Mahon v. Gormley
| Decision Date | 12 December 1854 |
| Citation | 24 Pa. 80 |
| Parties | Mahon <I>versus</I> Gormley. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Mellon and Negley, for plaintiffs in error.—The Court below was of opinion that the wife should have stated in her affidavit the purpose for which the money was borrowed; and that, this not having been done, it might be inferred that it was borrowed in the management of her separate estate. But, under the pleadings, it was not considered, on part of defendants, necessary to state that this was not the case, or that the debt was not contracted for necessaries. Reference was made to the case of Williams and Wife v. Coward and Wife, Legal Journal, July 22, 1854; and to the Act of 25th April, 1850.
Slagle, for defendants in error.—The Act of 1848 has effected a radical change in the condition of a feme covert. In respect of her separate estate she is to be considered as a feme sole: 1 Jones 272, Cummings' Appeal; 1 Harris 480, Goodyear v. Rumbaugh and Wife; 4 Id. 134, Sheidle v. Weishlee. It is not imperative, by the Act of 1850, that a feme covert should manage her estate through a trustee.
The rule of Court requires a specific affidavit of defence.
The opinion of the Court was delivered, December 12, by LEWIS, J.
The Act of 11th April, 1848, "to secure the rights of married women," was intended for their protection, not for their injury, and must receive such a construction as shall promote that object. It may occasionally be necessary, in order to carry out the intent of the statute, that a married woman should be able to bring suits in her own name for rights which belong to her: 1 Harris 480; 4 Harris 134. And there are cases in which suits may be sustained against her for the purpose of charging her estate with the liabilities thrown upon her by the Act, or necessarily resulting from the privileges conferred by it. But it was not intended to clothe her with the unlimited power of a feme sole, so that she might embark in trade, incur liabilities without her husband's consent as surety for strangers, or borrow money for speculations at usurious rates. In her dependent condition, with duties which preclude and habits which unfit her for out-door business of life, to give her these extensive powers would be an injury instead of a benefit to her, and would be altogether at variance with the benevolent purposes of the legislature. The statute is in derogation of the common law, and must therefore be strictly confined to the objects plainly expressed or necessarily implied. The marital relation, with its rights and duties, are not abrogated. They remain as before except in the particulars necessarily changed by the Act. She has the right to "own, use, and enjoy her estate as her own separate property;" but it has been decided...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Krueger v. Nicola
...agree in a case like this is not a mere technical one: ROGERS, J., in Clark v. Partridge, 2 Pa. 13. Assuming, on the authority of Mahon v. Gormley, 24 Pa. 80, Murray et al. v. Keyes et ux., 35 Pa. 384, that a material defect in a narr. may be cured by a replication, to be regarded as an ame......
-
Baker v. The Singer Manuf'g Co.
...be cured by collateral proof of consideration? We think not. We may say of the act of 1872 as was said of the act of 1848 in Mahon v. Gormley, 24 Pa. 80, a married woman is thereby vested with the unlimited powers of a feme sole; the power is exceptional, hence the plaintiff must by his ple......