Malbrough v. Stelly
| Decision Date | 14 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-30269,19-30269 |
| Parties | HENRY LEE MALBROUGH, Individually and on Behalf of Anthony Campbell, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CARROLL J. STELLY, In His Official Capacity as Chief of Police for the Rayne Police Department; PARISH OF ACADIA; WAYNE MELANCON, In His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Acadia Parish; JACKIE BODDYE, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; JOSEPH CREDEUR, Individually and in His Official Capacity; CITY OF RAYNE; SHERIFFS OFFICE ACADIA PARISH; CHRISTOPHER CORMIER, Individually and in His Official Capacity; GEORGE BRAD WARE, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.
*
Anthony Campbell was in his GMC Yukon with two friends outside his home in Acadia Parish, Louisiana when Police arrived to execute a search warrant. Officers surrounded Campbell's vehicle, shouted commands for the occupants to exit, and pulled one of Campbell's friends out onto the ground. Campbell refused to exit, threw his Yukon in reverse, smashed into the police cruiser parked behind him—then switched gears and took a hard-left turn, attempting to flee while surrounded by officers. One officer was either bumped to the ground or fell. The officers fired. And Campbell was hit. Tragically, the bullet, which remains lodged in Campbell's brain, disabled him for life. Campbell's father, Henry Lee Malbrough, on behalf of his son and himself, sues the city, the parish, the police department, the sheriff's office, and a handful of officers. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding no constitutional violation, because Campbell posed an immediate threat to the officers and civilian bystanders. We AFFIRM.
In January 2009, the Rayne Police Department obtained a search warrant for the home of Anthony Campbell, who was known in the area as a drug dealer.2 Officers from the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office and Louisiana State Police assisted the Rayne Police Department in executing the warrant.3Malbrough and Defendants tell remarkably different stories. We start with Defendants' version of events.
Defendants contend that all officers, regardless of agency, were wearing either "Class A" law enforcement uniforms or clothing with clear insignia indicating they were police. When the officers arrived, Campbell's GMC Yukon was parked in the driveway. Because of Campbell's darkly tinted windows, the officers could not see inside the vehicle.
The officers surrounded the Yukon and shouted commands for any occupants to exit. Brian Smith, who was in the passenger seat, exited immediately and was handcuffed. Campbell was in the driver's seat, and Ricky Monceaux was in the backseat. Defendants contend that Campbell was repeatedly told to exit with his hands up. Rather than comply, Campbell reached behind the driver's seat for an unknown object. He then suddenly put the vehicle in reverse, accelerated backward, and crashed into a cop car that was intentionally parked behind his Yukon to block his exit. Then, even though several officers had surrounded his vehicle, Campbell revved the engine and made a hard-left turn. Defendants allege that Campbell struck Deputy George Ware4 of the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office, who was in front of the vehicle screaming for Campbell to exit.
Defendants assert that after seeing Ware struck, and as the Yukon kept moving, the officers believed that Ware was being dragged under the vehicle. The officers fired. Ware was not dragged, nor was he seriously injured. But he did testify that the Yukon struck him, knocked him over, and kept coming at him, which forced him to move out of the way to avoid being run over. Once out of the way of the Yukon, Ware jumped up and began firing at the vehicle. He claims that he attempted to shoot out the tires. Campbell continued driving down the street and came to a stop at an adjoining block next to a graveyard, having been struck by a bullet.
Backseat passenger Ricky Monceaux gave a recorded statement to police shortly after the incident, and he essentially confirmed the officers' telling of the event. Monceaux told police at least twenty times that Campbell "ran over the cop." Monceaux confirmed that Campbell reached behind the seat "like he was trying to hide something." Mounceaux also stated that the police were "doing their jobs professionally" and that "none of the cops were in the wrong."
Monceaux gave a similar statement to Malbrough's counsel a few weeks later. He said that after they pulled up to the house in the Yukon, Smith said that cops were "hitting" the house. The cops then surrounded the Yukon. When Campbell attempted to flee, Monceaux shouted at Campbell to stop, but Campbell accelerated anyway. Monceaux confirmed that the shooting did not start until Campbell had taken a hard left and the cop—apparently Ware—fell in the bushes: "When the cop fell down in the bushes, they started shooting." Monceaux confirmed that all the officers were in uniform. He didn't see anyone in plain clothes until after the shooting.
Malbrough's story is different in some key respects: He claims that most defendants arrived in unmarked vehicles and most wore unmarked uniforms. Campbell testified that he didn't know the officers were police; he thought theywere robbers.5 Officer Adam Ware failed to announce that he was a police officer when he approached the Yukon. Officer Joseph Creduer approached the Yukon as it was backing into the patrol unit, and he shattered Campbell's driver-side window with a hasp.6 Malbrough also contends that Ware's testimony about his location contradicts other testimony. Likewise, according to Malbrough, Ware was never struck by the Yukon but merely slipped near bushes, or outside near a kitchen window, depending on the witness.
Malbrough filed this lawsuit individually and on behalf of his son pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On behalf of Campbell, he alleged constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment as well as various state law claims.7 On behalf of himself, Malbrough asserted a "bystander" claim against Defendants for the heart attack he suffered on the day of theincident. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, which the district court granted. Malbrough now appeals.
We review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A. v. Am. Int'l Inv. Corp., Inc., 292 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2002). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). And the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient" to defeat summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. All reasonable factual inferences are drawn in the non-movant's favor. Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985). But "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Malbrough alleges that Defendants used excessive force against Campbell. We disagree. The officers' conduct did not constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.8
To prevail on an excessive force claim, Malbrough must establish: "(1) injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable." Ramierez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007)). The reasonableness of the use of force "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We are required to pay "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. That second factor is the most important: We must determine whether Campbell "posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others." Id. And critically, "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—incircumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
We first discuss Malbrough's state-created-need theory. Citing a Tenth Circuit case—Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997)—Malbrough argues that our excessive force inquiry must consider whether the officers "created the need to use such force" through their own "reckless or deliberate conduct." Malbrough contends that "the deliberate and reckless actions of law enforcement that took place immediately following their arrival . . . directly contributed to [Campbell's] reaction, which [Defendants] then use as the basis to justify the use of deadly force." Malbrough claims that Campbell did not know...
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