Mahoney v. Shinpoch

• Citation: 732 P.2d 510,107 Wn.2d 679
• Decision Date: 12 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 52943-4,52943-4
• Parties: Laura MAHONEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Respondent, v. A.N. SHINPOCH, Secretary of Washington Department of Social and Health Services, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

Page 679

107 Wn.2d 679

732 P.2d 510

Laura MAHONEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly

situated, Respondent, v. A.N. SHINPOCH, Secretary of Washington Department of Social and Health Services, Appellant.

No. 52943-4.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Feb. 12, 1987.

Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Charles F. Murphy, James R. Watt, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for appellant.

Evergreen Legal Services, Judith Klayman, Barbara Isenhour, Seattle, for respondent.

PEARSON, Chief Justice.

This case grows out of a challenge to rulemaking instituted by the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The plaintiff, a class of public assistance recipients, sought declaratory and injunctive relief through the invalidation of a DSHS rule reducing certain state-funded benefits. After cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff class, and it is from that order that DSHS appeals. This court accepted certification pursuant to RCW 2.06.030, and we affirm.

FACTS

The State of Washington provides public assistance to needy blind, elderly, and disabled persons in the form of State Supplemental Payments (SSP). Although the assistance is funded by the State, it is administered by the federal Social Security Administration in conjunction with the distribution of federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. DSHS is charged with informing the Social Security Administration of those SSI recipients who are to receive the State's SSP benefits, and the federal agency then distributes both benefits in a single check.

Congress provided that, effective January 1, 1986, recipients of the federal SSI benefits would receive a Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) increase of approximately 3 percent. In 1983, Congress had passed amendments to the Social Security Act permitting states to reduce their SSP benefits by part or all of the amount of federal COLA increases in SSI benefits, as long as the SSP benefits did not fall below an established floor. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(f), (g) (Supp.1982). DSHS contends that in its 1985 session the Washington Legislature took advantage of the amendments and reduced its own benefits, the SSP benefits, by the amount of the SSI COLA increase. As a consequence, persons receiving both the SSI and SSP benefits could expect to see virtually no net change in their benefit checks, the SSP reduction cancelling out the SSI COLA increase. The State, however, would realize a $6-$8 million savings.

The working papers prepared by the Senate and House Ways and Means Committees and the Governor's proposed budget contain indications of an intent to reduce SSP benefits by the amount of the federal COLA increase. There was no floor debate on the reduction, and the appropriations bill did not expressly address the SSP benefits, although it did expressly specify changes in several other benefits. See Laws of 1985, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 6, § 208, p. 2333. The bill consisted primarily of a lump sum appropriation to DSHS for its income assistance programs, with no mention of individual line item amounts for the various categories of benefits.

On October 18, 1985, pursuant to rulemaking procedures, DSHS filed notice of its intent to adopt a rule reducing the SSP benefits by a maximum of 3.5 percent. The notice indicated that a hearing would be held on November 26, 1985 to allow public comment on the intended reduction and that written comments should be submitted on or before that date. The notice also indicated that a formal decision on adopting the rule would take place on December 2, 1985. On November 7, 1985, 20 days after the notice was filed but 19 days before the hearing, DSHS wrote to the Social Security Administration that "the state is opting to revise the SSP per the Social Security Amendments of 1983." Subsequently, but also prior to the November 26 hearing, the Social Security Administration notified SSP recipients that their 1986 benefits would reflect DSHS' intended reduction.

Prior to the hearing, DSHS received a letter submitted by Evergreen Legal Services, an organization representing a large number of SSP recipients. The letter argued against the proposed rule, claiming that the reduction would cause hardship to needy elderly and disabled persons. No oral testimony was presented at the November 26 hearing. The final rule was filed with the code reviser on December 5, 1985, in substantially the same form in which it had been proposed. The rule became effective January 1, 1986. See WSR 85-21-068; WAC 388-29-295.

The benefits in dispute here cover a period between January and April, 1986. At the time it appealed the trial court's grant of plaintiff's summary judgment motion, DSHS initiated additional rulemaking--both emergency and permanent--to implement the SSP reduction. That rulemaking was the subject of a second lawsuit ¹ which resulted in the validation of the reduction. The benefits in the instant case, then, cover only the 4-month period between January 1, 1986 and the adoption of the emergency rule.

I

DSHS raises two issues in this appeal: whether the rulemaking implementing the SSP reduction fell within the dominion of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and, if it did, whether the rulemaking was in compliance with the APA. Although we will address each of these issues, we note that the second issue is essentially a factual determination that has been settled by the Narrative Report of Proceedings signed by the trial judge.

The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment order is de novo; that is, the appellate court conducts the same inquiry as the trial court. See Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Global Northwest Ltd., Inc., 105 Wash.2d 878, 719 P.2d 120 (1986); Hartley v. State, 103 Wash.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).

The first issue is whether DSHS was required to follow the rulemaking procedures set forth in the APA, RCW 34.04, when it promulgated the rule effectuating the SSP reduction. The facts here are not in dispute, and thus we must determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This court has held that in certain limited circumstances agency rulemaking is exempt from the APA's requirements. Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wash.2d 591, 589 P.2d 1235 (1979). Rulemaking involving program funding is exempt when (1) the program is exclusively state-funded and state-administered; (2) the Legislature enacted "an express absolute limitation" on expenditures for the program; and (3) the limitation has been reached and the funds totally expended. Pannell, at 602, 589 P.2d 1235. By setting an absolute limit on the disbursement of an appropriation, the Legislature has mandated agency action, with the consequence that the APA's function of monitoring agency discretion has no relevance. See Pannell, at 601-02, 589 P.2d 1235.

DSHS does not contend that the instant rulemaking falls squarely within the Pannell holding but argues instead that the principle underlying Pannell applies equally to this case. Appellant argues that because Pannell stands for the proposition that mandatory rulemaking should be exempt from APA requirements, the exemption should extend to appropriations rulemaking for which the legislative history mandates a particular line item appropriation or reduction, even in the absence of "an express absolute limitation" on the face of the enactment. As the trial court noted, DSHS' argument rests on two contentions: first, that the court should look beyond the face of the enacted bill, and second, that the legislative history of the appropriations bill evidences a mandate to the agency. We examine each of these contentions in turn.

The general rule of statutory construction is that a court should not look beyond the language of a statute unless the statute is ambiguous on its face. Service Employees v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 104 Wash.2d 344, 348, 705 P.2d 776 (1985); see also Clark v. Horse Racing Comm'n., 106 Wash.2d 84, 91, 720 P.2d 831 (1986). Although the primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative intent, see Clark, the court will not add language to an unambiguous statute even if the court believes the statute failed adequately to express that intent. Vita Food Prods. v. State, 91 Wash.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978). It is beyond dispute that § 208, the appropriations bill section at issue here, contains no express mention--much less mandated reduction--of SSP benefits. In contrast, the section does expressly mention and alter other benefits, such as general assistance, consolidated emergency assistance, and refugee assistance benefits. See § 208(3) (stating that "[g]rant payment standards and vendor rates shall be increased by 3% on January 1, 1986 ..."). The principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" leads us to the same conclusion the trial court reached: if the Legislature had wanted to mandate the SSP reduction, it would have used express language to that effect. See Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. 1, 77 Wash.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969). The absence of such language does not render the bill ambiguous. Under ordinary principles of construction, then, the reduction was not mandated.

This interpretation of § 208 comports with our prior understanding of legislative appropriations. See Island Cy. Comm. on Assessment Ratios v. Department of Rev., 81 Wash.2d 193, 500 P.2d 756 (1972). In Island Cy., the plaintiffs sought to compel the Superintendent of Public Instruction to disburse all the funds appropriated for their school district. In determining whether the distribution of the entire amount was mandatory, we looked to the language of the appropriations bill and the statutes establishing the Superintendent's duties. See Island Cy., at 204, 500 P.2d 756. Although the statute establishing the Superintendent's duties stated that the Superintendent "shall distribute [funds] annually as provided [by a...