Malafronte v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of City of Milford

• Decision Date: 08 June 1967
• Citation: 155 Conn. 205,230 A.2d 606
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Gabriel MALAFRONTE et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF the CITY OF MILFORD et al.

Page 606

230 A.2d 606

155 Conn. 205

Gabriel MALAFRONTE et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF the CITY OF MILFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

June 8, 1967.

Pasquale Young, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were Robert I. Berdon, New Haven, and David D. Berdon, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Robert Kapusta, Milford, with whom, on the brief, was Dennis F. Harrigan, Milford, for appellee (named defendant); with him also, on the brief, was George J. Jaser, Milford, for appellee (defendant Milford housing authority).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER and THIM, JJ.

COTTER, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas sustaining the actions of the named defendant, hereinafter referred to as the board, ¹ in unanimously granting the petitions of the Milford housing authority, which is also a defendant in this action, for (1) a change of zone of a certain parcel of land from an R-10 to an R-MF classification, to allow its use for a public housing project, and (2) a special permit, under chapter 4, § 13, of the Milford zoning regulations (1961, as amended), authorizing the proposed project on the property in question. A separate, full public hearing was held by the board, in regard to each petition, on July 13, 1965. Earlier the same evening, a public hearing was held on the board's own proposal to amend the plan of development of the parcel in question from medium-density residence to high-density residence. This change in the plan of development was approved unanimously at an executive meeting.

Under the Milford zoning regulations, an R-10 classification is a medium-density zone permitting one-family dwelling units on a minimum lot of 12,500 square feet with a minimum frontage of 100 feet, while R-MF is a residential zone in which multifamily dwellings are allowed by special permit on a minimum lot of 20,000 square feet with a minimum frontage of 100 feet and a density of not less than 2500 square feet per family unit.

The property in question is approximately 4.58 acres of undeveloped land bounded on the east by Harrison Avenue, on the south by Stone Stree, and on the other two sides by lots of private property owners. The property is within 370 feet of a partially completed urban renewal project which includes neighborhood businesses and other high-density uses. There is an existing business zone to the west, and another high-density residential area is across the street. A great many of the neighboring properties are nonconforming to the R-10 zone because their lots do not meet the 12,500 square feet density limitation. The houses on a number of these properties are quite closely spaced, as a result of which there is a higher actual density for the area than is provided for under the R-10 classification.

I

When enacting or amending its regulations, a local zoning authority acts in a legislative capacity. It must therefore be free to modify its regulations whenever time, experience, and responsible planning for contemporary or future conditions reasonably indicate the need for a change. Pierrepont v. Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 463, 468, 226 A.2d 659; Young v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 151 Conn. 235, 243, 196 A.2d 427. A legislative body is not necessarily bound by the rule which prohibits administrative boards, such as a zoning board of appeals, from reversing earlier decisions without a change in circumstances. Young v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, supra; Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 310, 170 A.2d 267, 95 A.L.R.2d 751; see 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (3d Ed.) § 7-3. The discretion of a legislative body, because of its constituted role as a formulator of public policy, is much broader than that of an administrative board, which serves a quasijudicial function. Thus, although we have said that a zoning commission should not ordinarily alter the classification of a certain area in the absence of changed conditions, it is clear that this rule, which is a restriction on the principle of legislative discretion, will only be applied in those rare instances where the zoning amendment is patently arbitrary. A less strict rule would require the court to exercise a legislative judgment. See Andrew C. Petersen, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 638, 642, 228 A.2d 126; Pierrepont v. Zoning Commission, supra; Winslow v. Zoning Board, 143 Conn. 381, 390, 122 A.2d 789.

Zoning must be sufficiently flexible to meet the demands of increased population and evolutionary changes in such fields as architecture, transportation, and redevelopment. Luery v. Zoning Board, 150 Conn. 136, 145, 187 A.2d 247; Clark v. Town Council, 145 Conn. 476, 483, 144 A.2d 327. The responsibility for meeting these demands rests, under our law, with the reasoned discretion of each municipality acting through its duly authorized zoning commission. Courts will not interfere with these local legislative decisions unless the action taken is clearly contrary to law or in abuse of discretion.

The property in the instant case was zoned R-10 by the board in 1960, having previously been included in a zone allowing one-family dwellings on lots of 7500 square feet. The change to R-MF, which is the subject of the present appeal, took place on July 14, 1965. One of the reasons given by the board was an increased need for housing to accommodate families being displaced by the urban renewal project, which extends to within 370 feet of the site in question. There was evidence before the board that the renewal project was already in progress at the time of the public hearing and that the taking of land for this project had begun about a year earlier. The impact of the renewal program, which had not yet been felt when the subject property was previously rezoned in 1960, was not limited in its scope to the immediate area of the actual condemnation. The new conditions created by the project affected the surrounding area and entitled the board, under its broad legislative powers, to revise the zonal classification of the property in question.

II

It is also urged by the plaintiffs that the action of the board constituted spot zoning. 'To constitute spot zoning, in the sense of an illegal exercise of power on the part of the zoning authority, a change of zone must be out of harmony with the comprehensive plan for zoning adopted to serve the needs of the community as a whole. * * * If the change is in accordance with the comprehensive plan and the predominating purpose in making the change is to benefit the community as a whole rather than the owner of the land, the action of the commission is not unreasonable or arbitrary and does not constitute spot zoning, although the owner may receive an incidental benefit.' DeMeo v. Zoning Commission, 148 Conn. 68, 73, 74, 167 A.2d 454, 457; see 1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, c. 26. The...