Major v. State
Citation | 814 So.2d 424 |
Decision Date | 28 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-1811.,SC01-1811. |
Parties | Fritz MAJOR, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael Niemand, Bureau Chief, and Regine Monestime, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Respondent.
We have for review Major v. State, 790 So.2d 550, 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT OR COUNSEL HAVE A DUTY TO ADVISE A DEFENDANT THAT [THE DEFENDANT'S] PLEA IN A PENDING CASE MAY HAVE SENTENCE ENHANCING CONSEQUENCES IF THE DEFENDANT COMMITS A NEW CRIME IN THE FUTURE.
We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const., answer the certified question in the negative, and approve the Third District's decision in this case.
In 1993, petitioner Fritz Major was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Prior to his trial in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, Major, while represented by counsel, pled no contest to this charge. The trial court, after engaging Major in a plea colloquy, adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to a term of eighteen months of incarceration. During the colloquy, the trial court did not advise Major that his plea could have sentence enhancing consequences if Major committed crimes in the future. After his release from state prison, Major committed a federal crime, which the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida successfully prosecuted. Major's federal sentence was enhanced from 210 months to 364 months due to his prior criminal adjudication in state court.
Major petitioned this Court for a writ of error coram nobis and attacked the validity of his 1993 plea on the theory that the trial court and his defense counsel failed to inform him of the future enhancement effect his state adjudication would have in a subsequent prosecution.1 We transferred the petition to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, which court denied the petition, finding that the possible future enhancement effect of an adjudication resulting from a plea was a collateral consequence of the plea. The trial court also concluded that neither the trial court nor defense counsel had a duty to advise Major of collateral consequences to the plea. Major appealed the trial court's denial to the Third District.
Pursuant to this Court's decision in Wood v. State, 750 So.2d 592 (Fla.1999), the Third District considered Major's petition for writ of error coram nobis to be one filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Adhering to its prior case law, see, e.g., State v. Fox, 659 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995),
the Third District held that neither the trial court nor defense counsel had a duty to anticipate a defendant's future recidivism. See Major, 790 So.2d at 551. Agreeing with the trial court, the Third District concluded that future sentence enhancement is a collateral and not a direct consequence of a plea, and therefore neither the trial court nor defense counsel was under a duty to advise Major of this potential consequence at the time he pled to the state crime. See id. at 552. In so holding, the Third District distinguished an apparent statement to the contrary in this Court's opinion in State v. Perry, 786 So.2d 554, 557 (Fla.2001). See Major, 790 So.2d at 552. Finding the statement in Perry to be dicta, the Third District held that Perry did not overrule that district's case law holding that potential future sentence enhancement is a collateral and not a direct consequence of a plea. See Major, 790 So.2d at 552. Thus, the Third District denied Major postconviction relief but certified the instant question so that it may be authoritatively resolved. See id. at 553.
We conclude that we answered the certified question in the negative in our decision in State v. Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960 (Fla.1987), and that decision continues to correctly state the law on this issue. In Ginebra we explained:
().
We therefore hold that counsel's failure to advise his client of the collateral consequence of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. We note that there are numerous other collateral consequences of which a defendant does not have to be knowledgeable before his plea is considered knowing and voluntary. See [Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 n. 4 (2d Cir.1974) ].
Id. at 960-62 (footnotes omitted).2
Our decision in Ginebra is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984), in which the Court reasoned:
(Footnotes omitted.)
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited to the Supreme Court's decision in Mabry in exploring a similar issue:
Moreover, we note that the voluntariness of the plea depends only upon whether the defendant is aware of the direct consequences of the plea. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509[, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437] (1984). For example, the use of a plea as a sentencing enhancement for another crime is considered a collateral, not a direct, consequence. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1980).
Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1139 n. 16 (11th Cir.1991).
Since our decision in Ginebra, Florida's district courts of appeal have consistently held that the trial court and counsel are not required to inform the defendant of potential sentence enhancing effects to the sentence of a crime committed in the future because such potential consequences are collateral to the plea. The Third District in its 1995 Fox opinion reasoned:
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831[, 110 S.Ct. 101, 107 L.Ed.2d 65] (1989). The sentencing court is not required "to anticipate a...
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