Malo v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 May 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-491-A,80-491-A |
| Citation | 459 A.2d 954 |
| Parties | Louis A. MALO v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This matter is before the court pursuant to G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-25 and Rule 72(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that upon the filing of an agreed statement of facts by the parties to any civil action pending in a District Court or Superior Court, that court may certify the action to the Supreme Court upon the filing of a motion by one of the parties and a hearing thereon. The issue presented by this action is as follows:
"Is plaintiff, who has received personal injuries while a passenger in an unowned uninsured motor vehicle, entitled to uninsured motorist coverage from defendant under an automobile liability policy issued to plaintiff's mother with whom he resided at the time of the accident when, at the same time, he owned an uninsured motor vehicle?"
The parties' agreed statement of facts reveals the following. On May 15, 1978, plaintiff, Louis A. Malo, sustained personal injuries as a result of an accident involving a motor vehicle owned and operated by Harold Lowry in which plaintiff was a passenger. At the time of the accident Mr. Lowry did not have any automobile-liability insurance. However, on May 15, 1978, Catherine Malo, plaintiff's mother, was the named insured under a motor-vehicle liability-insurance policy issued by defendant, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. Under the provisions of the uninsured-motorist coverage of this policy, the term "insured" includes the named insured and any relative. The applicable definitions portion of the policy defines "relative" as "a person related to the named Insured by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of the same household, provided neither such relative nor his spouse owns a private passenger automobile." On May 15, 1978, plaintiff resided with his parents and owned an uninsured private-passenger automobile.
The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to uninsured-motorist coverage under his mother's policy because a reading of the relevant provisions of the policy and the terms of a plain-English Agreement reveals an ambiguity in regard to what persons are eligible for such coverage. Rhode Island law mandates that when an ambiguity exists in an insurance contract, the terms should be interpreted so as to favor the insured. He asserts that the exclusion of a relative who owns an automobile was intended to apply only to the situation in which a resident relative is injured while driving his own uninsured motor vehicle and not to a case such as plaintiff's in which the resident relative's uninsured automobile is not involved in the accident. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that should this court find the terms of the policy unambiguous, the exclusion as it affects plaintiff is against the public policy enunciated in G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 27-7-2.1, the uninsured-motorist-coverage statute.
In interpreting the contested terms of the insurance policy, we are bound by the rules established for the construction of contracts generally. Colagiovanni v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 57 R.I. 486, 190 A. 459 (1937). The language used in the policy must be given its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Bush v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., R.I., 448 A.2d 782 (1982); Hughes v. American Universal Insurance Co., R.I., 423 A.2d 1171 (1980); Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 373 A.2d 810 (1977). When the terms are found to be clear and unambiguous, the task of judicial construction is at an end. The contract terms must then be applied as written and the parties are bound by them. Bush v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., R.I., 448 A.2d 782 (1982); Hughes v. American Universal Insurance Co., R.I., 423 A.2d 1171 (1980); Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of America v. Cooper, 106 R.I. 632, 262 A.2d 370 (1970).
After examining the language of Mrs. Malo's insurance policy, we conclude that the definition of the term "relative" under the uninsured-motorist-coverage provisions is clear and unambiguous. 1 The plain, ordinary meaning of the language is that a relative residing with the named insured is eligible for uninsured-motorist coverage under...
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