Mako, Inc., In re, s. 91-7049
Decision Date | 16 February 1993 |
Docket Number | 91-7050 and 92-7122,Nos. 91-7049,s. 91-7049 |
Citation | 985 F.2d 1052 |
Parties | , Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,147 In re MAKO, INC. Debtor. RETAIL MARKETING COMPANY, Appellant, v. William R. KING, Appellee. In re MAKO, INC. Debtor. RETAIL MARKETING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Saragene RHUEMS, Appellee. In re MAKO, INC. Debtor. RETAIL MARKETING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J & R MARKETING and Marvin Morse; Tulsa Cab Leasing Co.; James A. Brady; Jack Santee, Trustee, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Thomas A. Creekmore III (Steven W. Soule also of Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, with him, on the briefs), Tulsa, OK, for appellant.
Ron Wright of Kennedy, Wright, Stout & Fite, Muskogee, OK, for appellee William R. King (Ronald D. Wood, Tulsa, OK, with him, on the brief, for appellee Saragene Rhuems).
Before LOGAN, BARRETT and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
Retail Marketing Company (RMC) appeals orders of the district court dismissing its adversary proceedings against the defendants-appellees and affirming orders of the bankruptcy court holding that RMC lacked standing to prosecute the avoidance actions brought against defendants. 1
In June 1989, the bankruptcy court confirmed a Chapter 11 plan for Mako, Inc. proposed by a creditor. Under that plan, RMC, a stranger to the estate, purchased the assets of the debtor corporation, Mako, Inc., and assumed its priority and secured debt. To meet the § 1129(a)(9)(A) 2 requirement that all administrative claims be satisfied before the plan's confirmation, RMC specifically stated that it would pay all such claims, regardless of their amount. Although these claims were initially estimated at $2,350,000, RMC has had to pay nearly $1,000,000 more than that to satisfy all administrative claimants. The Chapter 11 plan also established a liquidating trustee, to transfer assets from the debtor to RMC, and a litigation trustee, to pursue certain adversarial actions on behalf of unsecured creditors.
After the effective date of the plan, RMC instituted this litigation against the various defendants-appellees. These defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted by the bankruptcy court and ultimately affirmed by the district court, both courts agreeing that neither the plan nor the Bankruptcy Code permitted RMC to exercise the avoidance powers. The cases were consolidated on appeal.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An order granting summary judgment is a legal determination subject to de novo review. Hatfield v. Burlington N. Ry., 958 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir.1992). Mixed questions of law and fact are also subject to de novo review. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.1988).
Section 1123(b)(3) provides that a reorganization plan may provide for
(A) the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate; or
(B) the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose, of any such claim or interest[.]
At issue in this case is whether the plan appoints RMC as a "representative of the estate" under that section, with authority to enforce the particular avoidance claims at issue. In Citicorp Acceptance Co. v. Robison (In re Sweetwater), 884 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir.1989), this court adopted the test for non-debtor, non-trustee parties seeking to qualify as representatives under § 1123(b)(3)(B) that was articulated in Temex Energy, Inc. v. Hastie & Kirschner (In re Amarex, Inc.), 96 B.R. 330 (W.D.Okla.1989).
That test is as follows: "Under § 1123(b)(3)(B), a party who is neither the debtor nor the trustee but who seeks to enforce a claim must establish two elements: (1) that it has been appointed; (2) that it is a representative of the estate." Id. at 334. The first element requires that the appointed party be approved by the court, which can be accomplished simply by approval of the plan. Sweetwater, 884 F.2d at 1326. Determining a party's representativeness under the second element is more involved. It requires the court to decide "whether a successful recovery by the appointed representative would benefit the debtor's estate and particularly, the debtor's unsecured creditors." Id. at 1327 (internal quotation omitted).
Whether RMC has satisfied the requirements of the first element of this test hinges on the interpretation of paragraph 6.01.05 of the plan, which purports to appoint RMC as the representative of the estate for certain purposes. It provides that confirmation of the plan will result in [t]he assumption by RMC of all the debtor's rights in pending litigation constituting contested matters or adversary proceedings in this case, and all pending appeals to which debtor or the liquidating trustee is or was a party on the effective date ... together with the right to prosecute or defend any other such litigation which the debtor or liquidating trustee may have brought on or before the effective date. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, RMC shall be entitled to prosecute all objections to claims which may exist on the effective date, or any others to which RMC may object in accordance with the plan, and may appear as the real party in interest in any pending or later instituted contested matter or adversary proceeding filed herein.
Focusing in particular on the phrases "may have brought," "may exist," and "later instituted contested matter or adversary proceeding," RMC has maintained throughout this litigation that this paragraph gives it authority to bring avoidance actions that had not been initiated on or before the effective date. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that this language was ambiguous because "it could 'be interpreted to mean that only actions pending on the effective date are truly retained under the Plan, with RMC assuming the position of the Debtor or the Liquidating Trustee at that time and not preserving any right in RMC to initiate litigation on its own accord.' " District Court Order at 4, quoting Bankruptcy Court Order at 7.
We agree with those courts that "have relied upon the express provisions of plans of reorganization that confer the right to bring particular kinds of actions on a particular party in concluding that that party has been appointed for § 1123 purposes." Amarex, 96 B.R. at 334 ( ); see also Kroh Bros. Development Co. v. United Missouri Bank (In re Kroh Bros. Development Co.), 100 B.R. 487, 497 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) ( ); Tennessee Wheel & Rubber Co. v. Captron Corporate Air Fleet (In re Tennessee Wheel & Rubber Co.), 64 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1986) ( ); Xonics, Inc. v. E & F King & Co. (In re Xonics), 63 B.R. 785, 786 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) ( ); Perlstein v. Saltzstein (In re AOV Indus., Inc.), 62 B.R. 968, 970 n. 1 (Bankr.D.D.C.1986) ( ). Here the provision of the plan purporting to confer authority on RMC to initiate avoidance actions after confirmation of the plan is vague. In assessing what power the plan intended to confer on RMC we must also consider that paragraph 6.04 of the plan created the office of the "Litigation Trustee," who was authorized to "act on behalf of all unsecured creditors." We hold that there must be clear evidence of the reservation of the avoidance powers RMC seeks to assert for it to have...
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