Mallory v. City of Riverside

• Decision Date: 25 November 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:13-cv-220
• Parties: MARISOL MALLORY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RIVERSIDE, OHIO, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

MARISOL MALLORY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RIVERSIDE, OHIO, et al. Defendants.

Case No. 3:13-cv-220

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

November 25, 2013

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

DECISION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 15). Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. No. 16) and Defendants have filed a Reply Memorandum in Support (Doc. No. 17).

The parties unanimously consented to plenary magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in their Rule 26(f) Report (Doc. No. 12) and Judge Rice has referred the case on that basis (Doc. No. 13).

Applicable General Standard

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept all well-pleaded material allegations of the complaint as true. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget,510 F.3d 577, 581 (6^th Cir. 2007); Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6^th Cir. 2001); Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n., 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6^th Cir. 1991), citing Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 51 (1941). The Court must then decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6^th Cir. 1993). This is the same standard applied in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6^th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. J. H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6^th Cir. 2001).

The test for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) has recently been re-stated by the Supreme Court:

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004)("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)(" Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely").

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007).

[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, "'this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" 5 Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233-234 (quoting Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D. Hawaii 1953) ); see also Dura [Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005)], at 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577; Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 289F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D.Ill.2003) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) ("[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase").

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (overruling Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), and specifically disapproving of the proposition from Conley that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief"); see also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545 (6^th Cir. 2007). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Supreme Court made it clear that Twombly applies in all areas of federal law and not just in the antitrust context in which it was announced.

"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)(on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.")

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." [Twombly], at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (brackets omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d at 157-158. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not "show[n]" -- "that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6^th Cir. 2008), citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens. v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6^th Cir. 2007)(stating allegations in a complaint "must do more than create speculative or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief"); see further Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6^th Cir. 2009), Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig.), 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6^th Cir. 2009),New Albany Tractor v. Louisville Tractor, 650 F.3d 1046 (6^th Cir. 2011) (holding a plaintiff is not entitled to discovery to obtain the necessary plausible facts to plead.)

Under Iqbal, a civil complaint will only survive a motion to dismiss if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. ... Exactly how implausible is "implausible" remains to be seen, as such a malleable standard will have to be worked out in practice." Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629-630 (6^th Cir. 2009).

A decision on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion is a decision on the sufficiency of the pleadings, and not on whether a plaintiff could plead a sufficient claim. If a complaint is founded wanting on a Rule 12(c) motion, the burden is on the plaintiff to offer an amendment correcting the deficiencies, if she or he can do so consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. When a district court denies a motion to amend after granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c), the Sixth Circuit will review both the complaint and the proposed amended complaint for purposes of construing the facts. LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097 (6^th Cir. 1995). If a party does not file a motion to amend, it is not an abuse of discretion to dismiss with prejudice. CNH Am. LLC v. UAW, 645 F.3d 785, 795 (6^th Cir. 2011).

Analysis

The Complaint in this case purports to state six separate claims for relief. It names as Defendants the City of Riverside, Ohio; Riverside Police Chief Mark Reiss; and Riverside PoliceOfficers Harold Jones and Matthew Jackson. Reiss, Jones, and Jackson are sued in both their individual and official capacities.

The First Claim is labeled as a claim for conspiracy between Jones and Jackson to violate Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, and Fifteenth Amendment rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Second Claim asserts these two Defendants violated the same rights, but makes no conspiracy allegation. The Third Claim for Relief returns to the conspiracy charge, this...