Mahoney v. Beacon Health Ventures

• Citation: 585 F.Supp.3d 1161
• Decision Date: 14 February 2022
• Docket Number: Cause No. 3:19-CV-1130-RLM
• Parties: Lynn MAHONEY, Plaintiff, v. BEACON HEALTH VENTURES, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

585 F.Supp.3d 1161

Lynn MAHONEY, Plaintiff,
v.
BEACON HEALTH VENTURES, et al., Defendants

Cause No. 3:19-CV-1130-RLM

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

Signed February 14, 2022

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Eric J. Hartz, Meghan U. Lehner, Cleveland Lehner Cassidy, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Myra R. Reid, Peter J. Agostino, Stephanie L. Nemeth, Anderson Agostino & Keller PC, South Bend, IN, for Defendant Saint Joseph County Police Department.

OPINION AND ORDER

Robert L. Miller, Jr., United States District Judge

This case is about a Facebook post. Lynn Mahoney worked as a nurse manager for Beacon Health Ventures and was assigned to provide nursing services at the St. Joseph County Jail and Juvenile Justice Center, which are run by the St. Joseph County Police Department. After Ms. Mahoney published a controversial Facebook post, the St. Joseph County Police Department had her removed from the jail and Beacon Health Ventures fired her. Ms.

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Mahoney sued Beacon Health Ventures and the St. Joseph County Police Department for First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy to deprive her of constitutional rights. She also sued the St. Joseph County Police Department for tortious interference with a business relationship. Beacon Health Ventures moved for summary judgment on both counts, [Doc. No. 48], and the St. Joseph County Police Department moved for summary judgment on all three counts, [Doc. No. 53]. The court heard oral argument on the motions on February 8, and now grants Beacon Health Ventures’ motion for summary judgment and grants in part and denies in part the St. Joseph County Police Department's motion for summary judgment

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we accept the non-movant's evidence as true and draw all inferences in his favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, the nonmoving party it not entitled to "[i]nferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture." Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008). The existence of an alleged factual dispute, by itself, won't defeat a summary judgment motion; "instead, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal," Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012), and "must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

It is June 14, 2019. Lynn Mahoney sees a news report about a white police officer following and confronting a pregnant black woman and her daughter in Phoenix, Arizona. The news report shocks Ms. Mahoney, who then posts a link to the report on her personal Facebook account and says this about it:

"And nobody can figure out why these people hate cops? What in the actual fuck is wrong with these testosterone filled assholes? A fucking TODDLER picked up a 99cent doll and walked out of the store with it and the cop follows them home and charges at the pregnant mother with his gun drawn??? Fuck that piece of shit ... I hope to fuck he gets fired .. Wait, she was black, he was white .. Ain't shit gonna happen to him, who am I kidding? This country is fucked ..."

This post becomes a problem because Ms. Mahoney has been a manager of jail health services for the St. Joseph County Jail since 2015. Ms. Mahoney manages the budget, oversees nursing staff and schedules, and works with the warden to administer health care to inmates safely.

Ms. Mahoney isn't a county employee. She actually works for Beacon Health Ventures, which has a contract with the St. Joseph County Police Department dating back to 1994 by which it provides health care services at the St. Joseph County Jail and Juvenile Justice Center. Beacon provides staff, the jail provides medical equipment, and Beacon and the jail split the expenses for equipment. Beacon staff assigned to the jail must follow both Beacon's policies and the jail's policy manual.

Still on June 14, a jail employee shows a printout of Ms. Mahoney's post to Warden Julieanne Lawson. Warden Lawson played

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a role in Ms. Mahoney getting her position at the jail: as part of Beacon's hiring process in 2018, Ms. Mahoney met with Warden Lawson, and William Redman, who later was elected sheriff of St. Joseph County in 2018. They gave positive feedback about Ms. Mahoney, and Beacon wouldn't have hired Ms. Mahoney without their approval.

Warden Lawson doesn't watch the video, but is quite unhappy with the post. She brings the post to the attention of Sheriff Redman and other managers at the jail and County Police Department. Sheriff Redman and Warden Lawson consider the post inappropriate and offensive to all law enforcement officers. On June 19, Warden Lawson tells Beacon to remove Ms. Mahoney from the jail and that Ms. Mahoney is no longer welcome there. Elizabeth Walker, Beacon's Director of Professional Services and Business Development, goes to the jail and removes Ms. Mahoney without looking at the post.

Ms. Mahoney has already made plans to move from the jail to another position with Beacon. She interviews for a new position the day before her removal from the jail, and expects to do a job shadow for the new job on June 21. On June 20, the person she interviewed with calls Ms. Mahoney with news that he can no longer pursue her application for the new job. On June 25, Beacon sends Ms. Mahoney a letter terminating her employment with Beacon as of June 19, the day she was removed from the jail.

Ms. Mahoney sues both Beacon and the County Police Department for First Amendment retaliation under § 1983 (Count I) and conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights under § 1983 (Count II). She also sues the County Police Department for tortious interference with a business relationship (Count III). Both defendants seek summary judgment on all claims.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Beacon's motion for summary judgment.

1. First Amendment retaliation (Count I)

Beacon moves for summary judgment on Ms. Mahoney's First Amendment retaliation claim, arguing that it performed no state action, so it isn't bound by the First Amendment and can't be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ Ms. Mahoney concedes that Beacon isn't a state actor per se but responds that Beacon can still be liable under the First Amendment and § 1983 because it was a de facto state actor.

The First Amendment limits government interference with speech, but not private interference, so First Amendment retaliation claims generally only apply against public employers, not private employers. See Yatvin v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 1988). An exception to this rule is when challenged private action has a "sufficiently close nexus" to the state so that the challenged action can be fairly considered an action of the state itself. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). Although courts have created several tests for evaluating whether a private action is de facto state action, the tests are "susceptible to semantic variations, conflations and significant overlap in practical application," and they "lack rigid simplicity." Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing

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Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 294, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) ). One test, the traditional, exclusive public function test, finds de facto state action when a private actor performs a function traditionally reserved to the state and only to the state. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) ; Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 354, 95 S.Ct. 449. Another, the symbiotic relationship test,² finds de facto state action when the state has "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with a private actor such that they're considered the same. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). A third, the state command test, finds de facto state action when the state compels the private party to take the challenged action. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928. Ms. Mahoney argues that Beacon is a de facto state actor under any of the three tests.

A non-state actor can be considered a state actor under the traditional exclusive public function test if the actor performs a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352, 95 S.Ct. 449. For instance, courts have found state action when private parties ran primary elections, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932), owned and operated towns, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946), established a city park, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966), and provided health care to prisoners, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). It's not enough that the action is something that the state does—the function must be something traditionally done by, and only by, the state. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159–161, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). A court applying this test must focus on the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S....