Maisonet v. Metropolitan Hosp. and Health Hosp.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08 Civ. 10668(VM).,08 Civ. 10668(VM).
• Parties: Jorge Castro MAISONET, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN HOSPITAL AND HEALTH HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Page 345

640 F.Supp.2d 345

Jorge Castro MAISONET, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN HOSPITAL AND HEALTH HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 08 Civ. 10668(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 29, 2009.

Jorge Castro Maisonet, New York, NY, pro se.

Andre Leon Lindsay, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Jorge Castro Maisonet ("Maisonet") brought this action against his former employer, Metropolitan Hospital Center ("MHC") and the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (collectively, "Defendants")¹, alleging that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race and disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 to 12117. Maisonet also alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for filing complaints regarding co-workers with the Office of Labor Relations ("Labor Relations") at MHC, in violation of Title VII. Defendants moved to dismiss Maisonet's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). In the alternative, Defendants moved for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(e) ("Rule 12(e)"). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Maisonet is granted leave to replead.

I. BACKGROUND²

Maisonet worked for over ten years as a housekeeping aide at MHC. After a series of incidents beginning in 2007, Maisonet filed a complaint, dated February 11, 2008, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging unlawful employment discrimination by both Defendants and Maisonet's union. On August 4, 2008, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, dismissing the charges under Title VII and the ADA and informing Maisonet of his right to file suit against Defendants in federal court within ninety days.

Maisonet filed his Complaint with the Court's Pro Se Office on a form provided to pro se litigants seeking to sue their employer for discriminatory conduct. In it, Maisonet alleges racial discrimination under Title VII and disability discrimination and failure to accommodate his disability under the ADA. Maisonet further alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for his filing complaints with Labor Relations at MHC. Maisonet attached approximately 100 pages of additional documents to the form complaint, including psychological evaluations that diagnose Maisonet with a bipolar disorder and depression; and handwritten letters to the EEOC, dated from May 2007 to August 2008, which describe ongoing disputes between Maisonet and various former co-workers.

Defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that both the Complaint and the Attachments filed with it fail to articulate any legal claims or factual allegations upon which relief can be granted.

II. DISCUSSION

A. LEGAL STANDARD

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Maisonet is proceeding pro se, and accordingly his submissions "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, moreover, must liberally construe Maisonet's pro se pleadings and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). This guidance applies with particular force when a plaintiff's civil rights are at issue. See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Flaherty v. Lang, 199 F.3d 607, 612 (2d Cir.1999). Pro se status, however, "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, 285 F.Supp.2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983)).

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The statement should be plain because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to provide the adverse party with fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him or her to answer and prepare for trial. See Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.1988).

While the pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations, ... [t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). In order "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face," a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (internal citations omitted). In other words, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's factual allegations must be at least "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

B. APPLICATION

Based on the Court's assessment of the Complaint, the Court considers Maisonet to be asserting four claims of employment discrimination, namely, that Defendants: (1) discriminated against Maisonet based on race, in violation of Title VII; (2) unlawfully retaliated against Maisonet for lodging complaints of harassment with Labor Relations, in violation of Title VII; and (3) discriminated against Maisonet on the basis of his disability, in violation of the ADA; and (4) failed to accommodate Maisonet's disability, in violation of the ADA.³ For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a sufficient claim under either Title VII or the ADA, and must be dismissed.

1. Racial Discrimination Under Title VII

To establish a Title VII claim of racial discrimination, Maisonet must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Collins v. New York City Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2002)). A complaint consisting only of assertions and setting forth no specific facts upon which a court could find a plausible violation of Title VII must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir.1994).

Maisonet fails to allege a plausible claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. First, the Complaint makes no mention of Maisonet's race. In his EEOC charge Maisonet identifies himself as Puerto Rican; however, even if Maisonet intended to claim discrimination based on his national origin, neither his EEOC charge nor the Complaint contain factual allegations that Maisonet suffered discrimination because of his Puerto Rican heritage. Instead, the Complaint alleges that Defendants discriminated against Maisonet based on his race by "[a] cussing [sic] me of bias crime that I called them the N word," (Complaint § II(D)), in retaliation for complaints he made to Labor Relations. Although the alleged accusation against Maisonet contains a racial component, the circumstances do not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent against Maisonet based on his race. While Maisonet's letters to the EEOC, attached to his Complaint, are replete with allegations of harassment against him and his daughters by other hospital workers, there is nothing in these letters to indicate that such harassment was motivated by discriminatory animus based on Maisonet's race.

Furthermore, even if the Court could infer such discriminatory intent, Maisonet's allegations of harassment by fellow employees do not rise to the level of an "adverse employment action" under Title VII, which must entail a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment." Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such an action must be "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (citations omitted). Examples of materially adverse changes include "termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Even if Maisonet's allegations of harassment and disrespect toward him and his daughters are true, they do not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. Accordingly, because Maisonet fails to allege his membership in a particular protected class based on race and fails to allege a materially adverse action occurring under circumstances from which the Court can reasonably infer discriminatory intent based on race, Maisonet's claim of racial discrimination under Title VII must be dismissed.

2. Retaliation Claim

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [the Act], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). To...