Maldonado v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before MANGANO
• Citation: Maldonado v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 548 N.Y.S.2d 548, 156 A.D.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
• Decision Date: 11 December 1989
• Parties: Georgina Perez MALDONADO, etc., Respondent, v. LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants, Sylvester Levy, Appellant.

Page 548

548 N.Y.S.2d 548

156 A.D.2d 431

Georgina Perez MALDONADO, etc., Respondent, v. LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants Sylvester Levy, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Dec. 11, 1989.

Molod, Berkowitz & Godosky, P.C., New York City (Frederick M. Molod, Matthew A. Tedone and Mary Sonneborn, of counsel), for appellant.

Isaacson, Schiowitz, Korson & Solny, New York City (Martin S. Rothman, Sanford Solny and Alyne I. Diamond, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and BRACKEN, KUNZEMAN and SPATT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a negligence action to recover damages for wrongful death and personal injuries, etc., the defendant Sylvester Levy appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Levine, J.), dated June 23, 1988, which, after a hearing, denied his motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against him.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and the facts, by deleting the provision thereof which denied that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death insofar as it is asserted against the appellant, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.

The plaintiff's decedent died on September 19, 1985. The two-year Statute of Limitations for a wrongful death action expired on September 19, 1987 (see, EPTL 5-4.1[1]. Although the summons and complaint were allegedly affixed to the appellant's door on September 18, 1987, the required mailing did not occur until after the limitations period had expired.

The plaintiff's attempt to toll the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 203...