Malecek v. Williams, 090517 NCCA, COA16-830
|Court:||Court of Appeals of North Carolina|
|Attorney:||The Law Offices of J. Scott Smith, PLLC, by J. Scott Smith and Andrew Newman, for plaintiff-appellant. Allman Spry Davis Leggett & Crumpler, P.A., by Kim R. Bonuomo, Joslin Davis, and Bennett D. Rainey, for defendant-appellee.|
|Judge Panel:||Judges ELMORE and TYSON concur.|
|Opinion Judge:||DIETZ, JUDGE.|
|Party Name:||MARC MALECEK, Plaintiff, v. DEREK WILLIAMS, Defendant.|
|Case Date:||September 05, 2017|
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2017.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 11 May 2016 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Forsyth County Superior Court No. 15 CVS 5646.
The Law Offices of J. Scott Smith, PLLC, by J. Scott Smith and Andrew Newman, for plaintiff-appellant.
Allman Spry Davis Leggett & Crumpler, P.A., by Kim R. Bonuomo, Joslin Davis, and Bennett D. Rainey, for defendant-appellee.
This case concerns two common law causes of action-alienation of affection and criminal conversation-that permit litigants to sue the lovers of their unfaithful spouses. These laws were born out of misogyny and in modern times are often used as tools for enterprising divorce lawyers seeking leverage over the other side.
Defendant Derek Williams contends that these aging common law torts are facially unconstitutional because they violate individuals' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to engage in intimate sexual activity, speech, and expression with other consenting adults.
As explained below, we reject this facial constitutional challenge. Claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation are designed to prevent and remedy personal injury, and to protect the promise of monogamy that accompanies most marriage commitments. This sets these common law claims apart from the discriminatory sodomy law at issue in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which was not supported by any legitimate state interest and instead stemmed from moral disapproval and bigotry. Similarly, these laws (in most applications) seek to prevent personal and societal harms without regard to the content of the intimate expression that occurs in the extra-marital relationship. Thus, under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), these torts are constitutional despite the possibility that their use burdens forms of protected speech and expression.
Our holding is neither an endorsement nor a critique of these "heart balm" torts. Whether this Court believes these torts are good or bad policy is irrelevant; we cannot hold a law facially unconstitutional because it is bad policy. We instead ask whether there are any applications of these laws that survive scrutiny under the appropriate constitutional standards. As explained below, although there are situations in which these torts likely are unconstitutional as applied, there are also many applications that survive constitutional scrutiny. Thus, the common law torts of alienation of affection and criminal conversation are not facially unconstitutional. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
Marc and Amber Malecek were a married couple. Ms. Malecek is a nurse. Defendant Derek Williams is a medical doctor at the hospital where Ms. Malecek works. In early 2015, Dr. Williams and Ms. Malecek began a sexual relationship.
Mr. Malecek discovered the affair and sued Dr. Williams for alienation of affection and criminal conversation. Dr. Williams moved to dismiss Mr. Malecek's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that North Carolina's common law causes of action for alienation of affection and criminal conversation are facially unconstitutional.
The trial court held a hearing on Dr. Williams's motion, accepted his constitutional arguments, and entered a written order granting his motion to dismiss. Mr. Malecek timely appealed.
This Court reviews the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 639, 781 S.E.2d 248, 252 (2016). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion "is properly granted where a valid legal defense stands as an insurmountable bar to a plaintiff's recovery." Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C. , 139 N.C.App. 421, 424, 533 S.E.2d 270, 272 (2000). Because the courts cannot permit a plaintiff to pursue a cause of action that is unconstitutional on its face, Dr. Williams's facial challenge to these common law torts is an appropriate subject for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
We begin by examining the elements of these common law claims. "A claim for alienation of affections is comprised of wrongful acts which deprive a married person of the affections of his or her spouse-love, society, companionship and comfort of the other spouse." Darnell v. Rupplin, 91 N.C.App. 349, 350, 371 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1988). To prevail on an alienation of affection claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the spouses were happily married and a genuine love and affection existed between them; (2) the love and affection was alienated and destroyed; and (3) the defendant caused the destruction of that marital love and affection. Id. at 350, 371 S.E.2d at 745.
Similarly, a claim for criminal conversation lies against a defendant who engages in sexual relations with a married person. "The elements of the tort are the actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture." Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C.App. 199, 200-01, 557 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2001).
In the trial court, Dr. Williams argued that both of these causes of action were facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court agreed and granted Dr. Williams's Rule 12(b)(6) motion without identifying the particular constitutional doctrine on which it relied. Because we review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, we must address all grounds on which Dr. Williams challenged these two common law claims.
I. Substantive Due Process
Dr. Williams first argues that alienation of affection and criminal conversation offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by restraining one's liberty to have intimate sexual relations with another consenting adult. In support of this argument,...
To continue readingFREE SIGN UP