Mallery v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 24 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 14300,14300
• Citation: 678 P.2d 19,106 Idaho 227
• Parties: Robert Michael MALLERY, Dean A. Schwartzmiller, Landis Dillard, Jr., Dale G. Goss, Jesse S. Gonzales and Randy Wise, Petitioners-Appellants, v. G.D. LEWIS, sergeant, Canyon County Sheriff's Office, and John D. Prescott, Sheriff of Canyon County, Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 19

678 P.2d 19

106 Idaho 227

Robert Michael MALLERY, Dean A. Schwartzmiller, Landis Dillard, Jr., Dale G. Goss, Jesse S. Gonzales and Randy Wise, Petitioners-Appellants, v. G.D. LEWIS, sergeant, Canyon County Sheriff's Office, and John D. Prescott, Sheriff of Canyon County, Respondents.

No. 14300.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Oct. 24, 1983.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1984.

Howard A. Belodoff, Boise, for petitioners-appellants

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, Mark Shuster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents.

HUNTLEY, Justice.

Petitioners were pretrial detainees in the Canyon County jail at the time they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging deprivation of constitutional rights guaranteed by the United States and Idaho constitutions. Petitioners alleged their cells were overcrowded and that the living space per inmate was insufficient to meet constitutional minimum requirements. On occasion, after deducting the space occupied by bunks, there remained less than 5 1/2 square feet of floor space per person. Prisoners were made to remain in those small areas for more than 72 hours at one time; only one of the five cell areas contain a shower and showers were provided to those locked in the other four areas at the whim of respondents. Petitioners alleged all correspondence, incoming and outgoing, was censored by respondents and in some instances copied to be used in criminal actions. Mail was withheld without notice to prisoners. Petitioners allege they were denied access to the courts in that the Canyon County jail has no law library; the petitioners were allowed virtually no phone calls to their court-appointed attorneys or the various courts of the state. Petitioners alleged the policy of the jail restricting visits to members of the immediate family is a deprivation of their first amendment right of association. Petitioners allege they were provided no recreation or exercise, there were inadequate hygiene supplies, and there was inadequate health care.

Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied petitioners' request for relief after encouraging the sheriff to change certain practices.

The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether the conditions in the Canyon County jail result in a deprivation of constitutional rights; and (2) whether appellants have standing to maintain this action.

The proper focus of inquiry into the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); that is, whether the conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. Under the due process clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt. The courts must determine whether the condition or restriction is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. In Bell, supra 99 S.Ct. at 1873, the court stated:

"The factors identified in [Kennedy v. ] Mendoza-Martinez [372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963) ] provide useful guideposts in determining whether particular restrictions and conditions The court in Bell, supra, also noted that the primary purpose of pretrial detention is to assure the defendant's presence at trial, but the government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained. The court held that

                accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment in the constitutional sense of that word.  A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.  See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S.   at 613-617, 80 S.Ct.  [1367] at 1374-1376 [4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) ].  Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].'  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S., at 168-169, 83 S.Ct. at 567-568;  see Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S., at 617, 80 S.Ct. at 1376.   Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.'   Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.  See ibid.   Courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility.  Cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2049, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977);  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1644, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)."
                

"Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial." Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. at 1874.

We turn now to the specific allegations of the petitioners.

OVERCROWDING

Adult pre-trial detainees at Canyon County jail are housed primarily in the fourth floor bullpen area in five cells. Four of the cells have a total floor space of ninety-six square feet each and the fifth has a total floor area of one-hundred sixty-eight square feet. Three of the smaller cells are furnished with six wall-mounted bunks in double tiers, a sink with hot and cold water, and a toilet. The fourth of the smaller cells and the largest cell are the same with the exception of having five instead of the six bunks. None of the smaller cells have a shower. The inmates are allowed out of their cells for a period of one to two hours per day, weekdays, for showers and recreation in the day room. They are also allowed out for visits, phone calls, attorney consultations, and trips to the dentist, doctor or court.

Each cell has at least one window with a gridded screen which permits sunlight and affords the inmates a view of the sky, but not of the ground. The cells are bright and clean, well ventilated, free of insects and rodents, and are open to view at all times. Depending on the number of pretrial detainees in custody, the number of inmates per cell varies from one to six. Many federal courts have considered conditions of overcrowding at prisons and jails. The courts have considered the length of detentions, the number of hours per day the inmates are confined to their cells, the number of persons confined to each cell, the rated capacity of the facility, whether the population exceeds that capacity and if so whether the excess is temporary or permanent. "In the daytime, prisoners were confined to the day room in such numbers that at times there was little more than six square feet per inmate. The west bullpen held eighteen inmates (in three six-bunk cells), and had only eleven square feet per person, including space occupied by tables. Conditions in the east bullpen, which held thirty inmates (five six-bunk cells), were worse and sometimes during the day there was only 6.8 square feet of space per person, including table space .... Prisoners often slept on mattresses laid on the floor or on tables in the day room."

In the cases granting relief, the prisons or jails were grossly overcrowded. In Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir.1981) the court disapproved of the conditions, finding that:

In Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F.Supp. 802 (Or.1980), prisoners were required to sleep on the floor, dayrooms were converted into dormitories, extra beds were placed in the dormatories, all resulting in a situation where the prisoners were "packed to the rafters." The average prisoner was required to spend eleven hours per day in his cell in the summer and twelve and one-half hours per day in the winter. The court in Capps, supra, stated that the cell space accorded inmates fell far below the recommended area by professional standards. (The August, 1977, standards of the American Correctional Association require that 60 square feet of cell space be accorded prisoners spending no more than ten hours per day in their cells, and that eighty square feet of cell space be accorded prisoners spending more than ten hours per day in their cells.) The court in Capps, supra, in holding the crowding constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, stated the following factors are to be considered:

"(1) the duration of the prisoners' confinement; (2) the degree to which the population exceeds the institution's design capacity; (3) the size of the inmates' quarters and the number of hours per day the inmates must spend in those quarters; (4) the effects of the increased population on the prisoners' mental and physical health; and (5) the relative permanency of the crowded conditions."

Detainees at the Canyon County jail spend approximately twenty-two to twenty-three hours per day in their cells. The number of detainees in each cell fluctuates from one to six. When five persons are housed in the smaller cell the floor space per person is nineteen feet and at six persons it is sixteen square feet. When the space taken up by the six bunks is deducted the result is three to four square feet of living space per person, less than one fourth the space required by the American Correctional Association standard.

The district court held that while this amount of space may be sufficient...