state court.
After the state court litigation ended, Mahers was given another prison disciplinary report based on the original urine sample and charged with violating Rule 29--"Being Intoxicated or Under the Influence." Rule 29 is violated when "the inmate uses or is found to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, dangerous drugs, and intoxicants." App. at 28. The Blue Book includes marijuana in its definition of dangerous drugs. App. at 23. Rules 9 and 29 are both class I offenses; Mahers was found to have violated Rule 29 and sanctions were imposed identical to those imposed on the Rule 9 violation, with credit for time served on the Rule 9 violation.
The stay of this action having been lifted upon the District Court's determination that Mahers had exhausted his state court remedies, Mahers filed a motion for summary judgment and defendants responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, of qualified immunity. 2 The District Court granted Mahers' motion and denied defendants' cross-motion. This appeal followed.
Initially, we note that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment, and therefore it ordinarily is not appealable. Wright v. South Ark. Regional Health Ctr., Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir.1986). In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), however, the Supreme Court held that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." This exception exists because qualified immunity provides "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and ... is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, so defendants have the burden of pleading and proving the defense. Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir.1982).
Generally, prison officials may rely on the defense of qualified immunity to protect them from liability for civil damages. Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 165 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1156, 107 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1990). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that, in order for officials to lose their qualified immunity, their conduct must violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." In order for a person to have a clearly established right, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The test "focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.
The District Court concluded that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because it was not reasonable for defendants to believe that a positive urine test gave rise to a Rule 9 violation--possession of dangerous contraband. Furthermore, based on the state court opinion, the District Court found that defendants were bound by the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating the issue of...
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