Majid v. Means
| Decision Date | 24 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 0:19-1937-MGL-PJG |
| Parties | Shahid L.A. Majid, aka Arthur Moseley, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Cassandra Means, Regional Dir.; Sherrisse Birch, CCC; DHE Francine Backman; Warden Randall Williams; Assoc. Warden Martell; SCDC; and IGB Sherman Anderson, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
The plaintiff, Shahid L.A. Majid, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this action alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 50.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Majid of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 53.) Majid filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 74), as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 66), and the defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 78).1 Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motion should be granted, and Majid's motion should be denied.
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to Majid, to the extent they find support in the record. Majid's Complaint contains a litany of allegations, many of which are difficult to discern. However, the majority of his complaints appear to concern his mental health treatment—or alleged lack thereof—by certain defendants while housed in various South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") facilities. Majid also references a "fraudulent" mental health assessment being presented at a disciplinary hearing, his being forced to take unprescribed medication, and being denied a crank up radio. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
The court construed Majid's Complaint as only alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and for retaliation. (Order, ECF No. 19 at 1.) No party challenged this construction of the claims. Majid seeks monetary relief and for all of his disciplinary charges to be expunged. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6.)
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court "may also consider documentsattached to the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic." Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); CelotexCorp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
The defendants argue that Majid failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the majority of his claims. A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." This requirement "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Generally, to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); but see Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires "using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v.McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thus, "it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The defendant has the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Pursuant to South Carolina Department of Corrections policy (see SCDC Policy GA-01.12 "Inmate Grievance System," ECF No. 50-5), an inmate seeking to complain of prison conditions generally must first attempt to informally resolve his complaint. Next, an inmate may file a "Step 1 Grievance" with designated prison staff. If the Step 1 Grievance is denied, the inmate may appeal to the warden of his facility via a "Step 2 Grievance." Moreover, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, review from the South Carolina Administrative Law Court ("ALC"), a state executive-branch tribunal, is generally part of the available administrative remedies an inmate must exhaust. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-500 () (emphasis added); see Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 649 S.E.2d 35, 38 (S.C. 2007) () (citing Slezak v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 605 S.E.2d 506 (S.C. 2004)); (SCDC Policy GA-01.12 "Inmate Grievance System" at § 13.9, ECF No. 50-5).
The law is clear that exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit and must be completed prior to filing an action. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 676-77 (4th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Page v. Paduly, No. 9:09-cv-0952-RMG-BM, 2010 WL 4365644, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2010) (); Cabbagestalk v. Ozmint, C/A No. 9:06-3005-MBS, 2007 WL 2822927, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2007) (); see also Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (...
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