Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., In re

• Decision Date: 17 October 1973
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of MAINE CLEAN FUELS, INC.

Page 736

310 A.2d 736

In the Matter of MAINE CLEAN FUELS, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 17, 1973.

Jensen, Baird, Chapman & Gardner by Merton G. Henry, Portland, David E. Scoll, New York City, for Maine Clean Fuels, Inc.

E. Stephen Murray, John M. R. Paterson, and Lee M. Schepps, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for the Environmental Improvement Comm.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

ARCHIBALD, Justice.

By order of July 21, 1971, the Environmental Improvement Commission (EIC) denied the application of Maine Clean Fuels, Inc. (MCF), requesting approval of its proposed development of a petroleum refinery on Sears Island. ¹ This is an appeal pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 487 seeking judicial review of the EIC action. We deny the appeal.

Enactment of the Site Location of Development Law (SLL) (38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488) provided

'a flexible and practical means by which the State, acting through the Environmental Improvement Commission, in consultation with appropriate state agencies, may exercise the police power of the State to control the location of those developments substantially affecting local environment in order to insure that such developments will be located in a manner which will have a minimal adverse impact

on the natural environment of their surroundings.'

38 M.R.S.A. § 481.

In accordance with the procedures established in Section 483, MCF notified the EIC of its intent to build an oil refinery and of the nature and location of the proposed development. The EIC determined that a public hearing thereon was necessary and caused public notice thereof to be given. The initial hearing commenced March 23, 1971, at Searsport.

Both the statutory criteria for approval of developments and the nature of the applicant's burden of proof were provided explicitly by the SLL then in effect:

'At such hearing the commission shall solicit and receive testimony to determine whether such development will in fact substantially affect the environment or pose a threat to the public's health, safety or general welfare.

The commission shall approve a development proposal whenever it finds that:

1. Financial capacity. The proposed development has the financial capacity and technical ability to meet state air and water pollution control standards, has made adequate provision for solid waste disposal, the control of offensive odors, and the securing and maintenance of sufficient and healthful water supplies.

2. Traffic movement. The proposed development has made adequate provision for loading, parking and traffic movement from the development area onto public roads.

3. No adverse affect (sic) on natural environment. The proposed development has made adequate provision for fitting itself harmoniously into the existing natural environment and will not adversely affect existing uses, scenic character, natural resources or property values in the municipality or in adjoining municipalities.

4. Soil types. The proposed development will be built on soil types which are suitable to the nature of the undertaking.

At hearings held under this section the burden shall be upon the person proposing the development to affirmatively demonstrate to the commission that each of the criteria for approval listed in the preceding paragraphs have been met, and that the public's health, safety and general welfare will be adequately protected.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Pub.L.1969, ch. 571, § 484.

Likewise, the scope of this Court's review of the action taken by the EIC pursuant to the SLL is limited in unambiguous terms.

'Review shall be limited to the record of the hearing before and the order of the commission. The court shall decide whether the commission acted regularly and within the scope of its authority, and whether the order is supported by substantial evidence, and on the basis of such decision may enter judgment affirming or nullifying such determination.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Pub.L.1969, ch. 571, § 487, now 38 M.R.S.A. § 487.

At the conclusion of the hearings, the EIC made forty-four findings of fact from which ten conclusions were drawn. On the basis of those findings and conclusions the commission determined that MCF had 'failed to sustain its burden of proof' that the proposed development:

'1. Has the financial capacity and technical ability to meet State air and water pollution control standards;

2. Has made adequate provision for the securing and maintenance of sufficient water supplies;

3. Has made adequate provision for traffic movement from the development area onto public roads 4. Has made adequate provision for fitting itself harmoniously into the existing natural environment and will not adversely affect existing uses, scenic character, natural resources or property values in the municipality or in adjoining municipalities.

5. Will adequately protect the public health, safety and general welfare.'

It is clear from the language of Section 484 that successful applicants must affirmatively demonstrate compliance with each criterion therein and failure to do so as to any one of them constitutes a basis for denial of the application. Since we have previously held that these criteria are severable, In Re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 751 (Me.1973), it necessarily follows that if the Court is satisfied from the record of the hearing that the commission's decision as to any one of them is supported by substantial evidence, the EIC order must be affirmed. ²

Substantial evidence has been defined as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Application of the substantial evidence standard of review requires the reviewing court to 'search the entire record . . . to determine whether on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits before the agency it could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did.' Braniff Airways, Incorporated v. C.A.B., 126 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453, 462 (1967). See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). And, the fact that it is possible to draw 'two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.' Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).

Thus the issue before this Court is not whether we would have reached the same conclusion but whether the record contains competent and substantial evidence which supports the result reached by the commission. As we noted earlier, because Section 484 places upon applicants the burden of proof as to each criterion, substantial evidence in support of any one of the EIC conclusions is decisive of this appeal. ³

I-A

We first deal with the challenged validity of the statute.

MCF advances several arguments based upon the erroneous premise that the SLL is the equivalent of a state-wide zoning statute. Appellant maintains that the SLL is invalid because it authorizes the exercise of zoning power without either a comprehensive plan or reasonable classifications.

Although this Court has characterized the SLL as 'in the nature of a zoning statute,' ⁴ we have more recently held that the statute is clearly distinguishable from zoning laws, the only resemblance being 'that both seek to restrict the use of land to areas appropriate for the purpose . . ..' In Re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d at 753. Unlike zoning laws, the

'Site Location Law . . . is not directed toward promoting an orderly community growth . . . It is not concerned with where a development takes place in general but only that the development takes place in a manner consistent with the needs of the public for a healthy environment. It did not grant the Commission the authority to determine where the location of a development must be but rather it gave the Commission authority to measure the proposal and location against statutory standards and to apply reasonable terms and conditions which the proposal must meet in order that it may be 'located in a manner which will have a minimal adverse impact on the natural environment."

Id. at 753-754.

Because of these basic distinctions between the Site Location Law and traditional zoning ordinances appellant's efforts to analogize the two must fail. The SLL was enacted to provide 'the State with a means of minimizing, through the exercise of its police power, the irreparable damage being done to the environment.' Id. at 746. There is no evidence that the legislature intended each EIC order or decision to fit within a broad comprehensive plan. Id. at 754. And, because the EIC does not function within the confines of a comprehensive, state-wide plan, MCF's contention that the EIC order amounted to 'spot zoning in reverse' is without merit. In short, the legal principles against which zoning ordinances are traditionally tested are inapposite to our consideration of the SLL. The appropriate legal standard to be applied to a police power measure is whether the means adopted by the legislature are rationally related to the purpose of the enactment. State v. Union Oil Co. of Maine, 151 Me. 438, 447, 120 A.2d 708, 712 (1956). The Court held in Spring Valley, and reaffirms here, that the means and purpose of the SLL are so related.

I-B

Maine Clean Fuels contends that the SLL fails to establish those clear and reasonable standards that are legally required before an administrative agency can be vested with the power of enforcement. Appellant specifically challenges the criteria established by Section 484 as impermissibly vague. Precisely the same attack was made on Section 484 in Spring Valley and was rejected by this Court. After discussing each of the criteria and its relationship to the purpose of the SLL, we concluded:

'(T)he standards which the...