Maiss v. Metro. Amusement Ass'n

• Decision Date: 12 October 1909
• Citation: 241 Ill. 177,89 N.E. 268
• Parties: MAISS v. METROPOLITAN AMUSEMENT ASS'N.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

241 Ill. 177

89 N.E. 268

MAISS

v.METROPOLITAN AMUSEMENT ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1909.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1909.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Edward A. Dicker, Judge.

Action by Frank Maiss against the Metropolitan Amusement Association. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed by the Appellate Court, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Blum & Blum, for appellant.

Frank L. De Lay, for appellee.

This was an action of the fourth class brought by appellee in the municipal court of the city of Chicago, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the appellee, and for damages to his buggy. Appellant conducts an amusement park at Cottage Grove avenue and Sixtieth street, in the city of Chicago, and in connection therewith operated an electric search light placed on a tower, and so constructed and arranged that the light could be thrown from it by the operator in a horizontal or vertical path. The appellee, on the 15th day of May, 1905, after dark, was driving a horse, which he testified was so quiet it could be driven by a child, in the vicinity of appellant's amusement park, when the search light was thrown down in the horse's face, frightening it so that it ran away, threw the appellee out, and injured him, and damaged the buggy he was riding in. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellee for $150. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and on a certificate of importance by that court a further appeal is prosecuted to this court.

FARMER, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).

The principal contention of appellant is that the municipal court had no jurisdiction of this cause, and should have sustained appellant's motion to dismiss the suit. The action was brought as one of the fourth class provided for in the fourth clause of the second section of the municipal court act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 37, § 265). Said clause reads as follows: ‘Fourth-Cases to be designated and hereinafter referred to as cases of the fourth class, which shall include (a) all civil actions, quasi criminal actions excepted, for the recovery of money only when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, exclusive of costs, does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), the amount in any action on a bond to be determined by the amount actually sought to be recovered and not by the penalty of the bond; (b) all actions for the recovery of personal property when the value of the property sought to be recovered does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000); (c) all actions of forcible detainer; (d) all proceedings for the trial of the right of property; and (a) all actions and proceedings of which justices of the peace are now given jurisdiction by law and which are not otherwise provided for in this act, in which class of actions and proceedings the municipal court shall have jurisdiction where the amount sought to be recovered does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.) In any action of the fourth class for the recovery of money only judgment may be rendered for over one thousand dollars ($1,000), where the excess over one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall consist of interest or damages or costs accrued after the commencement of such action.’ Appellant contends that civil actions ‘for the recovery of money only,’ mentioned in said clause, mean actions upon contracts, express or implied; that the legal signification of the term actions ‘for the recovery of money only’ is that there must be money due to the plaintiff from the defendant in the relation of debtor and creditor. The question is...