Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co.

Decision Date16 April 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–2893.,12–2893.
Citation714 F.3d 527
PartiesRenee S. MAJORS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Steven Sams (argued), Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Kenneth Brian Siepman (argued), Attorney, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, for DefendantAppellee.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and MILLER, District Judge.*

MILLER, District Judge.

Renee S. Majors, a long-time employee at General Electric Company's Bloomington, Indiana plant, filed suit alleging that GE violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., when it denied her temporary and permanent positions to which she was otherwise entitled under the seniority-based bidding procedure the plant used to fill vacant positions. Ms. Majors also alleged that GE retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII, for filing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charges of discrimination when she was denied overtime hours and the opportunity to work “lack of work” Fridays, and that GE constructively discharged her when she elected to retire. The district court granted GE summary judgment on all claims. Ms. Majors appeals that decision with the exception of her Title VII discrimination claim. We affirm.

I. Background

Ms. Majors worked at GE's Bloomington plant for 32 years. In 2000, she suffered a work-related injury to her right shoulder that left her limited to lifting no more than twenty pounds and precluded her from work above shoulder level with her right arm. The restrictions were considered temporary at first, but according to her medical file maintained by GE, the restrictions later were determined to be permanent.

The Bloomington GE plant manufactures side-by-side refrigerators. The workforce dropped from 3,000 employees in 2000 to 750–800 employees in 2009. A collective bargaining agreement between GE and the union governs the terms and conditions of employment for the Bloomington plant hourly employees, including Ms. Majors. The CBA requires that vacant temporary or permanent positions be awarded to the most senior eligible employee who bids on the position. The onsite medical clinic, which is operated by a third party, received notice of a job award. The clinic staff reviews the position and the employee's medical file to decide whether any restrictions affect the employee's ability to perform the position, and if so, whether the restrictions can be accommodated. The clinic staff informs GE's human resources department whether the employee is medically qualified for the position. The position goes to the next most senior bidder if the employee isn't medically qualified.

Ms. Majors held several different positions at the plant, including a stint as a purchased material auditor from December 2000 to June 2001. She worked as a quality control inspector in Assembly, performing quality audits on refrigerators, from February 2003 until her retirement in October 2009.

In May 2009, Ms. Majors was the senior eligible bidder for a temporary purchased material auditor position. A purchased material auditor inspects, tests, and audits a variety of purchased components and internally manufactured parts for conformance to engineering specifications and quality standards before the component or part is released to production or shipment. The position requires “intermittent movement of heavy objects,” which is the focus of this dispute. Lead Occupational Health Nurse Toni Kristoff reviewed the job award and noted that Ms. Majors had permanent lifting restrictions and the job description required intermittent movement of heavy objects. Ms. Kristoff discussed the position's lifting requirements with Labor Resources Manager Linda Schneider and discovered that lifting more than twenty pounds was an essential function of the position. Consequently, Ms. Kristoff determined Ms. Majors was not medically qualified for that position.

Ms. Majors let management know that she believed she could perform the auditor position. GE further investigated the position's requirements and whether Ms. Majors's lifting restrictions could be accommodated. A group that included Ms. Kristoff, Ms. Schneider, and an ergonomic technical specialist reviewed the auditor job description and visited the work area. The group discussed the position's requirements with a current auditor and the manager of the auditors, both of whom confirmed that lifting parts and material weighing more than twenty pounds was an essential function of the position. Ms. Schneider and the ergonomic specialist weighed objects the auditor had to lift and confirmed the objects weighed more than twenty pounds. A nurse practitioner reviewed and corroborated Ms. Kristoff's conclusion that Ms. Majors wasn't medically qualified for the position. Ms. Kristoff and the ergonomic specialist discussed the position's lifting requirements with Ms. Majors, who suggested that a material handler could do the lifting. Ms. Majors testified in her deposition that she repeatedly told Ms. Kristoff that the lifting restrictions no longer limited her.

GE decided Ms. Majors couldn't perform an essential function of the auditor position because of her permanent lifting restrictions, and the company gave the job to the next most senior eligible bidder. Ms. Majors filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on May 22, 2009 alleging she was denied the temporary auditor position because of her disability (in violation of the ADA) and her sex (in violation of Title VII).

Ms. Majors claims that as a result of filing her EEOC charge, she was denied overtime hours and the opportunity to work on “lack of work” Fridays. A “lack of work” day occurs when no production is scheduled at the plant and few employees are scheduled to work. Ms. Majors emphasizes the difference between her overtime hours worked and “lack of work” Friday assignments compared to those of three other quality control inspectors at the plant and her replacement. In 2009, GE offered a special early retirement program that required eligible employees to elect to participate by August 31, 2009. Ms. Majors claims that seven days before the deadline, shortly after returning from her mother's funeral, she chose to participate in the program and retire in November 2009 due to the discrimination and retaliation.

In October, after she had elected to retire but before her retirement began, Ms. Majors applied for and, as the senior eligible bidder, was awarded a permanent auditor position. Ms. Kristoff again reviewed the award and confirmed with the auditor supervisor that the position's lifting requirements hadn't changed. Ms. Kristoff determined Ms. Majors wasn't medically qualified for the auditor position, and the job went to the next most senior eligible bidder.

Ms. Majors filed a second charge of discrimination on March 30, 2010 alleging that she was denied the permanent auditor position because of her disability and sex. Ms. Majors also alleged retaliation and constructive discharge. Ms. Majors filed suit, alleging that by not awarding her either the temporary or permanent auditor position, GE discriminated against her in violation of the ADA and Title VII. Ms. Majors claimed GE retaliated against her, violating Title VII, by denying her overtime hours and the chance to work Fridays that were “lack of work” days. Ms. Majors also alleged GE constructively discharged her when she retired. The district court granted GE summary judgment as to all of Ms. Majors's claims, and Ms. Majors appeals the district court's decision with the exception of her Title VII discrimination claim.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo.Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Although intent and credibility are often critical issues in employment discrimination cases, no special summary judgment standard applies to such cases. Alexander v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Family Serv., 263 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir.2001). In an employment discrimination case, as in any case, we must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d at 774;Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir.2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

III. Discussion
A. ADA Discrimination

Ms. Majors first contends the district court improperly granted summary judgment on her claim that GE discriminated against her when she wasn't promoted to a purchased material auditor position due to her permanent work restrictions. The ADA proscribes an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in job application procedures and in the hiring or advancement of employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Depending on the issues raised by a summary judgment motion, an ADA plaintiff must identify a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) she is disabled; (2) she is able to perform the essential functions of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Povey v. City of Jeffersonville, Ind., 697 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir.2012). Ms. Majors argues that she was disabled within all three definitions of disability under the ADA....

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