Maldonado v. Baker Cnty. Sheriff's Office

• Decision Date: 25 January 2022
• Docket Number: No. 20-12605,20-12605
• Citation: 23 F.4th 1299
• Parties: Hamza MALDONADO, James Hill, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BAKER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Scotty Rhoden, Evelyn Blue, Captain, James Messer, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

23 F.4th 1299

Hamza MALDONADO, James Hill, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.BAKER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Scotty Rhoden, Evelyn Blue, Captain, James Messer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-12605

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed: January 25, 2022

Amir H. Ali, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Hamza Maldonado, pro se.

James Hill, pro se.

Matthew Joseph Carson, Jeffrey Slanker, Michael P. Spellman, Sniffen & Spellman, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Newsom, Branch, and Lagoa, Circuit Judges.

Lagoa, Circuit Judge:

Hamza Maldonado and James Hill filed a complaint against the Defendants in Florida state court, asserting violations of their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. After Maldonado and Hill applied for and were granted in forma pauperis status by the state court, the Defendants—the Baker County Sheriff's Office and Scotty Rhoden, Evelyn Blue, and James Messer, three employees of that office—removed the case to federal court and paid the requisite federal filing fee required under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). After removal, Maldonado and Hill did not seek in forma pauperis status in federal court. The district court subsequently dismissed Maldonado's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) —the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA")—and dismissed Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

As to Maldonado, this appeal requires us to determine whether a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying the filing fee after removal—is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We hold that it is not.

And as to Hill, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of Maldonado and Hill's claims.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Both Maldonado and Hill were prisoners detained in the Baker County Detention Center when they filed their pro se¹ prisoner civil rights action in Florida state court. Maldonado and Hill allege that the Defendants violated their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their Muslim faith by preventing them from attending Jummah prayer services.²

In state court, Maldonado and Hill both filed applications to proceed in forma pauperis , which the state court granted.

Maldonado is a frequent pro se prisoner litigant. At the time this case was being considered by the district court, Maldonado had nine different civil actions pending against various employees of the Baker County Sheriff's Office. Prior to the filing of those actions, Maldonado had filed four other civil rights actions, each of which was filed in federal court in the first instance, and three of which were the cases relied on by the district court in determining that Maldonado was a three-strike litigant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Indeed, it is undisputed that Maldonado has three strikes against him under § 1915(g).

When the Defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the Defendants, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), paid the full federal filing fee. Following removal, Maldonado and Hill did not apply for in forma pauperis status in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the district court granted the motion on two grounds. As to Maldonado, the district court dismissed Maldonado's claims based on his three-strike litigant status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). As to Hill, the district court dismissed Hill's claims based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This timely appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Daker v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr. , 820 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). We likewise review de novo whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Johnson v. Meadows , 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005). "We review de novo the district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the complaint's allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp. , 693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cinotto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 674 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) ).

III. ANALYSIS

There are three issues at the heart of this appeal: (1) whether Maldonado's claims are now moot; (2) whether the district court erred in dismissing Maldonado's claims under the three-strikes rule pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) ; and (3) whether the district court erred in dismissing Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We address each issue in turn.

A. Whether Maldonado's Claims are Moot

The Defendants argue that Maldonado's claims are moot. Specifically, the Defendants argue that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) precludes Maldonado from seeking compensatory and punitive damages because he failed to allege any physical injury arising from his detention.³ Because mootness is a threshold jurisdictional issue, we address this argument first.

We conclude that Maldonado's claims are not moot. First, § 1997e(e) states that:

No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.

Section 1997e(e), however, is not applicable in this case because, as discussed below in Part III.B.,"[n]o Federal civil action [was] brought by" Maldonado. See Harris v. Garner , 216 F.3d 970, 973–76 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that, in the context of § 1997e(e), the bringing of a suit is defined as the commencing of the suit, but not the maintaining of the suit). Indeed, " § 1997e(e) does not apply to prisoner lawsuits unrelated to prison conditions filed in state court based solely on state law and removed by defendants to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction." Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 294 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002).

Second, even if § 1997e(e) applied to Maldonado, the Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by this Court's en banc decision in Hoever v. Marks , 993 F.3d 1353, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2021). In Hoever , a state prisoner filed a § 1983 civil rights action against various prison officials, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and seeking injunctive relief and compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. Id. at 1356. The district court in Hoever , based on our earlier interpretation of § 1997e(e), dismissed the First Amendment claim insofar as it sought compensatory and punitive damages because the plaintiff failed to show a physical injury. Id. This Court, sitting en banc , receded from that earlier interpretation and held that the plain text of " § 1997e(e) permits punitive damages absent a showing of physical injury." Thus, pursuant to Hoever , Maldonado can assert a claim for punitive damages absent an allegation of physical injury.

B. The Three-Strikes Rule

Turning to the merits, Maldonado argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) based on his classification as a three-strikes litigant because he did not bring his action in federal court but instead filed it in state court.

In order to determine whether the district court's dismissal was proper under § 1915(g) ’s three-strikes rule, we begin " ‘with the language of the statute itself,’ giving ‘effect to the plain terms of the statute.’ " United States v. Henco Holding Corp. , 985 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Valone , 784 F.3d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 2015) ). Section 1915(g) —the three strikes provision of the PLRA—states as follows:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

(emphasis added). The two operative terms in the statute for purposes of this case are "bring a civil action" and "under this section."

To "bring" an action has long meant to initiate or commence it, not to prosecute or to continue it. See Black's Law Dictionary 192 (6th ed. 1990) ("To ‘bring’ an action or suit has a settled customary meaning at law, and refers to the initiation of legal proceedings in a suit."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that to "bring" an action means to commence it. See, e.g. , Hoffman v. Blaski , 363 U.S. 335, 344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) (holding that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) —which permits the transfer of "any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought "—unambiguously means at the time the lawsuit was filed); Goldenberg v. Murphy , 108 U.S. 162, 163, 2 S.Ct. 388, 27 L.Ed. 686 (1883) (determining that a legislative requirement that an action be "brought within 90 days" means it must be commenced in that time period and finding the terms "brought" and "commenced" as meaning the same thing and are used interchangeably).

And this Court likewise has held the same, including where "bring" or "brought" are used in other sections of the PLRA. See, e.g. , Harris , 216 F.3d at 974 (finding that the text "[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined" in § 1997e(e) means that the statute's bar on monetary relief absent...