Maiden Creek Assocs., L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–3224.,15–3224. |
| Citation | 823 F.3d 184 |
| Parties | MAIDEN CREEK ASSOCIATES, L.P.; Board of Supervisors of Maidencreek Township, Appellants v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; Secretary United States Department of Transportation; Administrator Federal Highway Administration; Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Marc B. Kaplin, Esq. (Argued), Daniel R. Utain, Esq., Kaplin, Stewart, Meloff, Reiter & Stein, Blue Bell, PA, Counsel for Maiden Creek Associates, L.P.
Christopher M. Garrell, Esq. (Argued), Eugene Orlando, Jr., Esq., Reading, PA, Counsel for Supervisors of Maiden Creek.
James A. Maysonett, Esq. (Argued), Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, DC, Susan D. Bricklin, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Secretary U.S. Department of Transportation and Administrator Federal Highway Administration.
Kenda Jo M. Gardner, Esq. (Argued), Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, PA, Counsel for PA Department of Transportation.
Before: FISHER, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
This action for declaratory and injunctive relief is brought pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321. Maiden Creek Associates and the Board of Supervisors of Maidencreek Township appeal the order of the District Court dismissing their complaint and denying their motion to amend. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Maiden Creek Associates (“MCA”), a limited partnership, owns 85 acres of land in Maidencreek Township that it hopes to develop into a 600,000 square-foot shopping center. The Board of Supervisors of Maidencreek Township (the “Board”) has taken the public position that the shopping center is “vital” to the economic well-being of the Township residents. (Compl., at ¶ 43.) MCA and the Board claim, however, that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation's (“PADOT” or “PennDOT”) plan to improve an adjacent highway, State Route 222, will impede what they hope to accomplish.
PADOT's Project would involve the following: (1) widening the highway from one traffic lane in each direction to a five-lane cross section with two lanes in each direction and a center turn lane; (2) improving the existing traffic signal at Route 222 and Route 72; (3) replacing an existing traffic signal at the intersection of Route 222 and Tamarack Boulevard/Genesis Drive with a dual lane roundabout; (4) constructing a new, dual lane roundabout at the unsignaled intersection of Route 222 and Schaeffer Road; and (5) constructing two storm water detention basins on MCA's property. The Project would be undertaken by PADOT on behalf of the United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration, and fully funded by the federal government.
MCA opposed the Project from the outset, but its basis for doing so has changed over time. Initially, it maintained that the Project should not go forward because the traffic circles would not be able to handle all of the traffic expected to be generated by its shopping center. MCA expressed its concerns to PADOT directly in a string of correspondence, and was heard publicly on July 17, 2014 before the Reading Area Transportation Study (“RATS”). RATS characterized MCA's concern as regarding “[d]esign issues with [the] proposed roundabout” and “its ability to accommodate a proposed shopping center.” (Compl., at ¶ 52.) In response, RATS offered that “[u]tilizing current PennDOT roundabout analysis software, PennDOT is projecting acceptable future levels of service for all legs of [Route] 222 and Genesis Drive, and [Route] 222 and Schaeffer Road intersections and feel[s] that their design will not preclude the ability to develop.” (Id. )
The Project was approved on August 6, 2014, at which time PADOT also made a critical finding regarding the degree of environmental review mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). NEPA requires that one of three levels of review be conducted for such projects, depending on, among other things, the extent of the environmental impact: (1) actions that significantly affect the environment require an Environmental Impact Statement; (2) actions for which the significance of the environmental impact is unclear require an Environmental Assessment; and (3) actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant environmental effect are entitled to a Categorical Exclusion from preparing an Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. 23 C.F.R. § 771.115. Finding that the Project satisfied the criteria for the Categorical Exclusion set out in 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(d), PADOT necessarily concluded that neither an Environmental Assessment nor an Environmental Impact Statement were required under the Act.
MCA and the Board commenced this action in response, naming as defendants the United States Department of Transportation; its Secretary, Anthony Foxx; the Federal Highway Administration; its Administrator, Gregory G. Nadeau (“Federal Appellees”); and PADOT and its Secretary, Barry J. Schoch (“State Appellees”). MCA and the Board alleged in their joint complaint that the Categorical Exclusion approval was based on inaccurate information supplied by PADOT that had not been adequately studied or investigated, and that the findings and conclusions contained therein were arbitrary and capricious. They argued that, in submitting and approving the Categorical Exclusion, “PADOT (i) failed to consider important aspects of the environmental issues associated with the Project; (ii) ignored material information supplied by MCA; and (iii) disseminated completely inaccurate information that is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” (MCA Br. at 5.) These procedural “defects” notwithstanding, the defendants' response was that the crux of the issue, as initially pled, concerned only the economic impact of the planned highway improvement; that, “[a]side from some general allegations about increased traffic and the safety of motorists, all of the injuries alleged by MCA and the Board ... were purely economic—neither alleged that the project would harm the environment.” (Federal Appellees Br. at 5–6.)
Defendants moved to dismiss on precisely the same basis. In their motion filed May 11, 2015, they argued that NEPA is meant to protect the environment and that MCA and the Board could not sustain claims thereunder because their “sole[ly]” economic pursuits fell outside of NEPA's “zone of interests.” (A266–270). MCA and the Board opposed the motion, and also moved for leave to amend their complaint. On August 20, 2015, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court concluded that MCA and the Board's interests were economic and inconsistent with NEPA's goal of protecting the environment, and that, therefore, they lacked prudential standing to pursue their claims under the statute. The Court also denied their motion for leave to amend as futile, finding that the new allegations inappropriately rested on injuries to third parties and were otherwise too speculative or generalized to support a claim.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the claims in this case were brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
First, we exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim,1 “accept[ing] all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving parties.” Bohus v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 918, 921 n. 1 (3d Cir.2015). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This standard is satisfied only if the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Second, although we review a denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, we review the District Court's determination that the amendment would be futile de novo. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir.2014). To evaluate futility, we apply the “same standard of legal sufficiency” as would be applied to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000). As with the motion to dismiss, we consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).
Because NEPA does not include a citizen's suit provision, MCA and the Board commenced this action by way of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Section 702. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Parties bringing suit under that provision must establish their Article III standing2 and demonstrate that their grievance falls within the “zone of interests” to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. See Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). The latter requirement forms the center of our inquiry. Appellees submit that the purpose of NEPA is to ensure that environmental concerns are integrated into their decision making process, and argue that the “injuries” alleged in both the complaint and the proposed amended complaint fall outside the “zone of interests” advanced by the Act.
NEPA is a procedural statute that was enacted to “declare a national...
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