O'MALLEY v. Frazier
Decision Date | 12 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 86,620.,86,620. |
Citation | 49 P.3d 438,274 Kan. 84 |
Parties | PHILLIP O'MALLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellees, v. RONALD L. FRAZIER and KATHRYN A. FRAZIER, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Kevin F. Mitchelson, of Wheeler & Mitchelson, Chartered, of Pittsburg, argued the cause, and John H. Mitchelson, Darron C. Farha, and Jason P. Wiske, of the same firm were with him on the briefs for appellants/cross-appellees.
Mark S. Gunnison, of Payne & Jones, Chartered, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Robin E. Scully, II, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellees/cross-appellants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This appeal raises the question of whether a conditional payment can be made on a promissory note barred by the statue of limitations and revive the obligation to pay the principal amount but not the interest thereon.
When the makers delivered a partial payment on the principal of a time-barred promissory note, they indicated an intent to repay the balance of the principal only. The payee sued to collect the remaining principal and interest on the note. The makers defended by asserting the statute of limitations. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court revived the principal by applying the provisions of K.S.A. 60-520(a) but not the outstanding interest. The parties cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals held that under K.S.A. 60-520(a), the makers' part payment revived the entire promissory note, both principal and interest. O'Malley v. Frazier, 29 Kan. App.2d 947, 34 P.3d 478 (2001). We granted the makers' petition for review.
Although both parties suggest there were controverted facts, any disputed facts, however resolved, would not affect the judgment and do not present a genuine issue of material fact. See Bergstrom v. Noah, 266 Kan. 847, 872, 974 P.2d 531 (1999). The trial court found the following facts to be undisputed, which we set forth along with the proceedings and rulings in the trial court and the Court of Appeals prior to our consideration of this appeal.
On May 24, 1984, Kathryn and Ronald Frazier entered into a promissory note with Phillip O'Malley in the amount of $27,000 at 14% interest, due in full in 90 days. The Fraziers did not repay the note according to its terms; however, they did make interest payments from time to time until September 9, 1987.
Ronald Frazier had conversations with O'Malley in which he always expressed his intent to repay, when he could, the $27,000 principal amount of the debt. Frazier never indicated an intent to pay any interest. O'Malley admitted in a deposition that Ronald Frazier always said: "I'm going to pay you the principal, but I can't pay you the interest."
On January 24, 2000, almost 13 years after their last payment, Ronald Frazier delivered a $5,000 check to O'Malley. The check was written and signed by Kathryn Frazier. When Ronald Frazier delivered the check, he stated to O'Malley that he would try to raise the money and try to pay the balance of the principal at some time in the future.
A few months later, Ronald Frazier offered to pay O'Malley the remaining $22,000 in exchange for a release acknowledging no further obligation on the debt. O'Malley refused and initiated this action. It is undisputed that by the time the Fraziers paid the $5,000 to O'Malley, the applicable limitation period for any action upon any agreement, contract, or promise in writing had expired. K.S.A. 60-511. It is also undisputed that O'Malley sued the Fraziers within 5 years of the $5,000 payment.
Our appeal centers on the interpretation of K.S.A. 60-520(a), which states:
The trial court concluded that the Fraziers' part payment on the promissory note was an acknowledgment of a present existing obligation to pay the principal of the note, but they had consistently denied any intention or obligation to pay interest. The court granted summary judgment to O'Malley as to the remaining principal of $22,000, but granted summary judgment to the Fraziers in ruling that no interest prior to the date of the judgment was owing. O'Malley appealed and the Fraziers' cross-appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed that portion of the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the Fraziers and held their part payment revived both the principal and interest on the promissory note. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
Our review of the interpretation of K.S.A. 60-520(a) is plenary. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 263 Kan. 875, 879, 953 P.2d 1027 (1998).
In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998).
The language of K.S.A. 60-520(a) concerning lifting the limitations bar after a part payment provides little guidance as to the legislative intent to be applied in this situation. The statute states that when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same. Clearly this is an alternative form of acknowledgment of the debt, but the statute does not indicate whether the payor can qualify or limit the effect of the part payment with the resulting revival of some portion of the debt and not another. We do not have the means of ascertaining legislative intent when this language has remained virtually unchanged since becoming territory law in 1858. See Terr. L. 1858, ch. 11 § 24; G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 24; G.S. 1949, 60-312; and L. 1963, ch. 303, 60-520.
In the long history of judicial interpretation of this language, we have not located a set of facts precisely on point where a debtor acknowledged the obligation to pay only the principal of a debt when making a part payment. However, there is a common thread of general rules that run throughout the cases. Typical of the type of language used by this court are the prouncements in Elmore v. Fanning, 85 Kan. 501, 504, 117 Pac. 1019 (1911), where it was held that when a comaker delivers a payment to the payee of his comaker's money and as agent for his comaker, it does not extend the statute of limitations as to himself. The Elmore opinion stated:
85 Kan. at 504.
The requirement that the acknowledgment must be without doubt or misunderstanding is repeated in another historical authority in this state, Dassler's Kansas Civil Code, Annot. ch. 4, § 120 (2d ed. 1931), which states:
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