Maki v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.
| Citation | 287 P. 170,87 Mont. 314 |
| Decision Date | 25 April 1930 |
| Docket Number | 6625. |
| Parties | MAKI v. ANACONDA COPPER MINING CO. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; Wm. E. Carroll Judge.
Compensation proceeding by Jalmar Maki, claimant, opposed by Anaconda Copper Mining Company, employer. From a judgment affirming the decision of the Industrial Accident Board to the effect that his claim was barred, claimant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank K. Sullivan and H. A. Tyvand, both of Butte, for appellant.
L. O Evans, D. M. Kelly, D'G. Stivers, John V. Dwyer, and John A. Groeneveld, all of Butte, for respondent.
Jalmar Maki has appealed from a judgment of the district court of Silver Bow county, affirming the decision of the Industrial Accident Board, to the effect that his claim for compensation for an alleged injury resulting from an industrial accident is barred by failure to file the same within time.
The record made before the board, and considered by the court without further testimony, shows that the claimant was treated by a company physician, under hospital certificate No. 2024, on March 1, 1928, for "sore eyes," and discharged as cured on March 3. Thereafter, according to the testimony of claimant and his working partner, on March 19 1928, claimant, while working underground in the West Colusa mine operated by defendant company, got a small piece of rock in his right eye, which was removed by his partner by the use of a small splinter of wood. The injury "was nothing" and was not reported; the two finished the shift. However, the next morning the claimant was not well and had some swelling in his face; he thought he "had a cold or something" and remained at home, requesting his partner to get him a hospital certificate. The slip issued was for "a cold." At 10 o'clock on March 20, 1928, claimant went to the Murray hospital, which was under contract with the company, saw a physician and returned at about 4 p. m. with a well-defined case of erysipelas. The physician testified that Maki told him he had been sick or having pains for two days; that the erysipelas was in the nose, but affected the soft tissues about the eyes, more particularly the right eye, but he was unable to find any abrasion through which the disease germs might have entered. Three days later the patient became delirious, and, fighting off his nurse, jumped from a third-story window and broke his left arm. The delirium lasted ten or eleven days; the arm became infected and for a period of "three or four months" the patient's condition was "extremely poor" and he could not think clearly or coherently; he was discharged from the hospital on July 27, 1928.
From August 21 to 28, claimant attempted to orally present his claim to the company through its claim agent and safety engineer; these attempts resulted only in the latter filling out a blank form from the alleged statements made by claimant, from which it appears that claimant "took hospital certificate on Mar. 1, 1928, for sore eyes." "Cause of accident-claims while picking got some dirt in his eyes." Under the head of "Hospital Certificate" appears "No. 2024." This report carries the annotation: "Maki is the man who was in the hospital with erysipelas."
The claim agent testified that Maki told him, in August, that he had had trouble with his eyes "five or six days prior to the date that the hospital slip was taken, on the 20th of March." On August 28, the claim agent informed Maki that he could not consider the claim for compensation.
On October 20, 1928, Dr. Worden, the attending physician, wrote the board a history of Maki's case, stating that "from March to July" his condition was such that he could not have been expected "to have made his claim." In his letter the doctor advised the board: "In July, he asked me to make a report to the claim department of the A. C. M. Co., saying that the day before the erysipelas became apparent he had been struck in the right eye by a piece of flying rock; * * * I made a report including the information I have given you, to the A. C. M. Co., and although he and his partner were interviewed by a member of the claim department, they were told that his claim for compensation was not justified." This letter was forwarded by the board to the legal department of defendant company.
In December, Maki employed counsel, and a formal verified claim was filed with the board on December 21, 1928. To the claim the defendant filed an answer, alleging that claimant suffered from a germ disease and not from the result of an industrial accident; that the disease developed before the alleged accident, and, if in fact claimant was injured, the erysipelas did not result from the injury. As a separate defense the answer pleaded sections 2933 and 2899, Revised Codes 1921, as bars to the maintenance of the claim.
The board decided that the claim was barred under the provisions of section 2899, which declares: "In case of personal injury or death, all claims shall be forever barred unless presented in writing under oath to the employer, the insurer, or the board, as the case may be, within six months from the date of the happening of the accident, either by the claimant or some one legally authorized to act for him in his behalf." The district court sustained this decision, and, in addition, made findings to the effect that, on the record, the claimant was not entitled to compensation as for injury resulting from an industrial accident. As the court was called upon only to determine the validity of the order made by the board, we are now concerned only with its judgment upholding the decision of the board.
As the board made no finding respecting the mental condition of the claimant at any time subsequent to March 23, 1928, we must assume that the board overlooked the provisions of section 2900, Revised Codes 1921, chapter 121, section 9, Laws of 1925, which provides: "No limitation of time as provided in the preceding section or in this Act shall run as against any injured workman who is mentally incompetent and without a guardian * * * A guardian * * * may be appointed by any court of competent jurisdiction, in which event the period of limitations as provided in the preceding Section, shall begin to run on the date of appointment of such guardian."
Conceding that the claimant was mentally incompetent from March until July, as claimed by counsel, the filing of the formal claim in December was timely; the board and the trial court were in error in holding that the claim was barred by the provisions of section 2899, above. However, if the claim was, in fact, barred by any other applicable statute, pleaded and relied upon by defendant, the decision must be upheld, for, if a prevailing party is entitled to an order or a judgment, the action of the court in granting it must be affirmed, although the particular reason for the ruling is erroneous. City of Butte v. Goodwin, 47 Mont. 155, 134 P. 670, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1012. This rule is too firmly established in this jurisdiction to require further citation or to be now departed from.
In addition to section 2899, above, defendant pleaded and relied upon section 2933, which declares a condition precedent to the right to maintain a claim and reads: "No claim to recover compensation under this act for injuries not resulting in death shall be maintained unless, within sixty days after the occurrence of the accident which is claimed to have caused the injury, notice in writing, stating the name and address of the person injured, the time and the place where the accident occurred, and the nature of the injury and signed by the person injured, * * * shall be served upon the...
To continue reading
Request your trial