Maldonado-Maldonado v. Pantasia Mfg. Corp.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. 92-1609 (DRD).
• Citation: 956 F.Supp. 73
• Parties: Manuel MALDONADO-MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. PANTASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

956 F.Supp. 73

Manuel MALDONADO-MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. PANTASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil No. 92-1609 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 7, 1997.

Enrique J. Mendoza-Mendez, Mendoza & Baco, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.

Graciela J. Belaval-Bruno, Martinez, Odell & Calabria, Hato Rey, PR, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

On May 6, 1992, plaintiff Manuel Maldonado Maldonado filed a civil action against his former employer, Pantasia Manufacturing Corp., for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), § 2 et seq., as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Pending before the Court in this suit is Pantasia's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 15), based on two arguments: first, that Mr. Maldonado has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination; and second, that even if he has established a prima facie case, he has failed to rebut the defendant's articulation of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate his employment. Maldonado disputes both arguments.

The Court referred this motion to U.S. Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas for a report and recommendation (Docket No. 25). Magistrate Judge Arenas recommends that the motion for summary judgment be granted (Docket No. 26). Maldonado has filed an objection to this recommendation (Docket No. 27), in which he argues that there exist genuine issues of material fact, regarding both his prima facie case and his claims of pretext, that prevent the entry of summary judgment. As will be further discussed below, upon reviewing de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation that the plaintiff objected to, the Court decides to deny the motion for summary judgment.

I. Standard of Review for Objections to Magistrate Recommendations

Because U.S. Magistrate Judges are Article I judges, they may not issue binding judgments unless the parties have consented to it. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Nevertheless, even without the parties' consent, a district court may refer the resolution of pending motions to a United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Rule 503, Local Rules, District of Puerto Rico. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).

Of course, the plaintiff may contest the Magistrate's report and recommendation. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1993) provides that:

"[w]ithin ten days of being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." (emphasis added).

This statutory provision is echoed by Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b) and Local Rule 510.2. In sum, a district court must make an independent examination of those findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge that a party has objected in writing to.

Conversely, any matters not objected to are deemed admitted. Local Rule 510.2(A) states that "[a]ny objections to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, recommendation, or report must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) days after being served with [a] copy thereof. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court's order" (emphasis added). Rules such as this one have been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155, 106 S.Ct. 466, 475, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1980), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 899, 88 L.Ed.2d 933 (1986), the Court wrote that:

"[w]e hold that a court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning appeal, when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a magistrate's report and recommendation, upon the filing of objections with the district court identifying those issues on which further review is desired."

Pursuant to this rule, "[a]bsent objection by the plaintiffs, the district court had a right to assume that plaintiffs agreed to the magistrate's recommendation." Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 571, 88 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985). Moreover, "[f]ailure to raise objections to the Report and Recommendation waives that party's right to review in the district court and those claims not preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal." Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992).

Given that plaintiff Manuel Maldonado-Maldonado has objected in detail to the Magistrate's recommendation, the Court must review de novo the entire controversy regarding the motion for summary judgment.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue is genuine if it `must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.'" Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must therefore be made in favor of the nonmoving party. LeBlanc v. Great American Insurance, 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). "An inference is reasonable only if it can be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation." Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 672 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Frieze v. Boatmen's Bank of Belton, 950 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir.1991)). Similarly, "[i]n this context, `material' means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Etc. (Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I.), 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992). Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, "the issue before [the Court] is not whether [the plaintiff] was in fact fired because of his age, which remains to be determined at trial, but whether the question, whether he was fired because of his age, is genuinely contestable." Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir.1990).

III. Summary Judgment and the McDonnell Douglas Burden-shifting Framework

"In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under the ADEA" in the context of resolving a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies "some variant of the basic evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas." O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Because the Supreme Court has "never had the occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct," O'Connor, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1310, the Court is guided in the interim by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which has consistently applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to ADEA cases. Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir.1996); Pagés-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d 533, 536 (1st Cir.1996); Olivera v. Nestlé Puerto Rico, Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 46-50 (1st Cir.1990); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-16 (1st Cir.1979).

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to first "make a prima facie showing (1) that he or she fell within the ADEA's protected age group — that is, more than forty years of age; (2) that he or she met [the defendant employer's] legitimate performance expectations; (3) that he or she experienced adverse employment action; and (4) that [the defendant employer] did not treat age neutrally or retained younger persons in the same position." Pagés-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d at 536 (emphasis added). "As the very name `prima facie case' suggests, there must be at least a logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for which it establishes a `legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.'" O'Connor, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1310 (citations omitted). Thus, for example, "in an age-discrimination context, [an inference that an employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion] can not be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger." Id.

By establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer discriminated on the basis of age. "However, to rebut this presumption, the employer need only `articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination.'" Pagés-Cahue, 82 F.3d at 536. Once the employer has articulated such a reason for the termination, the "McDonnell Douglas presumption drops out of the picture." Id. (citations omitted). In other words, the presumption merely shifts the burden of production, not the burden of proof.

If the defendant meets its burden of production, "the plaintiff, `before becoming entitled to bring the case before the trier of fact, must show evidence sufficient for the factfinder reasonably to conclude that the employer's decision to discharge him or her was wrongfully based on age.' ... Direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory intent may suffice, but `the evidence as a whole...