Maldonado v. Pratt

Citation409 P.3d 630
Decision Date17 November 2016
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 15CA2085
CourtColorado Court of Appeals
Parties Lisa MALDONADO and the Estate of Jacob Maldonado, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dennis PRATT and Karon Pratt, a/k/a Karen M. Pratt, Defendants-Appellees.

Earl & Earl, PLLC, Collin J. Earl, Ryan T. Earl, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Nathan, Bremer, Dumm & Myers, P.C., Mark H. Dumm, Kaitlin M. Akers, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS

¶ 1 In this appeal, we must determine whether an amended complaint's new claim against a new defendant, asserted after the statute of limitations has run, relates back to the date of the original complaint.

¶ 2 Plaintiffs Lisa Maldonado and the Estate of Jacob Maldonado (collectively, the Estate) sued Dennis Pratt II (Pratt Jr.) for wrongful death, in connection with Pratt Jr.'s fatal shooting of Jacob Maldonado (Maldonado). Months later, after the statute of limitations had run on any negligence claims, the Estate sought to amend its complaint to add a new claim under the Premises Liability Act against Pratt Jr.'s mother (Karen) and father Dennis Pratt (Pratt Sr.) (collectively, the Pratts). The Estate contended that it had recently learned that the Pratts, not Pratt Jr., owned the property where the shooting occurred.

¶ 3 We conclude, as the district court did, that the Pratts did not have timely notice of the original action. Accordingly, the amended complaint does not relate back to the original complaint and the Estate's claim is time barred.

¶ 4 We therefore affirm the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the Pratts.

I. Background

¶ 5 The Pratts and Pratt Jr. own adjacent properties in a rural area near Pueblo, Colorado. Pratt Jr. stored used car parts on his property, in a spot located about a quarter mile from his parents' house.

¶ 6 Pratt Jr. began to suspect that someone was stealing the car parts. On the night of October 16, 2012, he drove his truck to the storage area. When he saw beams from three flashlights approaching the area, he got out of his truck and fired his rifle in the direction of the lights, killing Maldonado.

¶ 7 A jury convicted Pratt Jr. of negligent homicide and he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

¶ 8 On September 16, 2014, one month before the end of the limitations period, the Estate filed a wrongful death action against Pratt Jr., alleging a single claim of negligence based on his act of shooting Maldonado. The complaint was served on Pratt Jr. at the Department of Corrections (DOC), where he was serving his sentence.

¶ 9 On April 1, 2015, the Estate filed an amended complaint, retaining the wrongful death claim against Pratt Jr. but asserting an additional claim against the Pratts under the Premises Liability Act (PLA), section 13–21–115, C.R.S. 2016. As the Estate later explained, the Pratts' insurance company had conducted an investigation of the Estate's claim against Pratt Jr. in January 2015, and had determined that the property where the shooting occurred was owned by the Pratts, not by Pratt Jr.1

¶ 10 The Pratts filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or for summary judgment, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations had run and, therefore, the claim against them was time barred.2 The Estate countered that, under C.R.C.P. 15(c), the amended complaint related back to the original complaint.

¶ 11 The district court disagreed, concluding that the Pratts did not have notice of the original lawsuit and, even if they had received notice, they would not have expected that, but for a mistake in pleading, they would have been named as defendants in the wrongful death action. Accordingly, the district court granted the Pratts' motion and entered judgment in their favor on the PLA claim.

II. Discussion

¶ 12 On appeal,3 the Estate concedes that the statute of limitations for a PLA claim had already expired when it filed its amended complaint. But it contends that, under C.R.C.P. 15(c), the new claim against the Pratts related back to the date of the original wrongful death action and was therefore timely.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 13 The Pratts' motion was denominated a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(c) or, alternatively, a motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h). By considering evidence outside the pleadings, the court treated the motion as a motion under Rule 56. Shaw v. City of Colorado Springs , 683 P.2d 385, 387 (Colo. App. 1984). We review a trial court's decision granting summary judgment de novo. Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman , 2015 CO 63, ¶ 30, 361 P.3d 400.

¶ 14 Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and supporting documents demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c) ; Laughman v. Girtakovskis , 2015 COA 143, ¶ 8, 374 P.3d 504. In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court grants the nonmoving party any favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the facts and resolves all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Cikraji v. Snowberger , 2015 COA 66, ¶ 16.

¶ 15 We also review de novo a trial court's interpretation of a rule of civil procedure. City & Cty. of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. , 239 P.3d 1270, 1275 (Colo. 2010).

B. Rule 15(c) and the Relation-Back Test

¶ 16 A new claim or defense asserted in an amended pleading against the existing party or parties relates back to the date of the original pleading so long as the new claim or defense arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. C.R.C.P. 15(c).

¶ 17 But when the amended pleading seeks to add a new party—not simply a new claim against an existing partyRule 15 adds two additional requirements, both focused on notice to the new party: first, the new party must have received such notice of the action within the period provided by C.R.C.P. 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint that he would not be prejudiced, and, second, having received such notice, the new party must have known or reasonably should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him or her. Id.4

¶ 18 Under modern pleading rules, requests to amend should be freely granted and liberally construed. Eagle River Mobile Home Park v. Dist. Court , 647 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1982). Rule 15(c) is a remedial tool that reflects a balance between this policy of liberally permitting amendments and ensuring the reliable application of statutes of limitation. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc. , 494 F.3d 458, 467–68 (4th Cir. 2007) ;5 Chaplake Holdings, LTD v. Chrysler Corp. , 766 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 2001). By focusing on notice to the new party and the amendment's effect on the new party, Rule 15(c) promotes the administration of justice by allowing cases to be decided on the merits, rather than on mere technicalities, Pan v. Bane , 141 P.3d 555, 559 (Okla. 2006), and, when appropriate, also gives defendants "predictable repose from claims after the passage of a specified time," Goodman , 494 F.3d at 468–70.

¶ 19 In light of these interests, notice is considered the touchstone of Rule 15(c) and is "strictly required." Currier v. Sutherland , 215 P.3d 1155, 1161 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd , 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009) ; see also Graves v. Gen. Ins. Corp. , 412 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1969) (the addition or substitution of parties who had no notice of the original action is "not allowed"). Notice "serves as a yardstick for evaluating whether or not amending the complaint will cause the new defendant to suffer prejudice if he or she is forced to defend the case on the merits." Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Det. Facility , 334 F.Supp.2d 114, 129 (D.R.I. 2004). Thus, an amendment is permitted to relate back only where a new party had timely knowledge of the original action and the original complaint provided fair and adequate notice of the new claim in the amended complaint. See Currier , 215 P.3d at 1162.

C. Did The Pratts Have Notice of the Original Lawsuit Within the Period Prescribed by C.R.C.P. 4(m)?

¶ 20 The Pratts concede that the Estate's PLA claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the negligence claim asserted against Pratt Jr. in the original complaint. But they argue that the Estate cannot satisfy elements two or three of the relation-back test: notice within the prescribed period and knowledge that they should have been defendants in the lawsuit. We agree that the Estate failed to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the Pratts had notice of the original lawsuit within the prescribed time period.

¶ 21 An amendment will not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c) unless the new party receives notice of the institution of the action within the period provided by Rule 4(m).6 Cf. Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc. , 2012 CO 62, ¶ 13, 287 P.3d 112 (under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, the phrase "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint," means that the new party must receive notice within a prescribed period after a complaint is filed); see Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr. , 266 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (this element of relation-back test requires both notice and absence of prejudice).

¶ 22 Under C.R.C.P. 4(m), the plaintiff must serve his summons and complaint within sixty-three days after the complaint is filed. The Estate filed its original complaint on September 16, 2014. Thus, to satisfy the second element of the test, the Estate had to show that, by November 18, 2014, the Pratts had notice of the action against Pratt Jr.

¶ 23 The district court found that there was no evidence that the Pratts had actual notice of the lawsuit before the end of the limitations period on October 16, 2014.7 Though the district court's finding misconstrued the relevant date for purposes of Rule 15(c), the Estate did...

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