Maldonado-Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Police, Civil No. 12–1088 (PAD).

• Decision Date: 25 June 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12–1088 (PAD).
• Citation: 110 F.Supp.3d 345
• Parties: Wanda MALDONADO–GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO POLICE; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

110 F.Supp.3d 345

Wanda MALDONADO–GONZALEZ, Plaintiff,

v.Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO POLICE; et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 12–1088 (PAD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed June 25, 2015.

Emil J. Rodriguez–Escudero, Jorge Martinez–Luciano, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Jaime J. Zampierollo–Vila, Zulma Carrasquillo–Almena, Department of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Lumy Mangual–Mangual, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DELGADO–HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Wanda Maldonado–González initiated this action against her employer—the Police Department of Puerto Rico ("PDPR")—and a number of PRPD officers, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; federal constitutional violations; and violations of Puerto Rico law. At Docket Nos. 38 and 72, the court dismissed all but plaintiff's Title VII claims. Then, the PRPD moved for summary judgment as to those claims (Docket No. 78). Plaintiff opposed (Docket No. 85). For the reasons explained below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the case DISMISSED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is need for trial. Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case in light of applicable law. Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). As to issues on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof, the movant need to no more than aver absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Mottolo v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 43 F.3d 723, 725 (1st Cir.1995).

Conclusory allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantly probative will not suffice to ward off a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Nieves–Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 378 (1st Cir.2013). Careful record review reflects absence of genuine dispute as to the facts identified in the section that follows. Based on those facts, the PRPD is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT¹

A. Employment

Maldonado has worked for the PRPD since May 21, 2004. See, Docket No. 77, PRPD's "Statement of Uncontested Material Facts" ("SUMF") at ¶ 1. On December 19, 2007, she was assigned to the Special Arrests Unit of the Criminal Investigation Division of Ponce as an Investigator. SUMF at ¶ 2. The Unit's Director was Sergeant Héctor Millán–Santiago. SUMF at ¶ 3.

B. Disobeying Instructions

On February 12, 2009, while Millán was on official duty outside of Ponce, officer Erwin León–Torres was the Unit's acting supervisor. SUMF at ¶ 4. On February 13, 2009, he reported to Millán that plaintiff had disobeyed his instructions in executing an arrest order in violation of applicable rules and procedures. SUMF at ¶¶ 5 and 9.² Millán discussed the incident with plaintiff; prepared a "Written Counseling to Member of the Corps;"³ ordered that copy of the document be given to plaintiff and be placed in her personnel file; and referred the Counseling to Anthony Ortiz–Santana, Director of the Ponce Region Criminal Investigations Corp. SUMF at ¶¶ 10–13.⁴

C. Plaintiff's Reaction

On February 23, 2009, plaintiff reacted to Millán's Counseling complaining of gender-based discrimination. SUMF ¶¶ 13–16 and 70. To that end, she claimed that:

• She felt humiliated and degraded by some of her fellow officers;

• She was subject to "difficult events" at the precinct like being ordered not to drive the patrol car since no woman assigned to the Special Arrests Unit had ever driven the car because it looked bad to have a woman drive a man around;

• She was forced to give up her assigned arrests to other male officers;

• Her supervisor explained that her "word had no effect in the unit";

• Her intellectual capacity was disregarded and she was told her master's degree was obtained online and given as a gift;

• Her physical appearance was questioned (specifically, why did she not wear makeup nor let her hair loose); that

• She had different assignments than her male coworkers; and

• She was told by Millán that she had to "lower the intensity" of her work because the other male officers may become jealous and conspire to have her taken out of the unit. SUMF ¶¶ 17–23.

D. Meeting

On February 24, 2009, Ortiz met with both plaintiff and Millán; discussed the alleged discrimination; ordered Millán to conduct an investigation on plaintiff's allegations and to take immediate action, if warranted, and gave him copy of communication SAIG–AP–CIC–1–226, which requires all supervisors to certify that personnel in their respective divisions have been counseled on this matter. SUMF ¶¶ 24–25. Attached to the communication was a Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice informing of a conciliation agreement reached in a gender discrimination and retaliation case filed by a female agent of the PRPD in Fajardo, Puerto Rico, and that Title VII enforcement was a priority of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. SUMF ¶¶ 26–29.

E. Follow Up

On February 25, 2009, Millán certified compliance with SAIG–AP–CIC–1–226. SUMF ¶¶ 30–32. Two days later, he conducted a local academy in which, among other things, discussed proper behavior toward female officers, sexual harassment and gender-based discrimination. SUMF ¶ 33. He prepared a certification to Ortiz, (i) informing of the local academy conducted; (ii) the matters discussed; and (iii) submitting signatures of all members of the Special Arrests Unit who attended the academy, including plaintiff, Nuñez, Colón, and León. SUMF ¶ 34. He also sent Ortiz a more detailed letter stating that agents were warned that denigrating comments toward fellow officers and police women and Macho comments alluding to women would not be tolerated. SUMF ¶ 35–37.

F. Administrative Complaint

In March 2009, plaintiff provided a copy of her letter to Ortiz to PRPD Superintendent José Figueroa–Sancha. The PRPD unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the claim through mediation. On July 9, 2009, plaintiff filed a formal Administrative Complaint No. Q–2009–3–4(g)–0123 for alleged gender discrimination. SUMF ¶¶ 46–48. According to the accompanying sworn statement:

• The sex discrimination acts against her began in March of 2008, when she noticed some "professional jealousy and resistance" toward her. SUMF ¶ 51;⁵

• Officer León cautioned plaintiff to take it easy and never considered plaintiff's wishes to go somewhere when they were investigating a complaint. SUMF ¶¶ 52 and 54;

• When the patrol car was assigned to her, Millán found subtle ways of taking away the keys. SUMF ¶ 53;

• Plaintiff felt uncomfortable when she made a mistake as she was chastised by Millán for honest mistakes. SUMF ¶ 55;

• Millán explained her that fellow workers—without mentioning anyone in particular—felt uncomfortable and that she had to lower her intensity in her work because, otherwise, they would "set [her] up to get [her] her out of the unit." SUMF ¶ 56;

• During a telephone call Millán told her that she "had no voice or vote in the unit," but then "tried to fix it" by saying "it's not that you don't count it's just that you have less experience." SUMF ¶ 57;

• On October 31, 2008, plaintiff was standing in front of the boardwalk with fellow officers Colón and Abdón, and Colón said he would exchange plaintiff for two females that walked by. SUMF ¶ 58. She was upset, looked at Abdón but did not say anything. Id. When asked by Abdón why she allowed Colón's behavior, plaintiff said Colón was "incorrigible and ignorant." SUMF ¶ 59;

• On February 9, 2009, Colón asked for a napkin and when plaintiff gave him one, he replied by telling her she was still a part of the unit because she was useful for some things. SUMF ¶ 60;

• Three days later, plaintiff complained to Millán about an injury she suffered while making an arrest. Millán "scolded" her and that she had specific functions and that it was the duty of the male officers to make such arrests. Thus, she "did not have to be jumping fences." SUMF ¶ 62;

• Officer Pacheco explained Millán's instructions that plaintiff was not allowed to drive the patrol car. Plaintiff confronted Millán, and he explained he had received complaints pertaining to her "manner of driving," but plaintiff replied she had her "own driving style." SUMF ¶ 63. Millán later "retracted" of this instruction. SUMF ¶ 64; and

• During the week of February 21 to 27, 2009, plaintiff saw Millán when she went to the Headquarters and Millán indicated "in an arrogantly manner to leave him the keys of the locker" or else he would break through the lock, to which plaintiff refused. SUMF ¶ 81.

G. PRPD's Response

In March 2009, Millán was transferred to another division because of plaintiff's complaint. SUMF ¶¶ 84–85. On October 27, 2009, the inspector in charge of the administrative investigation recommended that Millán, Colón and León be suspended without pay for thirty days (Docket No. 85, Exh. 2 and Docket No. 90, Exh. 1). Officer Colón was transferred to the Robbery Division, effective July 21, 2009, SUMF ¶ 90 and...