Maholanyi v. Safetouch of Tampa, Inc.

Decision Date05 July 2016
Docket NumberCase No. 3:14-cv-1161-J-32JRK
PartiesANDRAS MAHOLANYI, Plaintiff, v. SAFETOUCH OF TAMPA, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
ORDER

SafeTouch, a company providing security systems and related services, hired Drew Maholanyi1 as the branch manager of its Tampa, Florida office. Eighteen months later, they fired him and replaced him with a younger individual. Maholanyi filed this action against SafeTouch alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. SafeTouch filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Maholanyi filed a response and, with leave of Court, SafeTouch filed a reply, and Maholanyi filed a surreply. (Docs. 26, 32, 36, 37.) On February 11, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the record of which is incorporated herein. Following the hearing, the case was administratively closed while the parties engaged in settlement discussions. After asettlement conference with the Magistrate Judge resulted in impasse, SafeTouch moved to reopen the case and for consideration of its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 49.)

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2010, Bruce Allen, General Manager of SafeTouch Security, contacted Maholanyi about becoming the branch manager of SafeTouch's Tampa, Florida location. (Doc. 32 at 2.) Allen and Maholanyi knew each other from previous work in the security industry. (Id.; see also Maholanyi Dep. 40:4-16; Allen Dep. 10:17-11:10 (Doc. 25-5).)

Maholanyi accepted the position and worked as the Tampa branch manager from approximately January 3, 2011 to July 15, 2012. (Doc. 2 at 2; Doc. 32 at 3.) Fifteen to twenty employees reported to Maholanyi, and his duties consisted of sales; recruiting, hiring, training, and motivating salespeople; managing the day-to-day office operations, which included daily sales meetings and distributing sales leads; and attending quarterly branch manager meetings in Jacksonville, Florida. (Doc. 32 at 3.) According to Maholanyi, he broke sales records, was commended for doing a good job, received monthly performance bonuses, and received a raise in June 2012. (Id. at 4.) However, in July 2012, at Allen's direction, SafeTouch's marketing manager, James Salvatore, informed Maholanyi that SafeTouch needed to "make a change," and Maholanyi resigned in lieu of termination. (Doc. 32 at 5; Doc. 2 at 2-3.) Maholanyi then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and received a right-to-sue letter. (Doc. 2 at 2; Doc. 25-3 at 2-4.)

Maholanyi alleges that he was subject to hostility, treated poorly, and discharged because of his age (Doc. 2 at 3); as a result, he seeks general, compensatory, punitive, and liquidated damages; equitable relief; and attorneys' fees and costs. (Doc. 2 at 4-5.) SafeTouch denies the allegations and asserts that Maholanyi was terminated2 due to his poor performance, not his age. (Doc. 26.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper "when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The movant bears the burden of showing the absence of dispute as to material facts, and upon such a showing the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine dispute exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party, and all inferences drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. ANALYSIS3

The purpose of the ADEA is to "prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment," 29 U.S.C. § 621(b), and, relevant here, the statute "prohibits employers from firing employees who are forty years or older because of their age," Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). "To assert an action under the ADEA, an employee must establish that his age was the 'but-for' cause of the adverse employment action[,]" which can be done using direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009), and Mora v. Jackson Mem'l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).

"Direct evidence is that which establishes discriminatory intent without inference or presumption. But '[o]nly the most blatant remarks whose intent could only be to discriminate on the basis of age constitute direct evidence.'" Morrison v. City of Bainbridge, Ga., 432 F. App'x 877, 880 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 1993)) (citation omitted). By contrast, "[i]f the alleged statement suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory motive, then it is circumstantial evidence." Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir.1997)). Here, the Court does not find direct evidence of discrimination,4 and therefore will evaluate Maholanyi's claims within the framework for circumstantial evidence.

In determining whether there is circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, courts apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1298. Under this framework, an employee must first establish a prima facie case, which creates a presumption of discrimination. Id. "Once an employee has established a prima facie case, 'the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.' If the employer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's reason is a pretext." Id. (quoting Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012)) (citation omitted).

A. Maholanyi has established a prima facie case of age discrimination

"To make a prima facie case of age discrimination, the employee must show: (1) he was a member of the protected group between the age of forty and seventy; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) a substantially younger person filled the position from which he was discharged; and (4) he was qualified to do the job from which he was discharged." Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1298 (citing Kragor, 702 F.3d at1308). SafeTouch concedes that Maholanyi was a member of the protected age group, subjected to adverse employment action, and replaced by someone substantially younger. (Doc. 26 at 13.) Thus, the only disputed factor is whether Maholanyi was qualified to serve as branch manager.

"In assessing a plaintiff's qualification for a position, [courts] examine his skills and background," and long tenure at a position permits an inference of qualification. Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1299 (citing Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999)). SafeTouch contends that Maholanyi was not qualified for the branch manager position because he failed to increase the Tampa branch's new unit sales,5 and his eighteen-month tenure was too short to support an inference that he was qualified. (Doc. 26 at 13, 15-16.)

While there appears to be no bright-line minimum length of employment to warrant the inference of qualification, courts are divided as to whether a tenure of several months is long enough. Compare Aldabblan v. Festive Pizza, Ltd., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (employee who had been in position approximately seven months was not entitled to inference of qualification), and Brockman v. Avaya,Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1253-54 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (ten and a half month tenure, standing alone, did not warrant inference of qualification), with Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1305 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (ten month tenure was sufficient for court to infer employee was qualified). However, it is undisputed that Maholanyi has over twenty years' experience in the security industry. (Maholanyi Dep. 40:6-7.) His prior experience, which includes a position as a branch manager for a different security company, may be considered in determining whether he was qualified to serve as SafeTouch's Tampa branch manager. Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1299; see Brockman, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 1253-54 (although ten and a half month tenure in position, standing alone, did not warrant inference of qualification, when considered with her prior work in the industry employee met her burden to demonstrate she was qualified); Brown v. Sybase, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (ten month tenure in position plus prior experience in industry was sufficient evidence that employee was qualified).

In fact, Allen recruited Maholanyi for the branch manager position because he believed Maholanyi was qualified based on his experience and background. (See Allen Dep. 98:11-14 ("I believed he was very qualified because he had been a branch manager of four branches, one of those companies actually hired him to teach all of their branch managers how to be a branch manager."); id. at 67:10-12 ("I picked Drew. I chased him twice. I called him -- before I hired him this time, I tried to hire him another time. I felt like Drew was my man.").) Salvatore also thought Maholanyi was qualified. (See Doc. 25-14 at 3 ¶ 4 ("Based on what I knew of Mr. Maholanyi and hisprior experience, I...

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