Maier v. Green

• Citation: 485 F.Supp.2d 711
• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06-715.
• Parties: Elizabeth MAIER v. Morgan GREEN, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

485 F.Supp.2d 711

Elizabeth MAIER v. Morgan GREEN, et al.

Civil Action No. 06-715.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lafayette-Opelousas Division.

March 30, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

G. Paul Marx, Lafayette, LA, for Elizabeth Maier.

Marc W. Judice, Michael W. Adley, Judice & Adley, Lafayette, LA, for Morgan Green, Todd Borel and Lafayette City.

MEMORANDUM RULING

MELANCON, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Rec. Doc. 8] and plaintiff's Opposition thereto [Rec. Doc. 18]. For the reasons set out below, defendants' Motion will be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 9, 2005, a female victim ("Victim") of domestic violence presented to the Emergency Room of Lafayette General Medical Center ("LGMC") and was subsequently admitted. (Plaintiffs Statement of Uncontested Facts, # 1). A nurse on duty called 9-1-1 to report the incident of domestic violence. (Id. at # 2). Lafayette police officer Todd Borel was dispatched to LGMC for the purpose of investigating the domestic violence, where a nurse informed him that a woman had reported to the hospital with injuries that she said were caused by her husband. (Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Facts, # 's 4-6).

At that time plaintiff, Elizabeth Maier, was employed by Lafayette General Hospital in the capacity of case manager. (Defendants' Motion, Exhibit B: "Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest"). She was assigned to attend the Victim during the event at issue. When Officer Borel attempted to speak with the victim, Maier denied access. (Defendants' Motion, p. 7). Even though she was informed that the Victim needed to be interviewed in reference to the crime, Maier refused to let Officer Borel speak with the Victim, blocking access to the Victim and threatening a lawsuit if he persisted in his efforts. (Defendants' Statement, # 8; Defendants' Motion, Exhibit B). Plaintiff claims that the police were advised that the Victim had asserted her right to privacy of medical treatment and that "all hospital personnel" informed the police that LGMC could not provide further information or access to the patient in the facility due to the legal restraints imposed by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act pf 1996 ("HIPAA"), Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936 (1996). (Plaintiffs Statement, # s 3-4). When Officer Borel was prevented from reaching the Victim, he contacted Sergeant Morgan Green and reported that his access was blocked. (Defendants' Statement, # s 9-10).

Thereafter, Sergeant Green traveled to LGMC, where he explained to Maier that Louisiana law mandates an investigation of domestic violence cases and that the hospital personnel could not deny police access to a victim of a crime. (Id.). Despite this warning, Maier continued to block access to the victim, threatening a lawsuit if the police persisted. (Id., # 's 11-14). Maier explains that she advised police of the Victim's right to privacy but never used or threatened force nor physically prevented the police officers from reaching the Victim. (Plaintiffs Statement, # 's 5-6).

Officer Borel and Sergeant Green (collectively, "police officers") spoke with the hospital attorney, Gordon Roundtree. (Defendant's Motion, p. 2). Defendants posit that they understood that the Lafayette Police Department would be contacted when the Victim was discharged and that Maier was told to contact the Department when the patient was discharged. (Id.; also Exhibit B). The Victim was eventually discharged into the care of her husband, in spite of the fact that he was her assailant and that she reported that she felt unsafe at home, without any notice being given to the Lafayette Police Department. (Defendants' Statement at 20-23). Maier states that she never promised to call the police nor was she ordered to do so by any supervisory personnel of LGMC. (Id., # 7).

At that time, Sergeant Green initiated further investigative efforts. Assistant District Attorney Jay Prather issued a subpoena deuces tecum to obtain the Victim's records, which revealed injuries to the head, face and forearm. (Id. at 20-23). Sergeant Green believed that Maier's action obstructed and delayed the investigation of the domestic violence incident by preventing the police from interviewing the Victim and so obtaining information necessary to arrest the perpetrator. (Id. at 24). Accordingly, Sergeant Green presented an affidavit seeking a warrant for the arrest of Maier for obstruction of justice to Judge Phillis M. Keaty, 15^th Judicial District Court, Lafayette Parish, Louisiana. (Defendants' Motion, Exhibit B: "Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest"). Based on a review of the affidavit, Judge Keaty issued a warrant for the arrest of Maier for obstruction of justice. (Defendants' Motion, Exhibit C: "Warrant").

On May 2, 2005, Maier was arrested and charged' with obstruction of justice pursuant to the warrant. (Defendants' Statement at # 's 25-27). She was booked in the Lafayette Parish Prison. Ultimately, the District Attorney refused charges. (Plaintiff's Statement, at 10-11).

Maier filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983 against Officer Borel, Sergeant Green and the City Parish Government of Lafayette for false arrest in violation of her 4th, 6th and 8th Amendment rights claiming that the police officers abused their power "for personal reasons." (Complaint; also Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 3). Specifically, plaintiff claims: 1.) defendants secured an arrest warrant and proceeded with booking despite the fact that the officers knew or should have known that Petitioner was acting in the course and scope of her employment, pursuant to the instructions of her employer and in compliance with the mandates of Federal Law, and the police officer's motive and purpose for making the arrest was solely to punish Petitioner for her "attitude" and the fact that she "embarrassed" them; 2.) defendants abused their authority in the planning and execution of the arrest warrant in a manner that would embarrass, humiliate and harass plaintiff, and without any lawful cause, by removing her from her workplace in the presence of co-employees and supervisors at Lafayette General Medical Center; 3.) the City-Parish Government of Lafayette, Louisiana does not maintain department policies to prevent officers from responding to personal affronts under color of law, and has no policy of education and counseling directed at assisting police in objectifying their job experiences to prevent emotional responses that cause damage to citizens. (Complaint.) Plaintiff asks for a monetary judgment for specific damages in the sum of $170,000.00 plus interest and with costs and attorneys fees as provided by law.(Id.).

Defendants request summary judgment dismissing all claims against them on the grounds that they had probable cause and a valid arrest warrant to effectuate the arrest of Maier, whose actions were neither justified nor excused by HIPAA, so there is no basis for suit against them. (Defendants' Motion, p. 6). "Once probable cause has been established, a law enforcement officer cannot be held liable for false arrest or a civil rights violation." (Id.) (citing Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.1977); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485 (10th Cir.1977); Perry v. Jones, 506 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.1975)).

In response, plaintiff alleges that probable cause did not support the arrest of Maier because her actions were not in violation of the Louisiana statute on Obstruction of Justice, LSA R.S. 14:130.1 under which she was arrested. (Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 5). Also, although defendants do not raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity under the "break in causation" theory, plaintiff argues that the existence of a warrant does not shield defendants from liability because Green did not tell Judge Keaty all of the pertinent facts. "When an officer does not frankly convey all of the material facts to the magistrate, the issuance of the warrant is tainted and is not a basis for immunity." (Id.)(citing Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir.2005)).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir.1994)(en banc). Initially, the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. When a party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if such evidence were uncontroverted at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). As to issues which the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claim. Id. If the moving party fails to carry this burden, his motion must be denied. If he succeeds, however, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.¹ Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the burden shifts to the respondent, he must direct the attention of the court to evidence in the record and set forth specific facts sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct: 2548; Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e). The responding party may not rest on mere allegations or denials a the adverse party's pleadings as a means of establishing a genuine issue worthy of trial, but must demonstrate by affidavit or other admissible evidence that there are genuine issues of material fact or law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Adiekes S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26...