Maldonado v. Flannery

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BEAR, J.
• Citation: Maldonado v. Flannery, 200 Conn.App. 1, 238 A.3d 127 (Conn. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 08 September 2020
• Docket Number: AC 43154
• Parties: William MALDONADO, et al. v. Kelly C. FLANNERY, et al.

200 Conn.App. 1

238 A.3d 127

William MALDONADO, et al.

v.Kelly C. FLANNERY, et al.

AC 43154

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 29, 2020

Officially released September 8, 2020

Jack G. Steigelfest, Hartford, for the appellants (defendants).

Philip F. von Kuhn, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Keller, Bright and Bear, Js.^*

BEAR, J.

The plaintiffs, William Maldonado and Geovanni Hernandez, brought a negligence action against the defendants, Kelly C. Flannery and Michael T. Flannery,¹ seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in which it found economic damages for the plaintiffs but no noneconomic damages. The plaintiffs filed a joint motion for additurs requesting that the court order noneconomic damages. The court granted the plaintiffs’ joint motion and ordered noneconomic damages. The defendants appeal from the judgment of the court granting the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs and ordering additurs in the amount of $8000 to the verdict in favor of Maldonado and $6500 to the verdict in favor of Hernandez. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs because the court's memorandum of decision lacked the specific facts it relied on to justify additurs, and there existed issues of credibility regarding the plaintiffs’ testimony about their noneconomic damages. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove their claims for noneconomic damages. We agree that the court abused its discretion in ordering additurs and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The court set forth the following factual and procedural history in its memorandum of decision on the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs. "On June 6, 2016, at approximately 3:20 p.m., [the plaintiffs] were driving [a 2004 Ford Econoline van] on Route 4 in Farmington. Maldonado was driving ... [and] Hernandez was the passenger. ... [The defendant] was driving a Ford Taurus sedan ... [and] collided with the rear of [the plaintiffs’] van. Accident photos entered into evidence showed that [the defendant's sedan] sustained serious damage to its front bumper and front hood, while [the plaintiffs’] van sustained minimal visible damage. This disparity in vehicle damage was likely due to the van's sturdy metal rear bumper and the fact that the disparity in the vehicles’ height caused [the defendant's sedan] to slide under the van's rear bumper.

"[The plaintiffs] did not complain of injuries at the scene of the accident. [They] sought treatment in the evening on the same day of the accident at the Hospital of Central Connecticut. At that time, [the plaintiffs] complained of pain in their lower backs and neck regions. Maldonado had a contusion on his sternum, presumably from his seat belt. Both [of the plaintiffs] were evaluated and released from the [hospital] on the evening of June 6, 2016.

"Maldonado treated with a chiropractor for approximately [two] months from April to June, 2014 [after a prior motor vehicle accident]. At that time, Maldonado visited the chiropractor [twelve] times and was discharged with no further treatment needed. Hernandez had no prior accidents.

"Subsequent to the 2016 accident, [the plaintiffs] had [magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans] and other diagnostics tests related to the accident that the jury reasonably could have concluded caused the plaintiffs no pain or suffering. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ medical records introduced at trial demonstrate that, from the date of the accident to approximately August of 2018, the plaintiffs did receive treatment that inherently involved some degree of pain. Specifically, Maldonado treated at New Britain Injury & Spine approximately [sixty-two] times. These treatments involved chiropractic manipulation of Maldonado's spine and neck, application of hot and cold packs, electrical stimulation, and, on occasion, mechanical traction. Similarly, Hernandez treated at New Britain Injury & Spine approximately [forty-nine] times. These treatments involved chiropractic manipulation of Hernandez’ spine and neck, application of hot and cold packs, and electrical stimulation. Finally, on one occasion, [the plaintiffs] received epidural steroid injections of their lumbar regions at Jefferson Radiology. Maldonado was assigned a 5 [percent] permanent partial disability rating by his chiropractor, [Brian] Pollack. Although the defendants’ expert, [Jonas] Lieponis, an orthopedic surgeon, disputed the extent of the plaintiffs’ injuries, he agreed that both plaintiffs sustained sprains and/or strains to their neck and lumbar regions.

"In [returning] its verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the jury awarded $17,228.38 of Maldonado's claimed $18,953.38 in past economic damages for medical costs, as well as $1800 in future economic damages. With respect to Hernandez, the jury awarded $11,864.94 of the claimed $13,254.94 as past economic damages for medical costs. The jury did not award Hernandez any future economic damages. The jury did not award either plaintiff any noneconomic damages. The plaintiffs’ verdict forms stated the amount claimed for past economic damages for each individual medical provider. With the exception of slight reductions for the claimed amounts for chiropractic care at New Britain Injury & Spine, the jury awarded the plaintiffs the requested amounts."

The plaintiffs filed a two count complaint sounding in negligence² on July 18, 2017. The case was tried before the jury from January 23 to January 25, 2019. The jury returned its verdict on January 25, 2019, in favor of Hernandez and awarded him economic damages of $11,864.94 and zero noneconomic damages. The jury also returned its verdict in favor of Maldonado and awarded him economic damages of $19,028.38 and zero noneconomic damages. Thereafter, on January 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their joint motion for additurs.

On June 25, 2019, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs, concluding that the jury verdict awarding economic damages to each plaintiff, but no noneconomic damages, was internally inconsistent. The court further concluded that the jury could not have properly reached its verdict, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to awards for pain and suffering, on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

A motion for additur is a "statutory creation that allows the court to increase the award of damages when the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law."

Demchak v. New Haven , 93 Conn. App. 309, 311–12, 889 A.2d 266 (2006) ; see General Statutes §§ 52-228a³ and 52-228b.⁴ "The standard of review for determining whether a trial court properly ordered an additur is well settled. [W]e review a decision of the trial court ... ordering an additur to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion. ... [T]he jury's decision to award economic damages and zero noneconomic damages is best tested in light of the circumstances of the particular case before it. Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue. That decision should be made, not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do. ...

"It is axiomatic that [t]he amount of damages awarded is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury .... Moreover, there is no obligation for the jury to find that every injury causes pain, or the amount of pain alleged. ... Put another way, [i]t is the jury's right to accept some, none or all of the evidence presented. ... It is the [jury's] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. ... The [jury] can ... decide what—all, none, or some—of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject. ... The only practical test to apply to a verdict is whether the award of damages falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cusano v. Lajoie , 178 Conn. App. 605, 609–10, 176 A.3d 1228 (2017).

On appeal, the defendants argue that the court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. Specifically, they argue that the court abused its discretion by granting the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs because it improperly concluded that the jury verdict awarding economic damages but not noneconomic damages was inconsistent and that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to awards for pain and suffering. We agree.

Our Supreme Court has stated that "a case-specific standard should apply to the instance in which a party seeks to have a verdict set aside on the basis that it is legally inadequate." Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174, 181, 745 A.2d 789 (2000). This court, thereafter, interpreted and explained Wichers : "For more than seventy-five years, judicial decisions have reflected the wisdom of legal realism that case law should reflect the factual circumstances under which the controversy between the parties arose. In that sense, every judicial ruling is case specific. Wichers must, therefore, have intended something more. We read Wichers as an instruction to a trial court specifically to identify the facts of record that justify the extraordinary relief of additur and as an instruction to an appellate court to inquire whether the facts so identified justify the trial court's exercise of its discretion to set a jury...