Maki v. State

Decision Date03 January 1911
Docket Number632
PartiesMAKI v. STATE
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

ERROR to the District Court, Uinta County, HON. DAVID H. CRAIG Judge.

The material facts are stated in the opinion.

Reversed.

H. E Christmas and H. R. Christmas, for plaintiff in error.

Testimony given, either under oath or otherwise, at the coroner's inquest by persons under arrest or suspected of crime is not admissible upon their subsequent trial for the crime then under investigation. Such testimony cannot be regarded as voluntary. (Tuttle v. People, 33 Colo. 243, 79 P 1035, 70 L. R. A. 33; Twiggs v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 75 S.W. 531; State v. Spier, 86 N.C. 600; State v. Hdw. Co., 109 Mo. 118.) The early English cases denied the admissibility of such evidence although the party was not then charged with the crime. (Rex v. Lewis, Carr. & P. 161; Reg v. Owen, 9 id. 238.) Where the party has testified without any knowledge as to his rights and without the aid of counsel the testimony is not admissible. (State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1.) In the following cases under varying circumstances, such testimony was held to be inadmissible: People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384; Wood v. State, 22 Tex.App. 431, 3 S.E. 336; Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 13; State v. Garvey, 25 La. Ann. 191; Clough v. State, 7 Neb. 320; Scheffler v. State, 3 Wis. 823; State v. Andrews, (Ore.) 58 P. 765; People v. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557; State v. Welch, 36 W.Va. 690; U. S. v. Bascadore, 2 Cranch C. C. 30.) The cases cited hold that the confession is incompetent when given under oath, and that rule is applicable to a person tried upon a charge of homicide who testified as a witness at the coroner's inquest. The mere fact that at the time of the inquest he was suspected of the homicide will not exclude his incriminating statements voluntarily made. They may be subsequently used against him as a confession, and go to the jury for what they are worth, though he was not cautioned that they might be used against him. If, however, he is under arrest, or if he has been indicted or formally charged with the crime, he stands in the position of a prisoner on trial. He is entitled to the same privileges and warning so far as his statements are concerned as a prisoner at a preliminary examination. He cannot be directly or indirectly compelled to testify against himself. (State v. Seen, 32 S. Car. 394; State v. Carroll, 85 Ia. 1, 51 N.W. 1159; Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 13; Teachout v. People, 41 N.Y. 7; People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211; Clough v. State, 7 Neb. 320; State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 P. 1091; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384; State v. Young, Winst. (N. C.) 126; Underhill on Ev., pp. 165, 166.)

The evidence in this case was circumstantial, and on behalf of plaintiff in error it is contended that the circumstances shown by the evidence are not sufficient to warrant the verdict of guilty. All the facts and circumstances as proven must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused, but they must at the same time be inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other hypothesis except that of guilt. (State v. Johnson, 19 Ia. 230; Findley v. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 576; State v. Asbell, 57 Kan. 398; People v. Ward, 105 Cal. 335, 38 P. 945; State v. Hunter, 50 Kan. 302; U. S. v. Reder, 69 F. 965; Wentland v. State, 145 Ind. 38, 43 N.E. 931.

W. E. Mullen, Attorney General, for the State.

The testimony given by the plaintiff in error at the coroner's inquest and repeated by the coroner as a witness at the trial of this case does not appear to have been in any way prejudicial. It tended to prove, if anything, only that plaintiff in error was endeavoring to prevent his co-defendant from striking the deceased with a knife, and the willingness of this plaintiff in error to make a statement before the coroner favorable to himself is therefore quite apparent. It was not a confession of guilt nor a declaration against himself. If no other proof of his guilt had been submitted the jury would have been authorized to acquit him upon the charge. His statement did not come within the rule against self-incrimination, for the reason that it did not furnish a necessary link of evidence relating to the whereabouts or movements of the defendant at the time of the homicide, and necessary to secure a conviction. The statement itself was not incriminating, and the whereabouts and movements of defendant at or about the time of the homicide was shown by the testimony of other witnesses. Hence, if the admission of the coroner's testimony on this point was erroneous as a matter of law, which we do not concede, it was not prejudicial and did not affect the substantial rights of the accused. It is therefore insufficient as a ground for reversal. (Edelhoff v. State, 5 Wyo. 19; Leslie v. State, 10 Wyo. 10; Long v. State, 15 Wyo. 262.) It is necessary to carefully examine the facts in each case before applying the principles relating to the admission of the statements of an accused. (Clay v. State, 15 Wyo. 58.) The general subject of confessions and incriminating statements is reviewed in Horn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80. Other cases presenting various facts and circumstances under which the admissibility of statements made before coroners or at preliminary hearings are upheld are: People v. Thayers, 1 Park. Cr. Rep. 595; Williams v. Comm., 29 Pa. St. 102; Mack v. State, 48 Wis. 271; State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328; Griggs v. State, 59 Ga. 738; State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514; People v. Mondon, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 188. The facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence were sufficient, in our opinion, to sustain the verdict, independent of any statement made by the plaintiff in error.

SCOTT, JUSTICE. BEARD, C. J., and POTTER, J., concur.

OPINION

SCOTT, JUSTICE.

An information was filed in the District Court of Uinta County on November 4, 1908, charging Charles Maki with the crime of murder in the first degree. He was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty and was subsequently tried and found guilty of manslaughter. He filed a motion for a new trial which was overruled, judgment was pronounced against him upon the verdict, and he brings error.

1. The plaintiff in error was sworn and testified as a witness at the coroner's inquest. The coroner testified as a witness at the trial on behalf of the State and inquiry was made as to statements made by the plaintiff in error in his evidence given at the inquest. The defendant was permitted to interrogate the witness as to the conditions under which he so testified. Upon the answers to such interrogatories the defendant objected to the witness testifying to what he said under oath at the coroner's inquest for the reason that his statements were not voluntarily made, but were made at a time when he was under arrest for the crime charged in the information and had not been apprised by the coroner that he was under no obligation to testify, and that if he did testify at such inquest his statements might be used against him upon his trial. The objection was overruled and an exception reserved.

The evidence of the coroner shows that the plaintiff in error was under arrest at the time he gave his evidence before the coroner for killing the deceased, whose dead body and the nature of the death was then the subject of the coroner's inquest. He was not informed that what he said might be used against him upon his trial, nor was he advised of his rights in the matter nor does it appear that he had the benefit of counsel. Under such circumstances it is contended by the defendant that evidence of what he then and there testified to under the surrounding conditions was inadmissible as evidence against him upon the trial. This evidence was material. It tended to show that he was present with the deceased at the time and place when the latter received his death blow. The evidence was largely circumstantial and the defendant did not testify as a witness upon the trial.

The right of the State to use this evidence turns upon the question as to whether it was voluntarily given by the plaintiff in error at the coroner's inquest. If it is not stamped with that essential requirement then it was inadmissible and prejudicial for it was one of the constitutional rights of the defendant that he should not be compelled to testify against himself. (Sec. 11, Art. I of the Constitution.) It is the general rule that self-criminating statements are not per se admissible over objection when the evidence discloses that the defendant was in custody for the crime charged at the time of making such statements unless shown to have been voluntarily made. Under this rule there is no presumption that such statements are voluntarily made but on the contrary the presumption is the other way, and upon the trial of an accused the burden is upon the State seeking to prove such statements to show their voluntary character. It is impossible to show this where the accused is under arrest for the crime under investigation by the coroner's jury, and upon such investigation the criminating statements were made under oath without also showing that he had the benefit of counsel or was fully informed of his rights. He was not here told that he need not make a statement or might make a statement or be sworn as a witness and that if he made a statement whether under oath or not it might be used against him if subsequently tried upon the charge for which he was then under arrest and that he could do as he pleased about the matter. It is true that the coroner testified that the accused voluntarily gave his evidence but he also said in answer to an inquiry propounded by the Court as to what he said to the accused before the latter testified and as to what the accused said, "I just merely asked him...

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21 cases
  • Snyder v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 12 Octubre 2021
    ...proving and persuading that the statement was made freely and voluntarily." Evans , 944 P.2d at 1127 (referencing Maki v. State , 18 Wyo. 481, 485-86, 112 P. 334, 335 (1911) ). "The prosecution has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is volu......
  • State v. Crank
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 23 Octubre 1943
    ... ... from the District Attorney's office, and veiled threats ... of sending her to a Federal penitentiary were made. The court ... held a confession obtained under such circumstances ... inadmissible ... The ... Wyoming court in Maki v. State , 18 Wyo ... 481, 112 P. 334, 335, 33 L.R.A. N.S., 465, was considering ... whether testimony given by the accused at an inquest was ... admissible as being a voluntary confession, and gave the ... following definition: ... "A ... statement, to have been voluntarily made, ... ...
  • Vasquez v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 16 Noviembre 1999
    ...equivalent to Miranda rights and the exclusionary rule more than fifty years before the federal judiciary followed suit (Maki v. State, [18 Wyo. 481, 112 P. 334] (1911)). But now, in the aftermath of the Warren Court's criminal procedure rulings, the Wyoming Supreme Court appears to follow ......
  • Jerskey v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 27 Enero 1976
    ...is applicable here: 'Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. '' (Emphasis supplied)We said in Maki v. State, 18 Wyo. 481, 485-486, 112 P. 334, 335 (1911).'. . . It is the general rule that self-criminating statements are not per se admissible over objection, when the evidenc......
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