Mahoney v. State
| Decision Date | 19 November 1925 |
| Docket Number | 24,838 |
| Citation | 149 N.E. 444,197 Ind. 335 |
| Parties | Mahoney v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied February 26, 1926.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.---Supreme Court will not disturb decision of trial court based on conflicting evidence.---Where there was a conflict in the evidence which made it necessary for the trial court to weigh the evidence presented, the Supreme Court will not disturb the ruling of the trial court. p. 340.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.---Application to withdraw plea of guilty is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of trial court.---An application for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty and to go to trial is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, but such discretion must be guided by law. p. 340.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.---The only pleas in bar recognized in this state are not guilty, former acquittal and former conviction nolo contendere not being recognized.---In this state the only pleas in bar that are recognized are not guilty, former acquittal and former conviction, the plea of nolo contendere which is in the nature of a conditional plea of guilty, not being recognized. p. 341.
4. CRIMINAL LAW.---Court is not bound by agreement between prosecuting attorney and defendant's counsel that former will use his influence to have sentence suspended.---On a plea of guilty by one charged with a crime, the court is not bound by an agreement between the prosecuting attorney and defendant's counsel that the former will use his influence with the court to get the sentence suspended. p 341.
5. CRIMINAL LAW.---Statements in affidavit in support of application to be allowed to withdraw plea of guilty held not to show accused to be innocent of crime charged.---Statements in an affidavit on which an application for leave to withdraw & plea of guilty was based held insufficient to establish accused's innocence of the crime charged, taking into consideration the other statements therein. p. 343.
6. CRIMINAL LAW.---Judgment on a plea of "guilty should not lie set aside merely because the judgment was more drastic than accused had hoped for.---A judgment on a plea of guilty should not be set aside merely because the accused was disappointed in the judgment rendered, it being more drastic than he had hoped would follow the plea of guilty. p. 344.
7. CRIMINAL LAW.---In prosecution for a misdemeanor, arraignment may be made in absence of accused if he is represented by an attorney.---In a prosecution for a misdemeanor, the arraignment of an accused may be had in his absence if he is represented by an attorney and a plea of guilty made by his attorney, by his direction, is binding upon him (Southerland v. State, 176 Ind. 493, 495, on the subject of arraignment, declared to be dictum). p. 344.
8. CRIMINAL LAW.---Waiver of arraignment ana plea of guilty entered by accused's attorney, in his absence, but by his direction, confirmed by his appearance for sentence a week later without objection or change of plea.---Waiver of arraignment and plea of guilty entered by accused's attorney, in his absence, but by his direction, was confirmed by his appearance for sentence a week after the arraignment, and, without objection or change of plea, acquiescing in the judgment of the court. p. 344.
From Wabash Circuit Court; Frank O. Switzer, Judge.
Jessie Mahoney was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition, and she appeals.
Affirmed.
D. F. Brooks, for appellant.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Attorney-General and George J. Muller, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
This appeal presents the question of the abuse of judicial discretion as alleged in the error assigned, that: "The court erred in overruling appellant's motion and petition to set aside the judgment and to permit her to withdraw her plea of guilty." Appellant was charged by an affidavit with unlawfully operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Acts 1923 p. 328.
The record discloses that appellant was arrested September 20, 1924, at which time she gave a recognizance bond for her appearance to such charge on September 22, 1924, and from day to day thereafter, until said cause is finally determined; and that, on October 7, 1924, appellant's attorney, together with the prosecuting attorney, in open court, waived arraignment for the defendant and entered her plea of guilty to the crime as charged, at which time the court fixed October 14, 1924, as the day for the sentence of appellant. On said October 14, 1924, the defendant appeared in person and by her attorney in open court, and the court entered its finding that: "The court now finds said defendant guilty of the crime charged, namely, 'operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,'" and thereafter entered judgment and made her fine in the sum of $ 100 and that she be sentenced to the county jail for a period of twenty-five days, with costs. The entry of judgment was on said October 14, immediately followed by appellant's motion supported by affidavit to set aside the judgment and to permit her to withdraw her plea of guilty, which after hearing and consideration by the court, was overruled.
The foundation for the ruling of the trial court in overruling appellant's said motion, and the decision upon appeal, is best disclosed by appellant's own affidavit in support of her motion, which is fortified by the affidavit made by her attorney, practically in the same language. She says that she is a resident of Churubusco in Whitley county, Indiana, and was, on September 20, 1924, personally acquainted with no one in Wabash county, Indiana, on the day that she was arrested and that she employed as her attorney D. F. Brooks, Esq., because her husband was acquainted with him; that subsequent to the time of such employment, she discussed the charge with her attorney, and that in the discussion concerning what course to pursue in said cause, she was advised by her said attorney that if she would enter a plea of guilty to the charge, that, although the law prescribed in addition to a fine for such offense a jail sentence, that the same would be suspended, and she was assured that the same would be suspended upon such representations; and, upon the advice of her said attorney, she agreed that he might enter a plea of guilty for her, and that said plea of guilty was entered for her by her attorney in her absence, but that had she known or had reason to believe that the jail sentence provided for by law would not be suspended, she would not have pleaded guilty, for the reason that she was not guilty of the charge, and that she was misled into pleading guilty; and further, that if she had not been misled as aforesaid, she would have had present witnesses to testify that she had never been in trouble before, was not addicted to becoming intoxicated, and that, when she was arrested, she was driving carefully and properly, and that no harm resulted from her driving, and that she was fully able to drive at the time without harming any other person; and that she is and always has been a woman of high character and high standing in the community in which she lives; but that she had not called such witnesses because she was misled as aforesaid. The affidavit of her attorney D. F. Brooks, Esq., in addition to making practically the same statement, said that he had had conferences with the prosecuting attorney, the prohibition agent, and the sheriff of Wabash county, in which conferences, he was led to believe by all of these persons that if the defendant in this case would plead guilty to the offense as charged, they would use their influence to have the jail sentence, as provided by law, suspended; and that, upon such representations being made to him, with the belief that they would use their influence to have the jail sentence suspended, he advised the defendant to plead guilty, and for no other reason; and that, because of such representations by the prosecuting attorney, prohibition agent and sheriff, he had not caused any witnesses to be brought to testify to the defendant's former good character and high standing, and that had he known that there was any question about the suspension of the sentence, he would not have authorized or directed the defendant to plead guilty, and would not have entered the plea for her as was done, but would have gone to trial and would have called her neighbors and friends to show that she is and was a woman of good character, never arrested before, and never in trouble, and that, by reason of being so misled, he did not do his duty to his client. The counter affidavit of the prosecuting attorney was filed, which admitted having had several conferences with defendant's attorney, D. F. Brooks, Esq., together with the sheriff and federal prohibition agent, which conferences primarily concerned another case against this defendant, and that the case at bar was touched upon only incidentally in such conversation; and at no time, in any manner, expressed or implied, did the prosecuting attorney lead the attorney for defendant to believe that he would in any way attempt to influence the decision of the judge of the Wabash Circuit Court, but that he told defendant's attorney that he would not ask the judge "anything regarding his possible decision in this case"; that, although defendant's said attorney had been representing her from the...
To continue reading
Request your trial