MAJS Inv., Inc. v. Albany Bank & Trust Co.

Decision Date27 September 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-3345,87-3345
Citation529 N.E.2d 1035,124 Ill.Dec. 918,175 Ill.App.3d 478
Parties, 124 Ill.Dec. 918 MAJS INVESTMENT, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALBANY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Gary S. Tucker, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, Chicago (Alan S. Gilbert, Alan M. Posner, Patricia W. Hatamyar, of counsel) and Morgan and Karzov, Ltd., Chicago (Arnold J. Karzov, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Justice EGAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, MAJS Investment, Inc. (MAJS), and Babu Patel filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking money damages. The trial court relied on an exculpatory clause in a trust agreement existing between the parties and dismissed the complaint on the defendant's motion. Only MAJS appeals.

The original complaint filed in December 1986 and the first amended complaint alleged the following:

Under a land trust agreement dated October 13, 1980, the defendant became the legal title owner of a piece of real estate valued at $800,000 which was encumbered by a mortgage in the sum of $475,000. The named beneficiary was the plaintiff corporation. At the time the sole shareholder and president of the plaintiff corporation was Meena Patel, who had the power of direction and was the wife of Babu Patel. In March 1983 the defendant was served with a mortgage foreclosure complaint and summons filed against the real estate.

Upon receipt of the documents, the defendant forwarded them in an envelope addressed to Babu Patel at his home address which was also the registered address of the plaintiff corporation. The cover letter enclosing the documents requested Babu Patel to acknowledge receipt thereof, to provide the defendant with the name, address and telephone number of his attorney and to direct his attorney to advise the defendant "that he is taking action to dismiss the bank or is taking other appropriate action to protect the interest of the bank as well as your own interest in this trust." The letter further stated that "[if] we do not hear from you or your attorney within ten days, it will be necessary that we turn this matter over to our attorney to perform such services and charge this trust accordingly for all expenses and attorney's fees." No letter was addressed to the plaintiff corporation or to Meena Patel, the sole shareholder of the corporation at the time, and the defendant received no response from either of them or Babu Patel. A default judgment of foreclosure was entered against the plaintiff corporation; and the plaintiff's motion to vacate the foreclosure was subsequently denied.

Both the original complaint and the first amended complaint were in two counts. Count I was based on an allegation of a breach of fiduciary obligations. Count II was captioned "Punitive Damages" and made the same allegations as Count I plus an allegation that the defendant "acted with a reckless disregard for the rights" of the plaintiff. The first amended complaint also alleged that the defendant knew that Babu Patel was frequently out of the city and not readily "communicable" (sic) and had agreed with him "to provide legal service to protect the interest of MAJS if necessary, and if Patel was not available; said service to be paid by Patel." The trial court, in dismissing the first amended complaint, held that since Babu Patel was not a beneficiary at the time of the foreclosure suit, the defendant owed him no duty. As noted, Babu Patel has not appealed.

The plaintiff bases its claim on two theories: First, the trust agreement provided that if the trustee shall be required to pay any sums of money on account of the trust or be made party to any litigation, the beneficiary was required to reimburse the trustee. It also provided as follows:

"However, nothing herein contained shall be construed as requiring the trustee to advance or pay out any money on account of this trust or to prosecute or defend any legal proceeding involving this trust or any property or interest thereunder. The sole duty of the Trustee with reference to any such legal proceeding shall be to give timely notice thereof to the beneficiaries hereunder after the Trustee is served with process therein and to permit such legal proceedings to be brought or defended in its name, provided that it shall be indemnified in respect thereto in a manner satisfactory to it."

The plaintiff contends that the defendant breached that duty to give timely notice to the proper party. Second, the plaintiff maintains that the letter of March 25, 1983, which the bank sent mistakenly to Babu Patel with a copy of the foreclosure complaint, constituted a modification of the trust agreement and that the bank was obligated thereby to provide legal services. The plaintiff's second argument we may deal with summarily. The very case it cites, John Kubinski & Sons v. Dockside Development Corporation (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 1015, 339 N.E.2d 529, is authority against it. In order that a modification of a contract may be established, it must be shown that the parties assented to the same terms. There is no showing in the pleadings that the defendant agreed to assume the obligation to defend the action; nor is there any showing that the beneficiary agreed to have the trustee defend.

In response to the plaintiff's first argument, the defendant points to the following language of the trust agreement:

"It is further understood and agreed that neither the Albany Bank & Trust Company, N.A. individually or as Trustee, nor as successor or successors in trust, shall incur any personal liability or be subjected to any claim, judgment or decree for anything it or they, or their agent or attorneys, may do or omit to do in or about the said real estate or under the provisions of said deed or deeds in trust or this Trust Agreement, or any amendment thereof, or for injury to person or property happening in or about said real estate or for any improvident conveyances, any and all such liability being hereby expressly waived and released." (Emphasis added.)

The trial court held that the mailing of the letter to Babu Patel, the husband of the president of the plaintiff corporation, rather than to the corporation was a "technical violation" and, therefore, the...

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  • Busey Bank v. Salyards
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 15, 1999
    ...to respond to arguments in the trial court may be deemed a waiver of the issue. MAJS Investment, Inc. v. Albany Bank & Trust Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 478, 482, 124 Ill.Dec. 918, 529 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (1988). However, Farmers Merchants' argument is that the trial court was without statutory autho......
  • Metro Communications v. AMERITECH MOBILE COM.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • February 19, 1992
    ...213, 216 (1981). The parties must express their mutual consent to the same terms, MAJS Invest., Inc. v. Albany Bank & Trust Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 478, 124 Ill.Dec. 918, 920, 529 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (1988), and the assent must be supported by consideration, Terminal Freezers, Inc. v. Roberts Fro......
  • Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, Missouri v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of Belleville, 5-92-0364
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 15, 1994
    ...effective except as to reckless or intentional breaches or those committed in bad faith. (MAJS Investment, Inc. v. Albany Bank & Trust Co. (1988), 175 Ill.App.3d 478, 124 Ill.Dec. 918, 529 N.E.2d 1035.) Based upon our review of the record, we do not find any evidence to support an argument ......
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    ...208 (7th Cir.1991) (employer could not unilaterally modify employment contract); MAJS Investment Inc. v. Albany Bank & Trust Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 478, 124 Ill.Dec. 918, 920, 529 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (1988) (for a valid modification of a contract, it must be shown that the parties assented to th......
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