Maling v. Crummey

• Citation: 5 Wash. 222,31 P. 600
• Parties: MALING v. CRUMMEY.
• Decision Date: 18 November 1892
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

31 P. 600

5 Wash. 222

MALING v. CRUMMEY.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 18, 1892

Appeal from superior court, Chehalis county; MASON IRWIN, Judge.

Action by J. B. Maling against G. W. Crummey. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

N.W. Bush and Doolittle & Fogg, for appellant.

D. Allen and M. J. Cochran, for respondent.

SCOTT J.

This is an action brought to recover money lost at gaming. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that the statute on which the action is founded is void, in that it is not embraced in the title to said act. The act was entitled "An act to prevent and punish gaming." The particular provision now section 142 of the Penal Code, provides that any person losing money, etc., on any of the games referred to, shall have a cause of action to recover, from the dealer or player winning the same, the money or thing of value so lost. The appellant contends that the right to recover the money or thing lost in no wise tends to prevent or punish gaming. But it seems to us that the right to recover is sufficiently germane to the title to be fairly embraced within it, for certainly a provision authorizing the recovery of money or property lost at gaming would tend in a large measure to prevent a person from conducting a game, by removing the object to be gained, or the inducement for carrying on the game. The court properly overruled the motion. The further point is made that the court refused to give certain instructions to the jury which were asked by the defendant. As to these, the matters embraced in them were all sufficiently covered in the instructions which were given.

Appellant also complains of the instructions which the court did give to the jury, but there was no sufficient exception taken to any of said instructions. At the conclusion of the charge the defendant excepted "to each and every statement and allegation in said charge," without specifying any objection or pointing out any ground for such exception. This sort of an exception will not avail a party unless the whole charge is wrong. The instructions consist of a number of separate propositions, some of which are undoubtedly right, and are not even questioned in this appeal, and for that reason the exceptions taken are insufficient. See Meeker v. Gardella, 1 Wash. St. 139, 23 P. 837. We have examined the charge, however, and it is sufficient to state that the cause seems to have been fairly presented to the jury. Under the...