Maier v. Maretti

• Decision Date: 06 March 1996
• Citation: 448 Pa.Super. 276,671 A.2d 701
• Parties: Donna MAIER, Appellant, v. Mary MARETTI and Donald Maretti.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 701

671 A.2d 701

448 Pa.Super. 276

Donna MAIER, Appellant, v. Mary MARETTI and Donald Maretti.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 26, 1995.

Filed Dec. 28, 1995.

Reargument Denied March 6, 1996.

[448 Pa.Super. 280] Byron King, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Martin Saunders, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before ROWLEY, President Judge, and BECK and HUDOCK, JJ.

BECK, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, Mary and Donald Maretti. Appellant, Donna Maier, filed suit against the Marettis alleging defamation and interference with contract. Appellant claims Mary Maretti intentionally and falsely attributed words to appellant which caused appellant to be terminated from her employment with Sears. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the defamation and interference with contract actions.

Appellant Maier was employed by Sears in its maintenance department. Appellee Mary Maretti was appellant's immediate supervisor. When Sears began requiring its maintenance employees to work on Sundays, appellant refused to work because of her religious beliefs and was suspended from her job. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC]. Before the EEOC had published its findings and determinations, appellant placed a call to appellee. Appellant claims the conversation concerned candy appellant had bought from appellee's sister and questions concerning who handled Sears' unemployment compensation. Following the conversation, appellee reported to the Branch Manager of Sears, Mr. Page, that appellant stated to appellee: "You better play ball with me, or I'm going to put your f--cking head through the wringer with your extramarital affair." Branch Manager Page concluded appellant was guilty of gross insubordination and harassment and fired appellant. Appellant denies making this statement and brought suit claiming appellee is guilty of defamation and tortious interference with contract. Appellant claims appellee falsely and intentionally attributed the above quoted words to appellant in her report to the branch manager and the personnel director. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging (1) the character of the statement was not defamatory and (2) a claim of interference with contract did not exist because there was no interference with a contract by a third person. The trial court granted appellee's summary judgment which is the subject of this appeal.

Our standard of review in assessing the grant of a motion for summary judgment requires us to view the record in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Rybas v. Wapner, 311 Pa.Super. 50, 457 A.2d 108 (1983). We must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleading, giving the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We will uphold a grant of summary judgment only in those cases in which the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions[448 Pa.Super. 282] on file, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Elia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 430 Pa.Super. 384, 634 A.2d 657 (1993).

DEFAMATION

In an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defamatory character of the communication; (2) publication by the defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to plaintiff; (6) special harm to the plaintiff; (7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8343(a) (Purdons 1982). Initially, it is the function of the court to determine whether the communication complained of is capable of a defamatory meaning. Rybas, supra. A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Elia, supra. A communication is also defamatory if it ascribes to another conduct, character or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his proper business, trade or profession. Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 340 Pa.Super. 253, 489 A.2d 1364 (1985). If the court determines that the challenged publication is not capable of a defamatory meaning, there is no basis for the matter to proceed to trial; however, if there is an innocent interpretation and an alternate defamatory interpretation, the issue must proceed to the jury. Livingston v. Murray, 417 Pa.Super. 202, 612 A.2d 443 (1992).

In determining whether the communication is defamatory, the court must consider the effect the statement would fairly produce, or the impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to circulate. Rybas, supra. The words must be given by judges and juries the same significance that other people are likely to attribute to them. Livingston v. Murray, 417 Pa.Super. 202, 612 A.2d 443 (1992). Furthermore, the nature of the audience hearing the remarks is a critical factor in determining whether the communication is defamatory. Id. See Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 340 Pa.Super. 253, 489 A.2d 1364 (1985) (court must consider the expertise and knowledge of those to whom the publication is circulated and consider the effect it is fairly calculated to produce); Agriss v. Roadway Express Inc., 334 Pa.Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456 (1984). It is also important to note communications which may annoy or embarrass a person are not sufficient as a matter of law to create an action in defamation. Gordon, supra.

Appellant claims appellee's false attribution of the sentence to appellant tended to lower appellant in the estimation of her employer, implied that appellant is vulgar, crude and grossly insubordinate, and indicated that appellant is intemperate, lacks integrity and self-control. The trial court concluded the statement was not capable of defamatory meaning because nothing in the statement tended to harm appellant's reputation. (Tr.Ct.Op. at 4). We agree with the trial court's determination, and affirm the grant of summary judgment with respect to the defamation claim.

Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant (that appellee falsely attributed the statement to appellant), the statement was incapable of a defamatory meaning. Attributing the quotation to appellant clearly embarrassed appellant, but it in no way lowered the community's estimation of appellant. First, alleging someone is crude, vulgar and insubordinate is not as offensive as other statements which have been characterized as incapable of defamatory meaning. See Parano v. O'Connor, 433 Pa.Super. 570, 641 A.2d 607 (1994) (statements that plaintiff was less than helpful uncooperative and took adversarial position was not capable of defamatory meaning because they are far less offensive than other characterizations); Kryeski v. Schott Glass Technologies, 426 Pa.Super. 105, 626 A.2d 595 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 643, 639 A.2d 29 (1994) (statement that plaintiff was crazy not capable of defamatory meaning); Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 340 Pa.Super. 253, 489 A.2d 1364 (1985) (statements by appellee that they lacked confidence in appellant's work and performance, and lacked trust in appellant were not capable of defamatory meaning); Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa.Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456 (1984) (statement published to employee's supervisor and co-workers concerning plaintiff's opening of company mail was defamatory because it implied plaintiff had committed a crime); Rybas v. Wapner, supra (characterizing person as anti-Semitic was not defamatory); Goralski v. Pizzimenti, 115 Pa.Commw. 210, 540 A.2d 595 (1988) (statement that appellant was terminated due to misconduct was not capable of defamatory meaning). In Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., supra, this court held the statement was capable of defamatory meaning because it implied the employee had committed a crime. However, in the present litigation there is no implication that appellant committed a crime. Given the above cited case law, an allegation that appellant was vulgar, crude and insubordinate, in no way reached the level capable of defamatory meaning and harm to appellant's reputation in the community.

Second, attributing the quoted words to appellant implied appellant was vulgar, crude and obscene and alleging someone is crude and vulgar is not capable of defamatory meaning. In Wecht v. PG Publishing Co., 353 Pa.Super. 493, 510 A.2d 769 (1986), this court held cartoon which portrayed appellant as a vile, obscene, abusive insensitive and paranoid individual was not capable of defamatory meaning.

Furthermore, Pennsylvania case law holds that the nature of the audience is a critical factor in determining whether the communication is defamatory. In Rybas v. Wapner, this court stated audience was a critical factor and since the statement was made only to a fellow attorney, the intended publication was extremely limited. 311 Pa.Super. at 56, 457 A.2d at 111. The court further held because the audience was limited it would not harm the reputation of the plaintiff in the community. Id. See Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., supra (statement published to employee's supervisors and co-workers concerning plaintiff's opening of company mail was defamatory because public contempt and ridicule was clear); Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa.Super. 527, 419 A.2d 583 (1980) (alleged defamation was evaluation of academic performance and since communication intended for only a few members of the community, it did not lead community to ostracize or shun plaintiff). Here the statement was a report by appelle...