Mallet v. Miller

• Decision Date: 26 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05 Civ. 00070(VM).,05 Civ. 00070(VM).
• Parties: Antonio MALLET, Petitioner, v. David MILLER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

432 F.Supp.2d 366

Antonio MALLET, Petitioner, v. David MILLER, Respondent.

No. 05 Civ. 00070(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

May 26, 2006.

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Eleanor Jackson Piel, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

DECISION AND ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

Petitioner Antonio Mallet ("Mallet") filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mallet was' convicted in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, of second degree murder in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1) and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 20 years to life.¹ In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Mallet asserts that he is entitled to the writ on the grounds that (1) he was denied his constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial, (2) the prosecution failed to disclose evidence favorable to him, including fingerprint evidence and evidence concerning a corrupt police officer, (3) he received ineffective assistance from his former counsel, Jeremy Schneider ("Schneider"), and (4) he is actually innocent of the crime charged. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Mallet's petition.

I. BACKGROUND²

On September 26, 1996, Mallet was arrested in connection with the shooting death of Michael Ledeatte ("Ledeatte") and was arraigned in Criminal Court, Bronx County the next day. An indictment charging him with Murder in the Second Degree was filed on October 18, 1996. Two months later, on November 18, 1996, Mallet was granted bail.

Mallet's trial commenced March 10, 1999, approximately thirty months after the date of his arraignment, in the New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County (the "trial court"). The prosecution's main witness against Mallet was Gregory Walker ("Walker"), who was a friend of Ledeatte. Walker testified that he and Ledeatte had worked together to steal cars, with Walker assisting Ledeatte on numerous occasions by backing Ledeatte up³ in a separate vehicle during a theft. Walker testified that he saw Mallet shoot Ledeatte in a parking lot behind a Bronx supermarket and that the shooting was related to the theft of a car. On March 18, 1999, after a jury trial, Mallet was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 20 years to life.

In March, 2000, Mallet appealed his conviction to the State Supreme Court Appellate Division (the "Appellate Division") arguing that (1) the prosecution failed to prove Mallet's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the critical witness was a criminal whose testimony was inconsistent with physical evidence and who had numerous incentives to lie; (2) the trial court deprived Mallet of his due process rights by admitting hearsay testimony, without a limiting instruction, that he was in the stolen car business; (3) the trial court violated Mallet's right to be present during all material stages of the trial when he was absent from a robing room conference regarding the testimony of a critical witness (Walker); and (4) the prosecution's misstatements during summation that Mallet had not voluntarily surrendered and was under the scrutiny of federal authorities denied Mallet a fain trial.

On December 12, 2000, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Mallet's conviction. People v. Mallet, 278 A.D.2d 51, 717 N.Y.S.2d 530, 530 (App.Div. 1st Dept.2000). The Appellate Division found that (1) the verdict was legally sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence, (2) the hearsay testimony regarding Mallet's involvement in the stolen car business was properly admitted to explain events leading up to the crime and had minimal prejudicial effect, (3) Mallet did not have the right to be present during the robing room conference because it "did not involve matters of defendant's peculiar knowledge and did not otherwise have any potential for meaningful participation by defendant," and (4) the prosecution's summation did not deprive Mallet of a fair trial. Id.

On April 6, 2001, Mallet's leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied.

In February of 2001, Mallet wrote a letter to the Disciplinary Committee of the First Department outlining perceived deficiencies in Schneider's representation of him, and also stating that he had been framed for murder by the New York City Police Department. (See Ltr. to Thomas J. Cahill from Antonio Mallet, dated February 28, 2001, attached as Exhibit J to Piel Aff. ("Disciplinary Comm. Complaint Ltr.").) In May of 2001, Schneider submitted a letter responding to Mallet's accusations to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee. (See Ltr. to Thomas J. Cahill from Jeremy Schneider, dated May 29, 2001, attached as Exhibit A to Piel Aff. ("Disciplinary Comm. Response Ltr.").)

Mallet moved for a writ of error coram nobis on May 14, 2002, alleging, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because that counsel had failed to argue that his trial counsel, Schneider, was ineffective. Mallet's primary contention was that appellate counsel had failed to properly frame his claim on the hearsay testimony as an issue of ineffective counsel, though he also suggested other aspects of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.

The Appellate Division unanimously denied Mallet's application for a writ of error coram nobis on May 20, 2003, and leave to appeal the denial was rejected by the New York Court of Appeals on July 16, 2003.

On August 15, 2003, Mallet filed a motion in Supreme Court, Bronx County, to vacate his conviction pursuant to N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10 (2006) ("§ 440.10"). In it, Mallet asserted Schneider was ineffective because, among other reasons, he (1) failed to adequately prepare for the case, (2) inadequately cross-examined several witnesses, (3) failed to develop a record regarding whether Walker received a plea bargain, (4) failed to request a limiting instruction on the use of hearsay evidence related to Mallet's participation in the stolen car business, (5) prevented Mallet from testifying on his own behalf, (6) failed to present an adequate defense, (7) did not produce an independent medical examiner, (8) was unwilling to appear at Mallet's sentencing, (9) failed to subpoena certain witnesses, and (10) did not move for a speedy trial. Mallet also argued that the prosecutor knowingly allowed false testimony to go uncorrected.

On April 26, 2004, the Supreme Court, Bronx County denied Mallet's § 440.10 motion. In denying the motion, the court held that many of Mallet's arguments should have been raised on appeal; that the medical records purporting to show Mallet physically incapable of firing a gun do not raise a threshold issue of fact; that Mallet's allegations that he was framed or the victim of police corruption are wholly unsubstantiated; that Mallet was not denied the right to a speedy trial because Schneider either requested or consented to almost every pretrial adjournment; and that none of these matters presented a cognizable issue of ineffective assistance. Mallet's application for leave to appeal the denial of his § 440.10 motion was rejected by the Appellate Division on January 4, 2005.

On January 5, 2005, Mallet filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the timeliness of which respondent David Miller ("Respondent" or "the State") does not dispute. The merits of the petition are discussed below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A habeas petitioner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment is entitled to habeas relief only if he can show his detention violates the United States Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which was codified in its current form by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), this Court may grant habeas relief to a petitioner whose claims were decided on the merits⁴ only if the state court's decision: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court precedent]" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court decision] and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). An "unreasonable application" of federal law is not merely an incorrect application, but "falls somewhere between `merely erroneous and unreasonable to all reasonable jurists.'" Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir.2000)). However, while "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required," such increment should not be so great that only state court decisions "so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence" are subject to habeas relief. Francis S., 221 F.3d at 111 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

B. EXHAUSTION

This Court can grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the petitioner first exhausts all available remedies.⁵ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). To fulfill this requirement, the petitioner must fairly present his federal claims in state court by "(a) [relying] on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) [relying] on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations, (c) [asserting] the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific [constitutional] right . . ., and (d) [alleging] a...