Malcolm Price, Inc. v. District Unemploy. Comp. Bd.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 8576.,8576.
• Citation: 350 A.2d 730
• Parties: MALCOLM PRICE, INC., Petitioner, v. DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD, Respondent.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 730

350 A.2d 730

MALCOLM PRICE, INC., Petitioner, v. DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD, Respondent.

No. 8576.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued May 21, 1975.

Decided January 22, 1976.

Bardyl R. Tirana, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Bill L. Smith, Washington, D. C., with whom George A. Ross and Robert J. Hallock Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for respondent.

Before FICKLING, GALLAGHER and NEBEKER, Associate Judges.

FICKLING, Associate Judge:

This is a petition for review¹ brought by Malcolm Price, Inc. (hereinafter, Price), in its capacity as a principal base period employer,² challenging an eligibility determination of the District Unemployment Compensation Board (hereinafter, the Board). The Board determined that Eugene W. Edwards, a former employee of Price, was eligible to receive unemployment benefits without disqualification despite his rejection of Price's offer of reemployment. The issues presented are whether (1) Price failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review, and (2) Price's offer of reemployment constituted an offer of "suitable work" pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, §§ 46-310(c)-(d).

Eugene W. Edwards, a 63-year-old nonunion carpenter with 40 years' experience, was employed by Price, a home improvement contractor, for about four years until Edwards voluntarily left in July or August of 1973 to take a job with Hawkins Construction Company. At the time of Edwards' departure, Price was paying him at a rate of $5.50 per hour. On August 10, 1973, after a brief period of employment with Hawkins, Edwards left to become a carpenter with Karma Construction Company at a rate of $8.06 per hour. Karma laid off Edwards on December 28, 1973, due to its lack of work.

On February 25, 1974, Edwards filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Board. The claims deputy determined Edwards to be eligible without disqualification and he received his first benefit payment on April 19, 1974. On April 25, immediately upon receiving notice of this benefit payment,³ Price extended a written offer of reemployment to Edwards at the same salary and on the same terms and conditions as his previous employment with petitioner. Edwards failed to respond and, accordingly, Price notified the Board of his refusal to accept its reemployment offer.⁴ The claims deputy reviewed the job offer and found that Edwards had established good cause for refusing to accept reemployment with Price.

Price filed an administrative appeal and a hearing was had on May 15, 1974. Edwards testified that $7 per hour was the minimum wage he was willing to accept. Edwards also described difficulties he had encountered with Price's building superintendent⁵ and stated, "I'll never work for that guy as long as I live." The appeals examiner noted for the record that, according to Public Employment Service figures, the going rate for nonunion carpenters is $4.71 to $6.50 per hour. By his decision of May 30, 1974, the appeals examiner affirmed the prior eligibility determination. He stated:

Review of the evidence supports the testimony and evidence presented by the claimant. He is an experienced craftsman and is justified in demanding $7.00 per hour and in expecting a wholesome work situation. The employment offered to the claimant was, therefore, not suitable, Section 10(c) and Regulation 301.3. Claimant has also met the availability requirements of Section 9(d) of the Act.

Price filed the present Petition for Review with the court on June 24, 1974.⁶

The Board contends that the Petition for Review should be dismissed since Price failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Specifically, the Board contends that Price is barred from seeking judicial review since it did not first appeal to the Board for a review of the appeals examiner's decision pursuant to D.C.Code 1973 § 46-311(e)⁷ We agree.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law and is recognized in this jurisdiction. Tarpley v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 342 A.2d 14 (1975); Smith v. Murphy, D. C.App., 294 A.2d 357 (1972). See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.01 et seq. (1958 ed., 1965 Supp). The doctrine is "the long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938).

The requirement that an aggrieved party exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review is based on a myriad of rational policy considerations. In summarizing the rationale for the doctrine, the Supreme Court, in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed.2d 194 (1969), stressed the need to prevent premature judicial interference with the administrative process before an adequate factual record is developed and before an application of agency expertise to the issues. The Court also stated:

Certain very practical notions of judicial efficiency come into play as well. A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. And notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors. Finally, it is possible that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.⁸

Pursuant to the administrative scheme set forth in D.C.Code 1973, § 46-311(e) and its accompanying regulations,⁹ an aggrieved party has the right to appeal to the Board for a review of an adverse decision of an appeals examiner. In the case at bar, Price resorted to the courts without first pursuing this additional channel of administrative review. We hold that this failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies is fatal to Price's appeal.

Price contends that it did exhaust its administrative remedies since pursuant to D. C.Code 1973, § 46-311(e), a decision of the appeals examiner becomes the final decision of the Board, if not modified sua sponte by the Board or appealed from within ten days. Price argues, in effect, that its administrative remedies were exhausted since the decision of the appeals examiner became the final decision of the Board after neither the Board nor Price acted within ten days.

We reject this argument. First, we find the failure of the Board to consider Price's case sua sponte to be irrelevant to the issue at hand.¹⁰ The duty to exhaust all available administrative remedies is placed on the aggrieved party, not the agency itself. Secondly, we reject the notion that Price can exhaust its administrative remedies through inaction. The theory that an aggrieved party can exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to pursue them is without support in precedent or reasoning. See Siaba-Fernandez v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1962); Olinger v. Partridge, 196 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1952).

Price also contends that it would have been a useless and futile gesture to file an appeal with the Board since, in its briefs to this court, the Board has conclusively demonstrated its agreement with the decision of the appeals examiner. We refuse to speculate as to the likely response of the Board to a timely filed appeal.

Price, having failed to invoke a readily available administrative remedy specifically created to correct any errors that may have been committed, cannot now invoke the aid of the courts. Accordingly, the petition is

Dismissed.

1. D.C.Code 1973, §§ 1-1510, 46-312 (Stipp. II, 1975).

2. A principal base period employer is the employer that paid a claimant the greatest amount of wages during the first four out of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately...