Mallory v. Ohio

• Decision Date: 13 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-4425,97-4425
• Citation: 173 F.3d 377
• Parties: William MALLORY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The State of OHIO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 377

173 F.3d 377

William MALLORY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The State of OHIO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-4425.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 10, 1999.

Decided April 13, 1999.

Peter J. Randolph (briefed), Cincinnati, OH, Thomas I. Atkins (briefed), Brooklyn, NY, James L. Hardiman (argued and briefed), Hardiman, Buchanan, Howland & Trivers, Michele R. Comer (briefed), Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs-Appellants William Mallory, Hazel L. Bland, Charles W. Cross, Robert Dogan, Donald H. Ells, Jessie Gooding, Jeffrey D. Johnson, Casey C. Jones, C Prentiss, Deborah Stokes-Abraham and Vernon Sykes.

Thomas I. Atkins, Brooklyn, NY, James L. Hardiman, Hardiman, Buchanan, Howland & Trivers, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellant Gladys M. Walcott.

Norton Victor Goodman (argued and briefed), Orla E. Collier, III (briefed), Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, Columbus, OH, for Defendants-Appellees State of Ohio and George V. Voinovich.

Mark D. Tucker (briefed), Norton Victor Goodman, Orla E. Collier, III, John F. Stock (briefed), Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, Columbus, OH, for Defendant-Appellee Robert Taft.

Before: SILER, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

William Mallory and eleven other plaintiffs, representing a class comprised of the voting-age population of African-Americans entitled to vote in judicial elections in eight of Ohio's largest counties ("the class"), sued the state of Ohio for alleged violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The class alleged that Ohio's "at-large" election system for judges impermissibly dilutes the voting strength of African-Americans. These claims were tried before the district court in February of 1997. The district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it rejected each of the class's claims, holding that the class had failed to prove that African-Americans were denied the equal opportunity to elect judges of their choice. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

In a carefully written, solidly reasoned, and extremely comprehensive opinion, the Honorable George C. Smith has set forth the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that we hereby adopt as our own. See 38 F.Supp.2d 525 (S.D.Ohio 1997). We write further simply to summarize the salient issues and address several points raised on appeal by the class.

In order to understand the class's contentions, we must first review the basic allegations contained in its complaint. This case challenges the "at-large" election of state appellate and trial court judges in eight of Ohio's most populous counties. In its complaint, the class alleged that this system, by which all voters within a specified jurisdiction vote for all of the positions, as opposed to voting in districts, impermissibly dilutes the voting strength of African-Americans. With a few minor exceptions, candidates for judicial office in Ohio also run for "numbered posts," i.e., they are candidates for specific judicial seats.

Under Article IV, § 6(A) of the Ohio Constitution, the electoral districts of all state courts are "linked" to the territorial jurisdictions of the courts. For example, the judges of the courts of appeal are elected by voters in their respective districts, and municipal court judges are elected by voters in their municipality. There are also a number of constitutional and statutory qualifications to run for judicial office, chief among them being admission to the Ohio State Bar and residence within the jurisdiction of the court to which election is sought.

In April of 1995, the 12 named plaintiffs filed suit against the state of Ohio, claiming violations of the Voting Rights Act, the United States Constitution, and the Ohio Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified a class comprised of the voting-age population of African-Americans entitled to vote in each of the challenged judicial districts. It subsequently granted the state's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claims, holding that the class had failed to raise a material issue of fact with respect to whether the state had purposefully discriminated against it. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the state on the Voting Rights Act claims for 2 of the 20 challenged judicial districts. It held that the state was entitled to summary judgment as to these two districts because the class had failed to demonstrate, as the Voting Rights Act requires, that African-Americans could constitute a geographically compact majority in a hypothetical single-member district for the Sixth District Court of Appeals and the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County. The class does not appeal any of the issues decided on summary judgment.

The remaining claims were tried before the district court in February of 1997. Although it found that race is sometimes a factor in Ohio judicial races, the district court concluded that it is a relatively minor one, especially when compared to factors such as political affiliation and incumbency. The district court went on to apply the three "Gingles preconditions," a set of three necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a plaintiff to succeed in a Voting Rights Act claim. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). These three preconditions are geographical compactness, political cohesion, and evidence of majority bloc voting.

The district court held that the class had established the first precondition, geographical compactness, with regard to 4 of the 18 judicial districts remaining before the court. For the other 14 districts, however, the district court found that although there was a sufficient number of African-Americans to constitute a majority in a hypothetical district, those African-Americans were not geographically compact.

The district court further concluded that the class had failed to satisfy the second and third Gingles preconditions with respect to each challenged judicial district. First, the district court held that the class had failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that African-Americans are "politically cohesive" in the challenged districts. Instead of presenting statistical evidence that examined the outcomes of the elections in question, the class relied on the uncorroborated opinions of various African-American voters. The district court, on the other hand, credited the testimony of the state's expert, who, after exhaustively examining the relevant statistics, was of the opinion that African-Americans in the challenged judicial districts were not politically cohesive.

Second, the district court held that the class had failed to prove the existence of "legally significant racial bloc voting," such that Caucasian voters vote sufficiently as a bloc to consistently defeat the candidates preferred by African-Americans. The district court again credited the state's expert, who testified that the candidate preferred by most African-American voters was often supported by large numbers of Caucasian voters.

Even if the Gingles preconditions had been satisfied, the district court found that the class had failed to meet its ultimate burden of persuasion in a Voting Rights Act case. This burden required the class to show that, under the totality of the circumstances, African-American voters in the challenged districts have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. Finally, the district court held that even if the class had satisfied all of its burdens, the court was without the power to impose a remedy because all potential remedies would impermissibly alter the structure of Ohio's judicial system. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

In considering the class's arguments on appeal, we review de novo the district court's interpretation of the relevant law, but review its factual findings under the "clearly-erroneous" standard. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Whether an electoral system has diluted the voting power of a minority group is a factual question. Because determinations of vote dilution are "peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case," the Supreme Court has stated that "the clearly-erroneous test ... is the appropriate standard for appellate review...." Id.

B. The Gingles preconditions

This action was brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which provides as follows:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis...