Major v. Vill. of Newberry
| Decision Date | 02 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 322368. |
| Citation | 316 Mich.App. 527,892 N.W.2d 402 |
| Parties | MAJOR v. VILLAGE OF NEWBERRY. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Hanshaw Burink, PLC, Marquette (by Sandra Hanshaw Burink ), for plaintiff.
Strom & Strom, PC, Escanaba (by Paul L. Strom ), for defendant.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and STEPHENS and RIORDAN, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court's order granting summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff, Debra Major, was an employee of defendant, village of Newberry. Relevant to this case, defendant operated two departments—the department of public works and the department of water and light. Plaintiff began working for defendant on May 15, 2002. From 2002 to 2008, plaintiff held the position of meter reader in defendant's department of public works; in 2010 and 2011, she held the position of apprentice lineman in the department of water and light. Plaintiff applied for the position of apprentice lineman1 in 2008, but defendant's village council voted to not offer plaintiff the position. Plaintiff filed a union grievance on July 3, 2008. Later in December 2008, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that plaintiff was denied the apprentice lineman position for no other reason than because she was female. The EEOC charge was resolved in an October 2010 conciliation agreement in which plaintiff agreed not to sue defendant with respect to the allegations in the discrimination charge, and plaintiff received the position of apprentice lineman.
Plaintiff was awarded the position of apprentice lineman on December 21, 2010. Two months later, on February 22, 2011, in accordance with her rights under the union contract, plaintiff wrote Beverly Holmes, defendant's village manager, and requested to return to her previous position of meter reader. Plaintiff cited two reasons for her decision. Plaintiff claimed that Matthew Perry (the lineman supervisor) had "done everything in his power to make" her 60–day period on the job "miserable" and that she did not see how she could attain the required 7,000 hours of work required to become a journeyman lineman.
Dissatisfied with her tenure as a lineman, plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC in July 2011, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her sex and that she was subjected to retaliation after filing her 2008 charge of discrimination. On August 3, 2012, plaintiff was notified by the EEOC that "[t]he facts, evidence, and information obtained throughout the course of the investigation fails to establish that you were discriminated against on the basis which you alleged in the charge." The EEOC letter informed plaintiff that
Plaintiff filed a charge with Michigan's Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) that was dismissed on September 19, 2012. The MDCR Notice of Disposition and Order of Dismissal provided that plaintiff could either request reconsideration of the refusal to issue a charge within 30 days after the date the notice was mailed, or appeal the notice of dismissal to "the circuit court of the State of Michigan having jurisdiction within 30 days of the date of service of an appealable order."
On October 17, 2012, plaintiff received notice from the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, informing her that because "180 days ha[d] elapsed since the date the [EEOC] assumed jurisdiction over the charge, and no suit based thereon [was] filed by this Department," plaintiff still had the right to institute a civil action against defendant under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 within 90 days of plaintiff's receipt of the notice.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court against defendant on April 24, 2013, alleging gender discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation under Michigan's Elliott–Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. As a basis for her gender discrimination claim, plaintiff alleged that she and other female employees were subjected to disparate treatment and were required to perform ministerial tasks when male employees were not. Plaintiff further alleged that she was not promoted to the position of apprentice lineman because she was not provided with the same training as was the male apprentice, Jake Lewis. Plaintiff also alleged that she worked in a hostile work environment because she was harassed with unwelcome comments and incidents of conduct that were offensive and targeted toward her gender. As a basis for her age discrimination claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant (1) failed to promote her to the position of apprentice lineman because of her age of 54 at the time she applied in 2008, (2) provided the necessary training to a younger employee, again Jake Lewis, and (3) changed the requirements for the position after it was posted. As a basis for her retaliation claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant retaliated against her after she filed a claim with the EEOC against defendant in December 2008.
Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). Plaintiff filed a brief in response supported by the affidavits of Terrence Webb (defendant's previous president and accounts payable clerk), Cheryl Withrow (trustee of defendant's council and council representative to defendant's department of water and light board), and William McNamara (former supervisor for defendant).
After a hearing, the trial court issued its decision on June 5, 2014. The court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition in part under MCR 2.116(C)(7), concluding that plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. The court reasoned that plaintiff failed to file her claim within the EEOC-stated 90–day period after her complaint was investigated by the MDCR, and that the statutory three-year period of limitations related to injuries to persons or property, MCL 600.5805(10), was inapplicable.
Plaintiff now seeks relief from this Court.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on a finding that she filed her complaint outside the period of limitations. We agree.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Waltz v. Wyse, 469 Mich. 642, 647, 677 N.W.2d 813 (2004). "Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Id. To determine whether summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7), "this Court consider[s] all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict them." Id. at 647–648, 677 N.W.2d 813 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Issues of statutory interpretation, like the interpretation of the CRA, are questions of law that this Court also reviews de novo. Krohn v. Home–Owners Ins. Co., 490 Mich. 145, 155, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011).
At issue in this case is which limitations period applies to plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff argues that her case is governed by the three-year period of limitations applicable to actions to recover damages for injury to a person, MCL 600.5805(10). The trial court applied the limitations periods set forth by the EEOC and the MDCR for appealing their respective dismissals of her claims. We hold that the trial court erred.
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the appropriate period of limitations is three years. MCL 600.5805(10) provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property." The CRA, in part, prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee or an individual in an apprenticeship or training program on the basis of sex or age with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment. MCL 37.2202(1)(a) ; MCL 37.2205. The CRA also prohibits retaliation or discrimination because the person made a charge, filed a complaint, or opposed a violation of the act. MCL 37.2701. A person alleging a violation of the act may bring a civil action for damages "in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his [or her] principal place of business." MCL 37.2801(1) and (2). The CRA "shall not be construed to diminish the right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of the state." MCL 37.2803.
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