Mak Co., Inc. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 08 February 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 90-6007.
• Citation: 763 F. Supp. 1003
• Parties: MAK CO., INC., Herbert L. McLeod and Lorene McLeod, Plaintiffs, v. Maurice SMITH, Individually and as the Director of the Arkansas Highway Commission; Ron Harrod, Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Rodney Slater, Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; L.W. "Bill" Clark, Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Raymond A. Pritchett, Jr., Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Samuel K. Skinner, as the Director of the Department of Transportation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

763 F. Supp. 1003

MAK CO., INC., Herbert L. McLeod and Lorene McLeod, Plaintiffs, v. Maurice SMITH, Individually and as the Director of the Arkansas Highway Commission; Ron Harrod, Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Rodney Slater, Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; L.W. "Bill" Clark, Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Raymond A. Pritchett, Jr., Individually and as a Commissioner of the Arkansas State Highway Commission; Samuel K. Skinner, as the Director of the Department of Transportation, Defendants.

Civ. No. 90-6007.

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division.

February 8, 1991.

Q. Byrum Hurst, Jr., Hot Springs, Ark., for plaintiffs.

Robert L. Wilson, Ark. State Hwy. Com'n, David Ferguson, Dept. of Transp., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

OREN HARRIS, District Judge.

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment by separate defendant Samuel K. Skinner. The motion contends that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and that the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs have responded to the motion.

This action involves the construction of a modification of a highway around the Hot Springs, Arkansas area. Plaintiffs previously brought suit in this court against the Arkansas State Highway Commission and Department of Transportation for inverse condemnation and equitable and injunctive relief on October 2, 1989, No. 89-6104. That complaint was dismissed by this court as being proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Mak Co. Inc. v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, slip op., No. 89-6104 (W.D.Ark., Dec. 7, 1989). Plaintiffs now bring this action seeking inverse condemnation and injunctive relief against Samuel K. Skinner as Director of the Department of Transportation in his official capacity, and the remaining defendants in their individual and official capacities.

The complaint alleges that the defendants propose to extend the highway through land owned by the plaintiffs, but defendants refuse to condemn the property. Plaintiffs contend that the defendants' refusal to condemn the property is an attempt to deprive the plaintiffs of their use of the property. Plaintiffs pray for this court to order condemnation proceedings against their property.

This issue is moot in that a complaint and declaration of taking were filed in the Garland County Circuit Court on March 29, 1990, styled Arkansas State Highway Commission v. MAK Company, Inc., Herbert L. McLeod and Lorene McLeod, Arkansas Bank and Trust Company, Civ. 90-217 (Garland Co.Cir.Ct.1990). After a trial, the jury awarded $370,040 to the plaintiffs, and judgment was entered December 20, 1990.

In this action, the complaint further alleges that plaintiffs have been deprived of their constitutional right of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, because of the unlawful taking of their property without payment of just compensation. Equitable relief could have been sought in the Garland County Chancery Court whereby the defendants may be enjoined from the taking of property until just compensation is provided therefor.¹ Light v. Blackwell, 472 F.Supp. 333 (E.D.Ark.1979) aff'd, 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir.1980); Flake v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, 251 Ark. 1084, 476 S.W.2d 801 (1972); and Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Partain, 192 Ark. 127, 90 S.W.2d 968 (1936). The plaintiffs here have not been deprived of due process since due process remedies are available to the plaintiffs in state court for the alleged taking of their property. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977).

In the event a taking occurred before the plaintiffs had the opportunity to seek injunctive relief in the Garland County Chancery Court, then the plaintiffs have recourse with the State Claims Commission. See Ark.Code Ann. § 19-10-201 et seq. "The State Claims Commission satisfies the constitutional requirement of due process, and is readily available to the plaintiffs for the relief they seek for the alleged wrongful acts. Thus having the remedies of the Garland County Chancery Court and/or the State Claims Commission available to them, it is not necessary for plaintiffs to resort to federal court for relief." Light v. Blackwell, supra at 336-37.²

The Eighth Circuit has also held that Arkansas provides adequate mechanisms for compensating property owners whose property is taken for public use, as well as for prospective injunctive relief to enjoin further occurrences of such conduct. See Collier v. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.1984). The Court further held that the availability of these state law mechanisms precludes finding that the taking of the owner's property was in violation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. at 1317. "To assume jurisdiction in a case of this type would mean the opening of a floodgate to a multiplicity of federal actions involving all aspects of state eminent domain proceedings which in truth should be adjudicated under state procedures and in state forums." Light, 472 F.Supp. at 339, cited with approval by Collier, 733 F.2d at 1317.

Finally, the United States Supreme Court has also held that individuals seeking relief under the due process clause must first avail themselves to state and/or federal procedures. Williamson Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). In Williamson, the plaintiff alleged that the application of various zoning laws and regulations of his property amounted to a taking of his property without due process. The Supreme Court found that his claim was not ripe in that he failed to seek compensation through the procedures the state provided for doing so. Id. at 194, 105 S.Ct. at 3120.

The Court stated "if the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process `yields just compensation,' then the property owner `has no claim against the Government' for a taking." Williamson, supra at 195, 105 S.Ct. at 3121, quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013, 1018, n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2878, 2881, n. 21, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). The Court further stated that "we have held that taking claims against the Federal Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Monsanto, 467 U.S., at 1016-1020, 104 S.Ct. at 2879-82. Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195, 105 S.Ct. at 3121. Pursuant to the above precedents, the court finds that the plaintiffs' due process claims are not yet ripe in view of the fact that they have failed to seek remedies in state court or from the Arkansas Claims Commission.³

The complaint also contends that jurisdiction is imposed under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq., specifically 42 U.S.C. § 4651. Plaintiffs' claims under this Act must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Eighth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 4602(a) precludes judicial review of actions taken pursuant to the substantive provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4651. Nall Motors v. Iowa City, Iowa, 533 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.1976), aff'd, 410 F.Supp. 111 (S.D. Iowa 1975). "No subject matter jurisdiction exists to entertain a private cause of action for either equitable or legal relief under the Act." Roth v. United States Department of Transportation, 572 F.2d 183, 184 (8th Cir.1978).⁴See also Tullock v. State Highway Commission, 507 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir.1974); Paramount Farms, Inc. v. Morton, 527 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir.1975); Rhodes v. City of Chicago, 516 F.2d 1373, 1378 (7th Cir.1975); Will-Tex Plastics Manufacturing, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 346 F.Supp. 654, 657-58 (E.D.Pa. 1972) aff'd, 478 F.2d 1399 (3rd Cir.1973); Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency, 432 F.Supp. 564, 566 (S.D.Tex.1977); Boston v. United States, 424 F.Supp. 259, 264 (E.D. Mo.1976); Nelson v. Brinegar, 420 F.Supp. 975, 978 (E.D.Wis.1976). Plaintiffs' claims under this Act shall be dismissed.

The complaint also states "the jurisdiction of this Court is further...