Maldonado Maldonado v. Lausell
| Decision Date | 22 January 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 85-1033 (JP). |
| Parties | Virginia MALDONADO MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. Miguel D. LAUSELL, President of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company, in his personal and official capacity; Rafael A. Navarro, Vice President Employee Relations, in his personal and official capacity, and the Puerto Rico Telephone Company, v. Annie CEIDE. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
José R. Pérez Hernández, Old San Juan, P.R., for Maldonado.
Salvador Antonetti, Fiddler, González & Rodríguez, San Juan, P.R., for P.R. Telephone Co.
Saldaña, Rey, Morán & Alvarado, Santurce, P.R., for Miguel Lausell.
This is an action for injunctive relief and damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, Virginia Maldonado Maldonado, was dismissed from her job in the personnel department of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC). Maldonado alleges that she was discharged because of her affiliation with the New Progressive Party (NPP). Defendants, Miguel D. Lausell and Rafael A. Navarro are sued in both their personal and official capacities as, respectively, President and Vice President for employee relations at the PRTC.1 Lausell, Navarro, and the PRTC itself, which is also a named defendant, have countered by charging that Maldonado was fired because she had been illegally recruited. Maldonado's claims, if borne out, would state claims for violation of her first amendment rights to free speech and association, and her fourteenth amendment right to be free from governmental deprivation of property without due process of law.
Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Maldonado bases her motion, as to the fourteenth amendment claim, on the undisputed fact that she was not given a pretermination hearing. Defendants base their fourteenth amendment section of their summary judgment motion on the argument that because Maldonado was illegally hired, she possessed no property interest in her PRTC job, and therefore, no pretermination hearing was constitutionally required. As to the first amendment portion of their claim, defendants argue that because an independent, legitimate reason existed for Maldonado's removal, i.e., her purportedly illegal recruitment, that plaintiff cannot succeed on her free speech and association claim.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court cannot grant summary judgment to either party. The cross motions are DENIED.
The record reveals the following facts. Unless otherwise noted, they stand as undisputed.
As the result of the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in Torres Ponce v. Jiménez, 113 D.P.R. 58 (1982), PRTC adopted personnel regulations paralleling the Puerto Rico Public Service Personnel Act of 1975, 3 L.P.R.A. § 1302 et seq. The regulations were put into effect in April 1983, and set out a procedure by which applicants are to be screened, evaluated, and placed in positions in the telephone company.
Maldonado was hired into the personnel department of PRTC on July 5, 1983. Holding the classification of Interviewer I, Maldonado completed the first ninety days of her tenure on October 4, 1983, and should have, at that point, passed from probationary status into the full career civil service. Maldonado was promoted in August 1984, and completed another ninety-day probationary period in that second post. On February 22, 1985, Navarro sent Maldonado a letter dismissing her. The letter stated that the reason for the dismissal was her purportedly illegal recruitment. This case soon followed.
The PRTC has raised the defense that this Court is barred from entertaining suit against it by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Whether this Court is berift of jurisdiction depends upon whether the PRTC should be treated as an arm of the state. Ainsworth Aristocrat Intern. Pty v. Tourism Co., 818 F.2d 1034 (1st Cir.1987). The relationship between the PRTC and the Commonwealth is well settled. The PRTC is not immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment. Anaya Serbia v. Lausell, 646 F.Supp. 1236 (D.P.R.1986). In any event, PRTC waived its immunity by its general appearance in this case and the filing of a third party complaint.3 Anaya Serbia, 646 F.Supp. at 1243 n. 5. This Court is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment from hearing suit against PRTC.
The Court must examine the record "in the light most favorable to ... the party opposing the motion." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1972).
Similarly the court must indulge all inferences favorable to the party opposing the motion. These rules must be applied with recognition of the fact that it is the function of summary judgment "to pierce formal allegations of facts in the pleadings ...", and to determine whether further exploration of facts is necessary. The language of Rule 56(c) sets forth a bifurcated standard which the party opposing summary judgment must meet to defeat the motion. He must establish the existence of an issue of fact which is both "genuine" and "material." A material issue is one which affects the outcome of the litigation.
Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976).
As the Supreme Court has recently amplified, the existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat a summary judgment motion; "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986) (emphasis in original). Materiality is defined by the substantive law governing the case. 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d at 211.
In order to succeed on this claim, Maldonado must show that her political affiliation was the substantial and motivating reason for her termination, and defendants must then fail to prove that there was any other legitimate and non-pretextual reason for ending her employment. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed. 2d 471 (1977). Before the Court can reach the merits of this claim, however, we must examine whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit, i.e., whether, at the time of Maldonado's discharge, "clearly established law" was violated. The "clearly established law" sought in the case of first amendment claims of dismissal is whether, at the time of Maldonado's firing, it was clearly established that her position was protected from political discharge. Government workers are, and have been protected against dismissal on the basis of their political affiliation unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for holding that position. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1295, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980).
In Jiménez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set forth a two-part analysis for determining whether political affiliation would be an appropriate requirement for holding the position at issue. If political affiliation or loyalty were such an appropriate requirement, then supervisors are immune from suit for discharging persons based on the employee's politics. Branti, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). The first part of the analysis is to examine whether the position at issue relates to partisan political interests or concerns. "That is, does the position involve governmental decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation?" Otherwise stated, do party goals or programs affect the direction, pace, or quality of government? Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 241-42. If satisfied, the second inquiry focuses on the inherent powers of the position to affect the formulation or implementation of those goals. If the position "`potentially' concerns matters of partisan political interest and involves a `modicum' of policy-making responsibility, access to confidential information, or official communication," then the officials involved are entitled to qualified immunity. Zayas Rodríguez v. Hernández, 330 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1987).
Although defendants have laid claim to qualified immunity, on this first amendment claim, they have presented no evidence as to Maldonado's position or position description. The burden of proof on defendants at this point was to demonstrate a permissible patronage firing. They have failed to present any evidence in this regard and qualified immunity as to the first amendment claim must be DENIED.
On the merits, Lausell and Navarro both submitted sworn statements in support of their motion for summary judgment. The statements aver that Lausell and Navarro had no knowledge of Maldonado's political affiliation. Lack of knowledge on their part would, of course, remove any political motivation behind Maldonado's discharge. Defendants' knowledge of plaintiff's politics is an essential element of Maldonado's claim that she would have to prove. Maldonado initially made the allegation of personal political bias on the part of defendants in her verified complaint. She later supplemented that...
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