Maia's Adm'r v. Dir.S Of Eastern State Hosp.

Decision Date23 November 1899
Citation97 Va. 507,34 S.E. 617
PartiesMAIA'S ADM'R. v. DIRECTORS OF EASTERN STATE HOSPITAL.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

CORPORATIONS — STATE HOSPITALDEPARTMENT OP STATE GOVERNMENT—INMATES— INJURIES—LIABILITY—CLAIMS — COURTS—JURISDICTION — DAMAGES — PRESENTATION TO THE LEGISLATURE—DETERMINATION.

1. Act 1769 (8 Hen. St. p. 378) appointed trustees to found a public hospital for insane persons; and by Act 1785 (12 Hen. St. p. 198) such trustees were created a corporation, which was continued by Codes 1819, c. 109 et seq., and Acts 1893-94, p. 397, under which it was known as the "Eastern State Hospital." There were no stockholders or members, except directors appointed by the governor, who were required to make quarterly reports to state departments, and who were endowed with corporate powers for convenience of administration, but were made liable to fines for failure to perform their duties. Funds for the maintenance of the hospital were furnished by the state, and their disposition prescribed by statute. Held, that the hospital was a public corporation, exercising governmental functions exclusively.

2. Since the Eastern State Hospital is a public corporation organized exclusively for governmental purposes, an action by an administrator for negligently causing his intestate's death will not lie against it, though Code 1887, § 1661, declares it to be a corporation which may sue and be sued.

3. Since a court cannot decree damages in an action for negligence against a state hospital organized exclusively for governmental purposes, an action will not be entertained for the purpose of fixing plaintiff's damages, in order that he may present such claim to the legislature for payment.

Harrison, J., dissenting.

Error to circuit court of city of Richmond.

Action by one Maia's administrator, etc., against the directors of the Eastern State Hospital, to recover for the negligent killing of plaintiff's decedent. From a judgment for defendant on demurrer to plaintiff's declaration, he brings error. Affirmed.

R. E. Frayser and S. D. Davies, for plaintiff in error.

The Attorney General, for defendant in error.

BUCHANAN, J. This cause was heard at a former term of the court, and an opinion and judgment rendered reversing the judgment complained of. Upon a petition to re hear, that judgment was set aside, and at this term of the court the cause was again argued and submitted.

The plaintiff in error, who was the plain-tiff in the court below, brought an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for the death of his intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, or its agents, in requiring and permitting the intestate, while a patient and inmate of the defendant's hospital for the insane, to dig and excavate in the side of an embankment, the property of the defendant, without providing props or supports to prevent the overhanging earth from falling upon him.

The defendant demurred to the declaration, and to each count thereof, upon the ground that it was a public corporation, —an agency of the state for the exercise of purely governmental functions, —and that no action would lie against it for the injury complained of.

The first question to be considered is the character of the defendant corporation. Is the defendant a public corporation, —an agency of the state, exercising exclusively governmental functions?

By an act of the house of burgesses passed in the year 1769, after a preamble reciting that persons of insane or disordered minds had been frequently found wandering in different parts of the colony, and no certain provision had been yet made either towards effecting a cure of those whose cases are not become quite desperate, nor for restraining others who might be dangerous to society, 15 persons (among them, John Blair, Peyton Randolph, and George Wythe) were "constituted trustees for founding and establishing a public hospital for the reception of such persons as from time to time, according to the rules and orders established by this act, may be sent thereto. And the said trustees shall be called and known by the name and style of the court of directors of the public hospital for persons of insane or disordered minds." 8 Hen. St. p. 378.

By an act of the general assembly passed in 1785, the directors of the public hospital which had been organized and conducted under the act of 1769 and amendments thereto was created a corporation (12 Hen. St. p. 198), and has ever since existed as a corporation under various names, and is now known as the "Eastern State Hospital." See Code 1819, c. 109; Code 1849, c. 85; Code 1887, c. 75; Acts 1893-94, p. 397.

An examination of the statutes creating and continuing this hospital shows that it was created and exists for purely governmental purposes, and is under the exclusive ownership and control of the state. It has no stockholders, —no members, even, except directors, having no interest in it or its affairs, who are appointed by the governor, by and with consent of the senate, and are in fact public rather than corporate officials, endowed with a corporate being for a more convenient administration of the duties imposed upon them by law, and are made liable to fines for any failure to perform their duties.

The money necessary to defray the expenses of maintaining and caring for its inmates is provided by annual appropriations made by the general assembly out of the public treasury, and the manner of keeping and disbursing its funds is prescribed by statute. The directors are required to make quarterly reports to the auditor of public accounts, showing in detail how they have been disbursed, and to report annually to the governor, for the information of the general assembly, the condition of the hospital, and the sums received and disbursed by them.

It is plain, under the authorities, and especially under the recent case of Phillips v. Rector, etc. (Va.) 34 S. E. 66, that the defendant is a public corporation, governed and controlled by the state, and acts exclusively as an agency of the state for the protection of society, and for the promotion of the best interests of the unfortunate people of the commonwealth, of insane or disordered minds.

The next question is whether the defendant, a public corporation, —an agency of the state exercising exclusively governmental functions, —is liable for the injuries complained of in the declaration.

In the case of City of Richmond v. Long's Adm'rs, 17 Grat. 375, the liability of a municipal corporation for the negligence of its agents when in the exercise and performance of governmental powers and duties was considered. That was an action to recover damages for the loss of a slave who it was alleged had lost his life by reason of the careless and negligent conduct of the agents of the city in permitting him to escape, while insane, from the smallpox hospital of the city, into which he had been admitted for treatment in pursuance of the ordinance of the city. In that case the distinction was drawn between powers and duties which are granted to or imposed upon a public body as an agency of government, to be exercised and performed exclusively for public, governmental purposes, and those powers and privileges which are exercised by the corporation or body for its own private advantage, and are for public purposes in no other sense than that the public derives a common benefit from a proper discharge of the duties arising from the grant.

For the negligent exercise or performance of the former class of powers and duties it was held that the city was not liable, and, as the injury complained of belonged to that class, it was held that the action would not lie, while it was admitted that, if the injury had resulted from negligence in the exercise or performance of the latter class of powers and duties, the city would have been liable in the same manner as an individual or private corporation. The doctrine enunciated in that case was recognized, and the case cited with approval, in De Voss v. City of Richmond, 18 Grat. 344; City of Petersburg v. Applegarth's Adm'r, 28 Grat. 343, 344; Noble v. City of Richmond, 31 Grat. 278; Orme v. City of Richmond, 79 Va. 89; and in the very recent case of Terry v. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 537, 544, 545, 27 S. E. 429, the distinction was again recognized and acted upon.

If a municipal corporation, which has a twofold character, one public and the other private, is exempt from liability for the negligence of its agents when in the exercise and performance of its powers and duties as an agency of the government, a public corporation which was created and exists for no other than governmental purposes must necessarily be exempt from such liability. Otherwise, there would be this anomaly: That for such negligence a corporation created partly for governmental purposes would be exempt from liability, while one created wholly for such purposes would not be, when the reason for such exemption is solely because it was in the exercise of governmental functions when the negligence occurred. But we are not left to determine this question upon reason merely. We have authority upon the subject

In the case of Sayre v. Turnpike Road, 10 Leigh, 454, which was an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for the washing away of the plaintiff's saw and grist mills and milldam, caused by the alleged negligent planning and construction of a bridge by the defendant corporation over the stream upon which they were built, it was held that the action would not lie, because the defendant corporation was composed, in the language of President Tucker, who delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, exclusively of officers of the government, having no personal interest in it or in its concerns, and only acting as the organ of the commonwealth in effecting a great public improvement.

This conclusion is fully sustained, I think, by the weight of authority. See Nugent v. Board, 58 Miss. 197; ...

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