Major v. Csx Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. DKC 96-3942.,No. DKC 98-1271.,No. DKC 98-1690.,No. DKC97-37.,No. DKC 96-3941.,No. DKC 97-2888.,No. DKC 98-789.,No. DKC 97-3219.,No. DKC 98-1270.,No. Civ. A. DKC 96-3940.,Civ. A. DKC 96-3940.,DKC 96-3941.,DKC 96-3942.,DKC97-37.,DKC 97-2888.,DKC 97-3219.,DKC 98-789.,DKC 98-1270.,DKC 98-1271.,DKC 98-1690. |
| Citation | 170 F.Supp.2d 563 |
| Parties | Margaret MAJOR, et al. v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Roger A. Doumar, Thomas C. Summers, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, Baltimore, MD, Eric Lee Siegel, Henrichsen Siegel, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.
M. Natalie McSherry, Stephen B. Caplis, Sandra Harlen Benzer, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P., Baltimore, MD, for CSX Transportation, Inc., National Railroad Passenger Corp.
James E. Gray, Michael B. MacWilliams, Venable Baetjer and Howard, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Warren L. Simpson, Jr., John E. Kawaczynski, E. Graham Robb, Weber Goldstein Greenberg & Gallagher, Philadelphia, PA, David H. Hollander, Jr., Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Gray, Baltimore, MD, for Sumitomo Corp. of America.
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case arising from a train collision are motions by (1) certain Plaintiffs for partial summary judgment as to the liability of Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT"), (2) Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") for summary judgment in its favor as to all remaining plaintiffs, and (3) Plaintiff Rodney Crawford to strike CSXT's sur-reply to certain Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The issues have been briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For reasons that follow, the court will deny Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to CSXT's liability for negligence. The court will also deny Amtrak's motion for summary judgment. No determination is necessary on Plaintiffs' motion to strike because the court never accepted the sur-reply for filing and so the issue is moot.
On or about February 16, 1996, Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC) train 286 collided with Amtrak train 29 east of Georgetown Junction, in Silver Spring, Maryland. The MARC train was owned by the Maryland Mass Transit Authority (MTA) and operated by CSXT. Paper no. 39, at 2.
The collision resulted in several deaths and injuries. A significant number of lawsuits were filed and are still pending against CSXT, Amtrak, and Sumitomo Corporation of America (Sumitomo), the company that built the MARC train.1 These lawsuits were consolidated for discovery and scheduling purposes. Several have settled. One remaining plaintiff ("Plaintiff Major") is the survivor of an operating crew member of the MARC train who also brings claims on behalf of the crew member's estate. Significant issues remain regarding potential contributory negligence on the part of Plaintiffs decedent. Other plaintiffs, including all those bringing the pending motion for partial summary judgment against CSXT, were either passengers on the MARC train or non-operating crew of the Amtrak train.
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir.1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Pulliam Inv. Co., 810 F.2d at 1282 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir.1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element ... necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In Celotex Corp., the Supreme Court stated:
In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, "`a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue.'" Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir.1984) (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C.1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir.1967)). There must be Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). The analysis in this case involves both an affirmative motion by the party which will have the burden of proof at trial and a defensive motion by a different party.
As a preliminary matter, the motion to strike CSXT's sur-reply is moot because the sur-reply in question was never accepted for filing or docketed by the court. It was returned on April 23, 2001 with a note that leave of court would be necessary before it would be received. CSXT never sought such leave.
Plaintiff passengers and service personnel move for partial summary judgment that CSXT is liable for the accident and so seek to move directly to a trial for damages. As the party that will have the burden of proof at trial, they must show that no material dispute of fact remains by pointing to admissible evidence on each of the elements of their claim. Plaintiffs base their claim that CSXT should be found liable as a matter of law solely on CSXT's answer to Plaintiff Major's Interrogatory no. 14, in which it conceded that its conductors "contributed to the cause of their own deaths by failing to abide by signal indications." Paper no. 182, ex. 1. In its response to Plaintiffs' motion, CSXT admits that the failure of the MARC operating crew to abide by signal indications was a "substantial legal cause of the collision", though it says that there is no material dispute as to that fact alone and that there remain significant disputed facts as to other theories of liability. Paper no. 184, Memorandum at 2. Plaintiff Major also filed an opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment. Although Plaintiff Major does not have standing to oppose, it should be noted that the determination of other Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment does not affect the validity of Plaintiff Major's claims against CSXT.
All of the moving Plaintiffs assert a claim of negligence against CSXT. The standard for negligence in Maryland has four elements:
In Maryland, in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove: a duty owed to the plaintiff or to a class of which the plaintiff is a part; a breach of that duty; a causal relationship between the breach and the harm; and damages suffered.
Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 361 Md. 645, 655, 762 A.2d 582 (2000), citing Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 531, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). Therefore, in order to prove that CSXT is liable as a matter of law, it is necessary for each Plaintiff to show that there is no material dispute of fact as to all four elements.
Plaintiffs assert that, under the standard for summary judgment, "... this Court must conclude that all allegations against CSX contained in the Complaints as to liability are true, due to the admissions by CSX" in its answer to Plaintiff Major's Interrogatory no. 14. Paper no. 182, Memorandum at 4. In their bare and conclusory brief in support of this motion, Plaintiffs assert CSXT's liability without analyzing the evidence according to the four elements of negligence and do not explain how CSXT's admission meets their burden of proving liability. In its answers to each of Plaintiffs' complaints, CSXT denied that it had a duty to Plaintiffs, that it breached that duty, and that Plaintiffs' injuries resulted from the collision.2 Therefore, each of these elements remain in dispute prior to consideration of the evidence proffered by Plaintiffs in support of their motion.
The only "evidence" proffered by Plaintiffs in support of their motion, CSXT's answer to Interrogatory no. 14, then, must meet the burden of proof for all four elements of negligence, if Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. Interrogatory no. 14 asked:
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