Majdipour v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC

• Decision Date: 18 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 12-07849 (WHW) (CLW)
• Parties: SIMON MAJDIPOUR, PAMELA AUSTIN, BRIAN FUCHS, CHARLES MANIS, JASON MANOWITZ, and MARVINA ROBINSON, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

SIMON MAJDIPOUR, PAMELA AUSTIN, BRIAN FUCHS, CHARLES MANIS,JASON MANOWITZ, and MARVINA ROBINSON, individually,and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant.

Civ. No. 12-07849 (WHW) (CLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 18, 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Walls, Senior District Judge

This matter arises from Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which includes new plaintiffs and raises new claims against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC ("Land Rover"). Land Rover moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint's new claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Without oral argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court denies Land Rover's motion in part and grants it in part. In the accompanying order, the Court denies dismissal of the new plaintiffs' common law fraud claims, but grants dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint's other new claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action was initiated by Plaintiff Simon Majdipour, individually and on behalf of a proposed class of similarly situated individuals, on December 26, 2012. Compl., ECF No. 1. Mr. Majdipour amended the initial complaint to add plaintiff Pamela Austin on April 17, 2013. FirstAm. Compl. ("FAC"), ECF No. 14. Defendant Land Rover moved to dismiss it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss FAC, ECF No. 17. The Court granted Land Rover's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part on October 9, 2013. Opinion on Mot. to Dismiss FAC ("FAC Opinion"), ECF No. 26. After the Court issued its opinion, Plaintiffs sought and obtained leave to submit a Second Amended Complaint, which they filed on August 11, 2014. Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 44. The SAC includes four new named plaintiffs who each assert three claims against Land Rover: (1) violation of state consumer protection statutes, (2) common law fraud, and (3) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. ¶¶ 101-08, 144-60. The SAC also adds a new claim brought by the existing plaintiffs; Mr. Majdipour, Ms. Austin, and a sub-set of putative class members; for failure to recall or retrofit. Id. ¶¶ 161-69.

Because the Court's earlier opinion summarized the facts asserted in the FAC, the Court limits its discussion here to the new factual allegations in the SAC. In the SAC, new plaintiffs Brian Fuchs, Charles Manis, Jason Manowitz, and Marvina Robinson ("New Plaintiffs") each allege that they purchased a Land Rover Range Rover sport utility vehicle, from the 2003 to 2006 model-years, which had a defective electronic air suspension system. Id. ¶¶ 1-8. They allege that their Range Rovers' suspension systems "are defective in material, manufacturing and/or design which causes them to develop leaks in the rubber air bellows used in those systems." Id. ¶ 1. The leaks "cause a loss of air pressure in the suspension system that renders Class Vehicles suddenly unable to travel in a straight line, which poses a serious risk of injury and death." Id. ¶ 2. The SAC contends that "Land Rover knew or should have known about the Defect since 2003" and "failed to disclose" it before and after New Plaintiffs bought their Range Rovers. Id. ¶ 3.

In July 2003, new plaintiff Brian Fuchs, a New York citizen, purchased a 2003 model-year Range Rover in New York. Id. ¶ 63. Before purchasing the vehicle, according to the SAC, Mr.Fuchs viewed a similar model-year Range Rover at the New York Auto Show "and at no time during the car show was it disclosed to him that the vehicle suffered from the alleged Suspension Defect." Id. ¶ 64. In September and October 2008, when Mr. Fuchs's Range Rover had accumulated over 50,000 miles, Mr. Fuchs brought it to an authorized Land Rover dealer in New York "complaining that the vehicle's electronic air suspension light was on." Id. ¶¶ 65-66. The dealer made repairs which cost Mr. Fuchs $1,665. Id. Mr. Fuchs also had the suspension system repaired in January 2009, at approximately 55,908 miles, and in July 2010, at approximately 70,857 miles. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. These repairs cost him $4,739. Id. The SAC alleges that Mr. Fuchs was never told during his repair visits "that this was a known systemic defect" that might recur. Id. ¶ 69.

New plaintiff Marvina Robinson, also a New York citizen, bought a certified pre-owned 2006 model-year Range Rover in or about May 2006 from an authorized Land Rover dealer in Glen Cove, New York. Id. ¶ 85. The SAC alleges that she attended the New York Auto Show and reviewed promotional materials about the vehicle, including Land Rover's website, television commercials, and brochures. Id. ¶ 86. She also "spoke to Land Rover Glen Cove's sales representative" about the vehicle, but none of these information sources disclosed that the vehicle suffered from the alleged suspension defect. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. In July 2012 and November 2013, Ms. Robinson brought her Range Rover to third-party repair facilities "complaining that the front suspension had dropped," and they made repairs that cost her $4,674. Id. ¶¶ 88-89.

In July 2005, new plaintiff Charles Manis, a Georgia citizen, purchased a used 2006 model-year Range Rover in Florida. Id. ¶ 71. The SAC alleges that, before making the purchase, Mr. Manis reviewed Land Rover sales and promotional materials about the vehicle, but they did not disclose the alleged suspension defect. Id. ¶¶ 72-73. In October 2011, when Mr. Manis's RangeRover had over 90,000 miles, an authorized Land Rover dealer in Florida found that "the right front air spring was leaking, and replaced the right front air spring" after the vehicle's "front suspension had dropped." Id. ¶ 74. The repair cost Mr. Manis over $1,600. Id. The SAC alleges that the problem recurred in December 2013 and that a third party repaired it for $1,172. Id. ¶ 75. Neither repair facility informed Mr. Manis "that this was a known systemic defect." Id. ¶ 76.

In or about December 2006, new plaintiff Jason Manowitz, a Florida citizen, purchased a certified pre-owned 2004 model-year Range Rover from a Land Rover dealer in Florida. Id. ¶ 78. Before his purchase, according to the SAC, Mr. Manowitz "reviewed Land Rover's sales and promotion materials" and spoke to a sales representative at the dealership, but no person or document informed him of the alleged defect. Id. ¶¶ 79-80. In October 2011, when Mr. Manowitz's Range Rover had over 80,000 miles, an authorized Land Rover dealer found "that the front air spring was leaking" and replaced it for $1,523. Id. ¶ 81. In March 2013, the SAC alleges that a third party made repairs that cost $1,115 because "the front suspension had dropped." Id. ¶ 82. The repair facilities never advised Mr. Manowitz that his vehicle had a "known systemic defect" which might recur. Id. ¶ 83.

Alleging these facts, New Plaintiffs and putative classes of similarly situated individuals seek to recover from Land Rover for violations of the New York and Florida consumer protection statutes, common law fraud, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. ¶¶ 101-08, 144-60. Plaintiffs Majdipour and Austin, in addition to re-alleging the claims that survived Land Rover's motion to dismiss the FAC,¹ also seek to recover for Land Rover's alleged failure to recall or retrofit its 2003 to 2006 model-year Range Rovers. Id. ¶¶ 161-69. The SAC asserts that despiteknowing that the defective suspension systems pose "serious safety risks" to consumers and other drivers, Land Rover has unreasonably "refused to recall or retrofit the Class Vehicles and their unsafe front air suspensions." Id. ¶ 165-68. Land Rover moves to dismiss each of the SAC's new causes of action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

LEGAL STANDARD

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679.

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, the analysis "unfolds in three steps." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). "First, we outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief. Next, we peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, we look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then 'determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Id. (citing and quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-79, and Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 73 (3d Cir. 2011)). As a general matter, the court's inquiry "is not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail in a trial on the merits, but whetherthey should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of their claims." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

1. New Plaintiffs' State Consumer Protection Statute Claims

a. New Plaintiffs' Claims Under Florida's Consumer Protection Statute Are Time-Barred

The SAC alleges that Land Rover violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat....