Maldonado v. Rosa

Decision Date09 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. Civ. No. 08-1798(PG).,Civ. No. 08-1798(PG).
PartiesPedro MALDONADO, et als., Plaintiff, v. COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO y Credito Abraham Rosa, et als., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

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Vilma M. Dapena-Rodriguez, Vilma Maria Dapena Law Office, Bayamon, PR, for Plaintiff.

Federico Lora-Lopez, Federico Lora Lopez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Pedro Maldonado (hereinafter "Plaintiff or "Maldonado"), his wife, Aileen Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), and the Conjugal Partnership constituted between them filed this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 ("ADA" or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. against Maldonado's former employer, the Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Abraham Rosa ("Cooperativa", "Defendant" or "the Company"), alleging discrimination and retaliation on the basis of a protected disability. See Docket No. 1. As part of his discrimination claim, Plaintiff alleges that Cooperativa submitted him to a hostile work environment and wrongfully terminated and retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct. Plaintiff and his wife include supplemental state law claims based upon Puerto Rico's wrongful termination, retaliation, disability and general negligence statutes. See P.R. LawsAnn. tit. 1, § 501, et seq. (disability discrimination); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185 et seq. (wrongful discharge); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5142 (general tort); P.R Laws Ann tit. 29, § 194 et seq. (retaliation).

The Cooperativa moved for summary judgment requesting the dismissal of the claims brought forth by the plaintiffs on the grounds that Maldonado is unable to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and retaliation. First, the Defendant argues that Maldonado is not disabled within the definition of the ADA. The Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is unable to prove his hostile work environment claim. In its defense, the Defendant proffers that its actions were not motivated by Plaintiff's alleged condition. On the contrary, the Company contends that it did not retaliate against Plaintiff for having requested an accommodation, but instead claims that its actions were based on legitimate grounds. See Dockets No. 43. Finally, the Defendant requests the dismissal of the derivative claims of Plaintiffs spouse and Conjugal Partnership claiming they are time barred. Plaintiff's opposi- tion is also before our consideration. See Dockets No. 64-65.

After a close examination of all the evidence on record and a careful review of the applicable statutory and case law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Cooperativa's motion for summary judgment for the reasons explained below.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows disposition of a case if "the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir.2000). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).

To be successful in its attempt, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact in the record, see DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997), through definite and competent evidence. See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). If the non-movant generates uncertainty as to the true state of any material fact, the movant's efforts should be deemed unavailing. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000). Nonetheless, the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, "summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

At the summary judgment juncture, the Court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging that party with all possible inferences to be derived from the facts. See Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). The Court must review the record "taken as a whole," and "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). This is so, because credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id.

II. FACTUAL FINDINGS

Before setting forth the facts found by this Court to be undisputed and relevant to the matter at hand, we must first address several compliance issues presented to the Court when reviewing Defendant's and Plaintiffs' statements of facts.

"Documents supporting or opposing summary judgment must be properly authenticated." Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Fed. R.CivP. Rule 56(e)). To be admissible at the summary judgment stage, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e). See 10A Wright, Miller &amp Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2722 (3d ed. 1998). "Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), on summary judgment, the parties in their supporting affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Hoffman v. Applicators Sales And Service, Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2006). "Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith." Id. "The failure to authenticate a document properly precludes its consideration on a motion for summary judgment." Robinson v. Bodoff, 355 F.Supp.2d 578, 582 (D.Mass.2005) (striking all exhibits that were submitted without affidavits).

Moreover, a party must not "[overlook] the crucial point that documents do not automatically become a part of the record simply because they are the products of discovery." Hoffman, 439 F.3d at 15. "If a party wishes the court to consider matters disclosed during discovery, he must take appropriate steps to have them included in the record: merely citing to pages of discovery materials not of record does not suffice." Id.

Pursuant to the foregoing, some of the materials submitted by both the Plaintiffs and Defendant are inadmissible for the purposes of summary judgment. After a careful review of the record, this Court finds that many of the exhibits submitted by the parties in support of their statements of fact lack an authenticating affidavit or fail to indicate whether they stem from discovery materials on file. As a result, unless admitted by the opposing party, the Court did not consider the factual statements submitted by the parties that were not properly supported by the record on file.

As per the foregoing discussion, the Court found the following relevant facts were undisputed:

1. Maldonado started to work for the Cooperativa on March 16, 1998.

2. Plaintiff was appointed to the position of Manager of the Department of Promotion and Educational Services at Cooperativa, and his immediate supervisor was the Executive President, Luis R. Lopez-Roman ("Lopez").

3. Maldonado received direct supervision from Lopez and in turn, Maldonado supervised the positions of Graphic Artist, Administrative Assistant and Advertising Agent. However, Plaintiff could not hire, terminate or promote employees.

4. Maldonado's position's description states that other tasks may be added or the existing ones may be modified as the Cooperativa stipulates.

5. On March 31, 2005, Maldonado signed a receipt of the position's description which had been discussed on February 21, 2005.

6. On May 4, 2006, Maldonado presented Lopez a note from Dr. William E. Phillipp addressed "to who whom it may concern." The note stated that Maldonado suffered from sleep apnea and that although he could continue his usual office work, he was not authorized to drive motor vehicles.

7. On May 18, 2006, Lopez wrote a letter to Maldonado, which was received on the same date, informing him, among other things, that due to the fact that driving a vehicle was an essential function of his position, the Cooperativa

could: (1) transfer him to a position in the client service area which did not require driving motor vehicles with the same salary until July 31, 2006, at which time his salary would be adjusted to the new position if his limitation continued; or (2) another provisional alternative would be for Maldonado to take his accumulated sick leave until the beginning of his vacation scheduled from June 12 until July 1, 2006. Lopez also expressed being in "the best disposition to hearing and pondering other alternatives which may be viable and not an onus for this institution."

8. On May 19, 2006, Maldonado responded to Lopez's letter. Therein, he informed Lopez that his...

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