Mailloux v. Town of Littleton
| Decision Date | 11 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-10762-JLT. |
| Citation | 473 F.Supp.2d 177 |
| Parties | Christopher MAILLOUX, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF LITTLETON and Alexander McCurdy, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Paul A. Manoff, Law Office of Paul A. Manoff, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Deborah I. Ecker, Leonard H. Kesten, Peter E. Montgomery, Brody, Hardon, Perkins, & Kesten LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
Christopher Mailloux (the "Plaintiff"), brings this action against Defendants, Town of Littleton ("the Town") and Alexander McCurdy ("McCurdy"), former Chief of the Town of Littleton Fire Department, for (1) breach of contract, (2) promissory estoppel, (3) violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, section 185 ("the Whistleblower Statute"), (4) misrepresentation, and (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 14] is ALLOWED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
In February 2003, Plaintiff applied for a position as a per diem firefighter with the Town of Littleton Fire Department.1 The Chief of the Town's Fire. Department, McCurdy, recommended Plaintiff to the Town of Littleton's Board of Selectmen ("the Board"), who promptly hired him on a per diem basis.2
As Chief of the Town's fire department, McCurdy did not possess the authority to hire or terminate employees. That duty rested solely with the Board, the appointing authority for the Town.
Plaintiff worked two to three times per week, substituting for the Town's four full-time firefighters. Plaintiff did not have a written employment contract for his per diem position with the Town. Nor did the Town guarantee Plaintiff a certain number of work hours.
At the time the Town hired him on a per diem basis, Plaintiff knew that the Board was the appointing authority for the Town. Plaintiff also knew that the Board could refuse to appoint a candidate recommended by McCurdy.
Defendants contest and deny the events as described in the following two paragraphs:
Once Plaintiff began serving as a per diem firefighter, McCurdy repeatedly promised Plaintiff that, if he moved his family to the Town and ceased working for other towns, McCurdy would recommend Plaintiff to the Board for the next available full-time opening. With this promise was the implied requirement that Plaintiff continue to do a good job in his duties as a Littleton firefighter. McCurdy instructed Plaintiff that, while the Board was the actual authority for hiring, they "always" followed McCurdy's recommendation and that it was an automatic process. Based on these promises, Plaintiff moved his family to the Town, quit his job as a per diem firefighter for the Town of Lincoln and continued to fulfill his responsibilities as a per diem firefighter for the Town of Littleton.
In 2004, both McCurdy and a second full-time firefighter for the Town, Alexander Steele McCurdy III ("Steele")3, repeatedly asked Plaintiff to write down in a notebook the actions and statements of fellow Littleton firefighter Keith Dunn. Plaintiff believed that McCurdy was looking to falsify evidence against Mr. Dunn to develop justification for. Mr. Dunn's dismissal. If Mr. Dunn was fired, McCurdy's son, Steele, would become the most senior firefighter in the department. Under the union contract, the senior firefighter received additional compensation. Although McCurdy never expressly told Plaintiff to write down anything false in the notebook, he implied that he wanted Plaintiff to write something false. Plaintiff refused to document Mr. Dunn's activities, because he believed doing so was highly unethical. And Plaintiff believed that doing so would make him part of an "illegal conspiracy." McCurdy repeatedly asked Plaintiff if he had written anything in the notebook. When Plaintiff said no, McCurdy made hostile remarks, including that Plaintiff "had no balls" and that he "better step up to the plate." At no time did McCurdy ever tell Plaintiff that his failure to write in the notebook would preclude him from getting the full-time firefighter position.
In the spring of 2004, the Town sought to fill a number of vacant full-time firefighter positions.4 Prior to the 2004 commencement of the Town's hiring process, Plaintiff had not spoken with any member of the Board about being appointed to a full-time position. No member of the Board ever promised Plaintiff that the Board would appoint him to a full-time position.
As he had done for filling previous, positions, McCurdy assembled a hiring committee to evaluate the candidates. The hiring committee was responsible for conducting initial interviews and recommending a number of applicants to the Board. Only candidates referred by the hiring committee would advance to interviews with the Board. The hiring committee consisted of members of the Littleton Fire Department command staff, a union representative, a citizen of the Town and an area Chief. Plaintiff maintains that the hiring committee was stacked with individuals loyal to McCurdy, including McCurdy's son, an in-law and several close friends.
When Plaintiff applied for a full-time firefighter position, the Town sent Plaintiff a letter dated June 29, 2005, stating that all applicants for the full-time firefighter position would be given a written test as well as a physical ability test on July 10, 2004. The candidates were also informed that if they satisfied the minimum test requirements, they would be invited to participate in the hiring committee's interview process. Plaintiff took the written and physical examinations and scored above the minimum passing score for each. After reviewing the applicants' test scores and applications, the hiring committee did not select Plaintiff as one of the applicants to interview.
The Plaintiff complained to McCurdy and wrote a letter to the Board reminding it that in its June 29, 2005, letter, the Town had promised that the hiring committee would interview any applicant who satisfied the minimum test requirements.5 Plaintiff believed he deserved an interview because he had passed the minimum requirements for both the written and physical tests. McCurdy, in response, acknowledged he had made a mistake and recommended that the hiring committee interview all candidates who passed both tests. The hiring committee then proceeded to interview all candidates who passed both tests, including the Plaintiff.
Following interviews of the applicants, the hiring committee selected five candidates whom they recommended that the Board interview. Plaintiff was not among the five candidates. The Board did not interview Plaintiff for the full-time firefighter position. And at no time did McCurdy recommend Plaintiff to the Board.
The Plaintiff complained about the hiring process to the Chairman of the Board, Robert Caruso ("Caruso"). Plaintiff maintains he had far more experience than both firefighters the Town hired and that he trained one of the hires at the state fire academy. After an investigation, the Board found that the hiring process was fair.
In his deposition, Chairman of the Board Caruso noted that the Board was unhappy that the hiring committee was not interviewing all qualified candidates as had been promised. It appeared to Caruso that the hiring committee had made up its mind as to whom the Board would interview even before the hiring committee had interviewed all the candidates. Caruso was not happy with the candidates recommended by the hiring committee. Several of the candidates had too little experience, and one had no relevant experience at all.
Plaintiff filed suit against the Town and McCurdy on March 25, 2006, in Massachusetts Superior Court, Middlesex County. Defendants removed the case to United States District Court, District of Massachusetts.
Plaintiff advances five causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) retaliatory action under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, section 185, for Plaintiffs refusal to assist Defendant McCurdy in an illegal conspiracy; (4) misrepresentation; and (5) violation of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6 The existence of "some alleged factual dispute" between the parties does not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment — the requirement is that there be "no genuine issue of material fact."7
"`[G]enuine' means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and a `material fact' is one which `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'"8
The party seeking summary judgment must show an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.9 "Once the movant has made this showing, the nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue."10
In determining whether that burden is met, a court "must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor."11 A court, however, need not afford any weight to "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."12 Summary judgment provides the necessary opportunity for a court "`to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.'"13
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Town violated his rights under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, section 185 because "[he] was not hired by the defendant town14 in retaliation for his refusal to join defendant McCurdy and his son, . . . in an...
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